Showing posts with label DoD. Show all posts
Showing posts with label DoD. Show all posts

Thursday, August 7, 2008

Fighting Terrorism in Trans Sahara Africa

Crossposted from our new home blog,They gave us a republic...

In 2004, the US Government realized that it needed to do something about the spread of terrorism in Trans-Saharan Africa:

U.S. Gen. Charles Wald, deputy commander of the European Central Command, has been warning Congress and the Pentagon for months that al Qaeda-affiliated groups are active in Mauritania, Mali, Chad and Niger. The trade in diamonds used by terrorist groups, begun under the protection of former Liberian strongman Charles Taylor, continues despite international efforts to curb it. "The terrorist activity in this area is not going to go away," Wald warned recently. "This could affect your kids and your grandchildren in a huge way. If we don't do something about it, we are going to have a real problem on our hands."


Unfortunately, the efforts since then have mostly failed, due to a lack of cooperation between the State Department and the Department of Defense.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently released a report that shows that the US State Department, the Department of Defense, and the USAID Agency are having key issues with regards to stopping the spread of terrorism throughout Trans-Sahara Africa. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)was set up to coordinate efforts to stop the spread of terrorism into the region.

First, the agencies lack a comprehensive, integrated strategy for their TSCTP activities, and the documents used in planning the activities do not prioritize proposed activities or identify milestones needed to measure progress or make improvements.

Second, disagreements about whether State should have authority over DOD personnel temporarily assigned to conduct TSCTP activities in partner countries have led to DOD's suspending some activities, for example, in Niger.

Third, fluctuation in State's and USAID's distribution of funds for TSCTP resulted in suspension of a peace-building program in Mali.

Fourth, although the agencies measure activities' outputs, such as the number of foreign military personnel trained, they do not measure their activities' outcomes in combating terrorism--for instance, any decrease in extremism in the targeted countries.


This region is familiar to anyone who understands that the spread of Islamic fundamentalism throughout the Trans-Sahara region is of great concern to our European allies.



Simply implementing programs and activities that would help these countries better fight the spread of terrorism has run into the usual challenges--State and DoD can't collaborate on anything, and this goes back to the way Don Rumsfeld operated, which, in most cases, was often in contradiction to the efforts of the State Department:

Several factors have hampered the key agencies’ ability to collaboratively implement TSCTP activities, in some cases limiting their ability to achieve or assess progress in combating terrorism and inhibiting the spread of extremist ideology.

First, no comprehensive, integrated strategy has been developed to guide the agencies’ activities, and documents used in planning program activities have not included some elements that we have identified as needed in an interagency counterterrorism program’s strategic plan.

Second, despite some collaboration at the headquarters level, disagreement between State and DOD about whether State should have authority over DOD personnel temporarily assigned to conduct TSCTP activities in the partner countries has contributed to the suspension of some of these activities.

Third, fluctuation in the distribution of obligations for TSCTP in Mali resulted in the suspension of some program activities.

Fourth, although the agencies have indicators to measure activities’ direct results, the agencies have not yet developed the capability to measure and report on overall progress toward program goals.


Take a close look at this distribution of funds:



These are relatively small amounts of assistance and aid, but of note should be the assistance given to Mauritania, which just underwent another coup that saw the President and the Prime Minister arrested. Instability in countries like Mauritania are one reason why terrorists might locate there and take advantage of the political situation.

Most of our assistance is going to Niger, in hopes of slowing the spread of terrorism there. Overall, though, it doesn't matter who gets what because the GAO has uncovered a decidedly common lack of focus on the part of the US State Department:

To enhance U.S. agencies’ ability to collaborate in strengthening country and regional counterterrorism capabilities and inhibiting the spread of extremist ideology in northwest Africa, we recommend that the Secretary of State work through the Director of Foreign Assistance, who serves concurrently as USAID Administrator, to develop a comprehensive strategy for the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership in conjunction with the Secretaries of Defense and the Treasury, the U.S. Attorney General, and the heads of any other partner agencies. The strategy should include clear goals, objectives, and milestones, including output and outcome indicators, and identify resources needed to achieve the program’s goals.

We also recommend that the Secretaries of State and Defense develop and issue joint guidance with regard to DOD personnel temporarily assigned to conduct TSCTP activities in the partner countries.


No one could reasonably expect Secretary Rice to be fired before the end of the Bush Administration, but this is one more issue that will land in the lap of the next Secretary of State, thanks to the neglect and the lack of interest in fighting the actual spread of terrorism in the world. The US military now has a command dedicated to Africa--AFRICOM--but will it focus on stopping terrorism or on keeping the flow of oil moving out of Nigeria?

Remember to update your blogrolls and bookmarks with our new domain name, They gave us a republic...

Monday, July 28, 2008

Parsons Fails in Iraq, But Keeps Lucrative Government Contracts?

One of the things you can do when a company fails to fulfill their obligations in Iraq--and screws the US taxpayer--is to look at just how many other possible government contracts they still have in other areas. Why should a defense contractor get away with not building a prison in Iraq but still keep contracts to provide workers for the US government in the United States?

I'm sure there are all kinds of high-minded reasons why I'm totally wrong, but here goes: Parsons of California screwed the taxpayers big time in Iraq:
The U.S. government paid a California contractor $142 million to build prisons, fire stations and police facilities in Iraq that it never built or finished, according to audits by a watchdog office.

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) said Parsons of Pasadena, Calif., received the money, part of a total of $333 million but only completed about one-third of the projects, which also included courthouses and border control stations. The inspector general's office is expected to release two detailed audits today, evaluating Parsons's work on the contract, which is worth up to $900 million.

"Far less was accomplished under this contract than originally planned," the inspector general wrote. "Millions of dollars in waste are likely associated with incomplete, terminated and abandoned projects under this contract." Auditors did not give a dollar figure of how much had potentially been wasted, but they said Parsons got about 10 percent -- or $11.3 million -- of the $108 million of award fees it could have received.

Parsons said in a written statement yesterday that it had "some serious reservations about the conclusions" in the audits, saying the company was hindered by the violent and unstable security situation in Iraq. One of Parsons's subcontractors was shot and killed at close range while in his office, the company said.

Therein lies the real problem--Parsons is merely stealing your money because it can. And while it is stealing your money, it's getting an award for doing a great job as it lies about the progress it is making so that it can claim awards it does not deserve.

And while all of that is going on, your government basically takes the coal shovel, and shovels the money at them while no one is watching over the contracts:
The office, which is charged with finding waste, fraud and abuse in U.S. spending, said a contract of Parsons's size should have had 50 to 60 contracting officers and specialists working on it, but it only had 10.

Parsons won its lucrative deal in 2004 to do security and justice work in Iraq, as part of a dozen other big reconstruction deals. Of 53 construction projects in the Parsons contract, only 18 were completed.

Auditors gave Parsons a scathing report on one of its biggest projects -- a multimillion-dollar prison in Diyala that was to house 1,800 inmates and help alleviate overcrowded facilities -- calling it a failure and wasteful. The U.S. government fired Parsons from the prison contract two years ago, saying it was late and over budget. It paid Parsons $31 million, and then paid other contractors $9 million to keep working on the project.

If Parsons was fired from that contract two years ago, take a look at this story from last year--another project to help restore the oil exporting infrastructure in Iraq details how Halliburton and Parsons have failed to meet deadlines:
Heavily armed soldiers spend their days at the oil terminals scanning the horizon looking for suicide bombers and stray fishing dhows (boats). Meanwhile, right under their noses, smugglers are suspected to be diverting an estimated billions of dollars worth of crude onto tankers because the oil metering system that is supposed monitor how much crude flows into and out of ABOT and KAAOT has not worked since the March 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.

Officials blame the four-year delay in repairing the relatively simple system on "security problems." Others point to the failed efforts of the two U.S. companies hired to repair the southern oil fields, fix the two terminals, and the meters: Halliburton of Houston, Texas, and Parsons of Pasadena, California.

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) is scheduled to publish a report this spring [Spring, 2007] that is expected criticize the companies' failure to complete the work.

You'd think the gravy train was over for Parsons. You'd think they wouldn't have the gall to keep trying to get more government contracts and fill contractor positions at various US government sites. You'd think there would be great concern as to granting Parsons any more work. But, no worries! If you want to work on a government contract for Parsons, there's no shortage of existing government contract work waiting for you. Parsons has scores of current listings, all throughout the continental United States and throughout the world, looking for people to fill positions on key government contracts.

I believe there should be some sort of law or some sort of regulation that ties what a company does in Iraq to what they do in the United States or in other regions. If a company blows it in Iraq and fails to meet its obligations there, then that company should have its other contracting work for the government held, called into question, or audited for similar cost overruns or practices. Some companies may claim that what their international division does is separate from what their domestic division does--I think that's a sham in order to stovepipe things and keep the money flowing to one part of their business while they use another part of their business to rip off the taxpayers.

And, as if this needs to be added, Parsons should not be awarded any more government contracts until it rectifies the problems with the existing or previous contracts.

Friday, July 25, 2008

Did the Pentagon Help Smear Obama Yesterday?

The smear against Obama--that he cancelled a visit to Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany to visit wounded troops--was perpetrated with the help of outlets like the Drudge Report overnight. But, curiously, the headline has now vanished from the front page of the site. Could it be because there was Pentagon interference in the cancellation?
Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama scrubbed a planned visit to see wounded American servicemen and women in Germany after Pentagon objections that the stop at Landstuhl Regional Medical Center could be seen as a political event, according to Obama's campaign.

Although the Illinois senator visited troops in Afghanistan and Iraq on the first part of his overseas trip, those stops were part of an official Congressional delegation, and therefore deemed apolitical. The European tour, which included a speech in Berlin last night before an enthusiastic crowd of 200,000, is funded by the campaign and as such is not official government business.

"Senator Obama had hoped to and had every intention of visiting our troops to express his appreciation and gratitude for their service to our country," retired Air Force Major General Scott Gration, an Obama adviser, said in a statement.

"We learned from the Pentagon [Wednesday] night that the visit would be viewed instead as a campaign event. Senator Obama did not want to have a trip to see our wounded warriors perceived as a campaign event...and decided instead not to go."

This is the price you pay for being too successful--did the Pentagon bow to pressure from the Republican Party and throw a spanner in the works so that the stories of his visit with wounded troops wouldn't bookmark his visit to Germany? The flyers for the Berlin event had the visit printed on them but the Obama campaign said the flyers were incorrect because the decision to cancel had been a last minute decision. The McCain campaign quickly denounced the move, almost seeming to have a ready-made smear in hand:
The spokesman, Robert Gibbs, said Thursday that Obama made his decision out of respect for the servicemen and women, but Sen. John McCain's presidential campaign immediately criticized the move.

"Barack Obama is wrong. It is never inappropriate to visit our men and women in the military," said Brian Rogers, a spokesman for the Republican contender.

Pretty clever for an off-the-cuff remark, since the cancellation happened at the last minute. And, no, the press wasn't going with Obama, Hagel and Reed to the medical facility--that had already been decided.

What isn't clear is whether or not we can expect the Pentagon to continue working alongside the McCain campaign.

UPDATE: Brandon Friedman at Vote Vets has more.

--WS

Saturday, July 19, 2008

Maliki Feels the Pushback

Someone probably blistered Maliki good--via video conference call or perhaps in person. Someone had to have felt the rage of John McCain today. Somewhere, Bob Gates is smiling, and, somewhere, the cracks in the rotten edifice of this administration showed a little more clearly than before. They cannot control Maliki, but they can threaten him and get him to backtrack after he humiliates them.

Shortly after embracing Barack Obama's plan to get US combat troops out of Iraq, Maliki sent a flunky out to "clarify" things--no doubt after hearing and earful.
But a spokesman for al-Maliki said his remarks "were misunderstood, mistranslated and not conveyed accurately."

Government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh said the possibility of troop withdrawal was based on the continuance of security improvements, echoing statements that the White House made Friday after a meeting between al-Maliki and U.S. President Bush.

In the magazine interview, Al-Maliki said his remarks did not indicate that he was endorsing Obama over presumptive Republican presidential nominee Sen. John McCain.

"Who they choose as their president is the Americans' business. But it's the business of Iraqis to say what they want. And that's where the people and the government are in general agreement: The tenure of the coalition troops in Iraq should be limited," he said.

"Those who operate on the premise of short time periods in Iraq today are being more realistic," al-Maliki said.

The interview's publication came one day after the White House said President Bush and al-Maliki had agreed to include a "general time horizon" in talks about reducing American combat forces and transferring Iraqi security control across the country.

Am I the only person who believes we're going to have do this all over again? In ten or twelve years, are we going to have to send five combat divisions to Kuwait in order to take down the dastardly Maliki regime? Am I the only person who can see that Defense Secretary Bob Gates is getting everything he wants when he wants it every single day? The man is not losing--he's gaining. He wants US troops out of Iraq because his DoD can't sustain it. He wants Gitmo closed. He wants the State Department to start acting like a State Department. He wants the Congress to stay out of his way, and they do.

When was the last time Gates was blistered before Congress, by the way? Remember when Rumsfeld would sit there with a shit-eating grin and give them the "stuff happens" look?

UPDATE: I don't buy that this was a clarification. Why does the "clarification" and the retelling of what Maliki said always seem to be in favor of the Bush Administration when what he originally said was in opposition to it? That suggests pushback to me--as in, "here's what I meant to say" after someone has complained about my original statement. Especially if the "clarification" comes from CENTCOM.

--WS

Wednesday, July 16, 2008

Gates Makes His Case to Stay on at Defense

While we're not huge fans of some of his earlier work, we bear a grudging respect for what Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has been doing--and saying--as of late. It's too bad the Republicans went out and found a Secretary of Defense who, essentially, rips the guts out of every argument John McCain and his surrogates have been making this year.
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates warned yesterday against the risk of a "creeping militarization" of U.S. foreign policy, saying the State Department should lead U.S. engagement with other countries, with the military playing a supporting role.

"We cannot kill or capture our way to victory" in the long-term campaign against terrorism, Gates said, arguing that military action should be subordinate to political and economic efforts to undermine extremism.

I can't wait for the outcry--Secretary Gates has basically undercut the rationale for staying in Iraq, effectively debunking the myth that if we don't fight them over there, we'll end up having to fight them over here. He has put the onus on Secretary Rice, who has never been up to the task. Her State Department is a shambles, with hundreds of key positions unfilled for months and years.

Every time McCain talks about attacking Iran, staying in Iraq, or using war as the instrument of our foreign policy--he should be hammered with this quote from Gates. McCain's manly boast about "I know how to win wars" should have been met with laughter and derision. Instead, the Man Crush continues.

We don't need another Richard Cohen type situation--Gates should not be kept by a possible Obama administration, if only because we need to develop Democrats who can effectively lead on defense issues.

[h/t to Juan Cole]

--WS

Tuesday, July 15, 2008

We Must End the Iraq War, Plain and Simple

Of course Obama is going to take heat for being realistic and flexible--that's a given. What isn't new about his position is that he offers the only realistic chance to actually draw our combat troops out of Iraq because he is not politically tied to the war in the way that John McCain is.
Barack Obama is taking heat for hinting that he might refine his 16-month timetable for withdrawing U.S. troops from Iraq. But a forthcoming Pentagon-sponsored report will recommend an even steeper drawdown in less time, NEWSWEEK has learned. If adopted, the 300-page report by a defense analysis group at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., could transform the debate about Iraq in the presidential election.

Expected to be completed in about a month, it will recommend that U.S. forces be reduced to as few as 50,000 by the spring of 2009, down from about 150,000 now. The strategy is based on a major handoff to the increasingly successful Iraqi Army, with platoon-size U.S. detachments backing the Iraqis from small outposts, with air support. The large U.S. forward operating bases that house the bulk of U.S. troops would be mostly abandoned, and the role of Special Forces would increase.

The report's conclusions have been discussed inside Secretary Robert Gates's Defense Policy Board, a body of outside experts. And they've found favor with some former members of the Iraq Study Group, such as former White House chief of staff Leon Panetta. "That's basically the approach we thought made sense—embedding some of our forces at smaller outposts, transferring major combat to the Iraqis," says Panetta.

Now, General Petraeus is saying he knew nothing about this study, and that's reasonable to conclude--he isn't exactly sitting around waiting for studies to pour in. What General Petraeus needs to do is align himself with the idea that the war in Iraq is not an endless hole in which to stuff troops that we don't have. If he wants to continue his career, he has to break with the Bush Administration and join the reality-based club. Obama at least realizes that this is about numbers, not a wish list for neocons. We don't have the numbers to sustain 140,000 troops in Iraq--not unless we empty Afghanistan, Europe, and Japan and walk away from those commitments. The Republican Party has broken the US military, and that should be the number one issue this fall, closely followed by the issues of tearing up the Constitution, abandoning Veterans, and ruining the economy.

The US Army needs to be rebuilt from the ground up. A radical reorganization and retraining needs to take place--emphasizing lessons learned and mistakes acknowledged. We have a unique situation with our military. We have hundreds of thousands of combat Veterans who can form the cadre and the backbone of a transformed Army that can defend American interests, if we can keep them. If we don't emphasize their medical care and their quality of life, these men and women are going to bolt the service and the institutional lessons of the Iraq War will leave with them.

I am not in the school of thought that says we must place strong emphasis on Counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics. All we are doing when we do that is hand the civilian leadership the justification to go out and find us the next insurgency to fight somewhere in the world. Build an Army that does only COIN, and that's the fight that the civilians will pick with someone. Better to have light units that can do COIN and their current missions; better to emphasize to all troops that COIN is something they might have to do one day and allow those hundreds of thousands of Veterans to train accordingly for it, but not exclusively for it. Nation building does not work. If a President Obama decides to go out and engage in nation building, I will be extremely disappointed.

None of this can happen under a President McCain. There will be no drawdown or resting of our exhausted forces under him--only a slow, grinding hell that allows him political cover until the next opportunity for glory reveals itself.

--WS

Friday, July 11, 2008

David Martin Catches the Army in a Startling Admission

Every once in a while, the working media at the network level gets something right. CBS News Correspondent David Martin nails one of the generals at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in a major, major gaffe.
In the wake of the Walter Reed scandal, 35 so-called "Warrior Transition Units" were set up at bases around the world. They were supposed to be places where soldiers could be cared for until they either returned to duty or were discharged.

But the general in charge of the program admits it hasn't been working the way it was supposed to. Here's why.

"How many soldiers in these units were actually wounded in combat?" Martin asked.

"About 12 percent were wounded in either Iraq or Afghanistan," Brig. Gen. Gary Cheek said.

"Only 12 percent?" Martin said.

"Only 12 percent," Cheek said.

If you include those whose injuries could be called combat-related - a stressed-out soldier in a car accident after returning from Iraq, for instance - the percentage goes up to 48 percent.

The rest have injuries or illnesses which have nothing to do with combat. As a result, the number of soldiers in Warrior Transition Units exploded from 6,000 to 12,000 - even as casualties in Iraq were going down.

"We were putting soldiers into the Warrior Transition Unit that really didn't need that complex, managed care," Cheek said.

"So did somebody say, 'Hey, this isn't how it was supposed to work?'" Martin asked.

"I would say yes," Cheek said.

I would say, "fix that problem immediately, and if no one gives you the resources to do it, tell someone BEFORE another reporter finds another massive problem at a major installation and exposes the shocking gaps in medical care that our soldiers are finding when they are injured, sick or wounded.

For every instance where a soldier is injured in combat, or injured in a combat zone, there are still the same basic needs for health care that existed before the Iraq War. Those needs are, by the admission of General Cheek, not being met because the programs designed for wounded warriors are swamped by the needs of soldiers should have already had the resources in place to care for them. The necessary expansion and increase in active duty health care hasn't met the needs. I want to stress something--the Veterans Administration is already overwhelmed. And so is the care given to active duty troops and troops activated for combat duty. The strain must be incredible--so where are the doctors, nurses and health care professionals to meet that demand? Why hasn't the military gone out and either activated them or recruited them or trained them?

We are nearly seven years past the attacks of September 11 and the invasion of Afghanistan; we are over five years past the war in Iraq. And no one thought this was going to be a problem?
With the number of soldiers in transition units increasing by about 600 a month, the Army can't hire health care workers fast enough.

"By the time we got the ratio up to where it needed to be, we were probably 30-to-60 days behind what the population had already grown to," Cheek said.

Last week the Army tightened the medical conditions that qualify a solider for a Warrior Transition Unit. And a new order requires all units to be fully staffed by Monday, but some aren't going to make it.

So when they say "tightened" they mean--they've kicked out the ones who needed care because they weren't already getting the care they needed and they're trying to hold open spots for the soldiers who aren't wounded yet.

It's time to clean house and get the personnel that are needed. If this is the state of medical care in the military, then the current leadership at the general officer level needs to go--and be replaced by a more creative and driven group of men and women who are in those middle grades and who want to step up and start solving these problems.

What a disgrace. Is there anyone in the support element of the United States Army who can figure out that we're actually in a war right now? We have a Combat Arms part of the Army that can definitely fight, and fight like no other Army in history and we have a support infrastructure that can't get them medical care, can't get them the gear they need and is struggling to adapt to the wars we're fighting now.

Thursday, July 10, 2008

The Weapons Will ALWAYS Improve in War

Better, faster, deadlier and more lethal--that's the trend in war. As we increase our ability to protect our soldiers, the weapons that our enemies use to try to kill them also increases. The trick is to anticipate changes in tactics and weapons and always give our troops what they need. A sluggish Pentagon that has a broken procurement system and a bloated bureaucracy can't do that--but who the hell expected the enemy to strap propane tanks to rockets?
Suspected Shiite militiamen have begun using powerful rocket-propelled bombs to attack U.S. military outposts in recent months, broadening the array of weapons used against American troops.

U.S. military officials call the devices Improvised Rocket Assisted Munitions, or IRAMs. They are propane tanks packed with hundreds of pounds of explosives and powered by 107mm rockets. They are often fired by remote control from the backs of trucks, sometimes in close succession. Rocket-propelled bombs have killed at least 21 people, including at least three U.S. soldiers, this year.

The latest reported rocket-propelled bomb attack occurred Tuesday at Joint Security Station Ur, a base in northeastern Baghdad shared by U.S. and Iraqi soldiers. One U.S. soldier and an interpreter were wounded in the attack.

U.S. military officials say IRAM attacks, unlike roadside bombings and conventional mortar or rocket attacks, have the potential to kill scores of soldiers at once. IRAMs are fired at close range, unlike most rockets, and create much larger explosions. Most such attacks have occurred in the capital, Baghdad.

First of all, saying that they have "begun" to use these weapons is a misnomer--just by doing some quick research, I've found people talking about these incidents as far back as October, 2007.

Rockets fired at COP Cashe; 1 rocket seized (1)
A robot controlled by Soldiers from the 789th Ordnance Company, from Fort Benning, Ga., currently attached to the 3rd Heavy Brigade Combat Team, investigates an Iranian 107mm rocket at a launch site Oct. 23 [2007]. Five rockets were fired at Combat Outpost Cashe from the site, but no soldiers were injured. Only one rocket managed to land inside the outpost perimeter. Date: 10/30/07


You can see that a weapon like that is relatively easy to transport, aim and fire at our troops and that it could easily be smuggled in a car. Add some propane tanks, and you're in business.

The question I always as, is this really a brand new phenomenon?
A June report on the Web site Long War Journal called the explosives-filled propane tanks "flying IEDs."

Militia members and insurgents have at times increased the sophistication of their weapons, but the rocket-propelled bombs are makeshift devices that also have been used in recent years by insurgents in Colombia. Propane tanks are ubiquitous in Iraq, where the fuel is widely used for cooking, making it hard for security forces to stop production of the bombs.

We always seem to be repeating our mistakes--here's a photo from the Vietnam War of a US soldier holding the remains of a 107mm rocket:



And much about what we learned about IEDs in the Vietnam War could have been applied to what we face today in Iraq. The difference is a technological one, not a philosophical one. Granted, adding propane tanks seems to be all the rage in Iraq since that's what the general population uses. I just hate to see us repeating our mistakes and failing to anticipate what's around the corner.

Wednesday, June 25, 2008

Another Corrupt Army Officer Pleads Guilty

Are we ever going to get to the bottom of what went on in the early days of the Iraq war? How could our government funnel billions of dollars in cash into the country and not provide any basic oversight or control on what happened to the money?

An Army officer and his wife have pleaded guilty in a money laundering scheme involving contracts in Iraq, the U.S. Justice Department said Tuesday.

Maj. John Cockerham, 43, pleaded guilty to one count each of bribery, conspiracy to commit bribery and money laundering, the Justice Department said. His wife, Melissa, 41, pleaded guilty to a count of money laundering.

The pleas were taken on Jan. 31, but weren't unsealed until Tuesday, the Justice Department said.

John Cockerham admitted taking or being promised more than $9 million in bribes for awarding contracts while stationed in Kuwait, the Justice Department said. He was responsible for awarding contracts worth millions of dollars including those for bottled water.

Once he agreed to take the bribes, Cockerham told contractors to pay his wife, sister and others to hide the activity, the Justice Department said.


What's even worse is that, reportedly, two suicides in Kuwait can be linked to the investigation that caught Cockerham:

Although a Justice Department official said it was too early to know if the suspects in the corruption investigation operated independently or in a network, public records indicate that several served overlapping tours. At least two officers who worked at Camp Arifjan when Major Cockerham was there committed suicide after learning they would face bribery charges. One, Maj. Gloria D. Davis of Missouri, shot herself in December 2006, a day after admitting she took at least $225,000 in bribes, government officials said.



Here's how it all worked--allowing Cockerham to rake in hundreds of thousands of dollars:

The camp, a $200 million logistics hub, stands like an island in the middle of the desert south of Kuwait City. Major Cockerham worked in a prefabricated two-story building with about 20 other military people and civilians, committing millions of dollars on the phone or with a few strokes on his computer in his cubicle.

Military officials said a major assigned to award such large contracts for the Army Contracting Agency should have at least 10 years of experience in “broad acquisition,” a minimum of four years of direct contracting experience and annual ethics training. But the procurement workload from the Iraq war grew so big so fast that the Pentagon was forced to rush people with virtually no training or experience into some of its most complicated contracting jobs, Army officials said.

“From what I understand, John didn’t get the courses he should have had for his assignment until his assignment was over,” said Mr. Parks, Major Cockerham’s lawyer.

Oversight was virtually nonexistent by design. There were no auditors at Camp Arifjan, and contracts worth more than $500,000 were the only ones requiring review in Washington. Most contracts were written for about $100,000. It was also common for contracting officers to use “blanket purchase agreements,” allowing them to open a line of credit with a company with little more than a promissory note, much like a customer at a small-town grocery store.

Ideally, Army officials said, the purchasing cycle would be divided among at least three contracting officers. One would take an order for supplies from a unit commander and seek bids from companies to fill the order. Another would award the contract, and a third would oversee delivery of the goods. That system, officials said, would allow each contracting officer to serve as a check on the others.

At Camp Arifjan, a single contracting officer handled all three parts of the process, giving the officers broad discretion and creating opportunities for unit commanders to join conspiracies by inflating their troops’ needs. What resulted, said Mr. Young, the Army Contracting Agency director, was “a web of deceit.”


The only thing that is shocking is that he got caught. Cockerham apparently kept ledgers of what he did in his home--a pretty clear indication that he knew what he was doing was wrong, he wanted to keep detailed records of what he was doing, and at the end of the day, proof positive that a person can be too smart for their own good.

Memo to all you wannabe criminal masterminds out there--don't keep a ledger of all of the the illegal things you do in your home.

Tuesday, June 24, 2008

Here's Why We Need a Truman Committee

I hate to write about something that's going to upset people so early in the morning, but how can anyone stomach the incompetence and the greed and the corruption of the political appointees of the Bush Administration?

A House investigative committee has learned that the American ambassador to Albania knew evidence of Chinese origins was being removed last year from an ammunition shipment before a U.S. contractor sent the material to Afghanistan, said Rep. Henry A. Waxman (D-Calif.), chairman of the panel.

This month, Maj. Larry Harrison, a Pentagon official at the U.S. Embassy in Albania, told staff members of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee that Ambassador John L. Withers II held a late-night meeting with Albania's defense minister. After the Nov. 19 meeting, the order was given to Albanian officers "to remove all evidence of Chinese packaging" from the ammunition, Waxman said in a letter sent yesterday to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

In a June 9 appearance, Harrison told the committee that "the ambassador agreed that this would alleviate the suspicion of wrongdoing," Waxman wrote. Harrison also said "that he did not agree with the decision to remove the Chinese markings," Waxman said.

A federal grand jury on Friday indicted Efraim E. Diveroli, president of AEY Inc., the U.S. company involved, on 71 counts, including conspiracy to defraud the government on a $298 million U.S. Army contract to provide various types of ammunition to the government of Afghanistan.


Where do you start with something like that?

I hope Major Harrison's career doesn't come to an end because of this incident. Rarely does the person who speaks up and blows the whistle on the Bush Administration and their political appointees emerge unscathed from the act of thwarting their political goals and their rampant greed. Someone will likely take action against Harrison's career, and that's why we are seeing a military that is hollowed out, staffed with yes-men, and overrun by the God-boys who invite crazies to come to the Pentagon and give them briefings.

No matter how you look at this story, what emerges is a troubling incident of corruption and greed:

On March 27, The New York Times published an article that said Albanian documents showed that the Miami company had bought more than 100 million Chinese cartridges that were stored for decades in former cold war stockpiles.

Mr. Diveroli arranged to have them repacked in cardboard boxes, many of which split or decomposed after shipment to the war zones, according to the article. Different lots or types of ammunition were mixed. In some cases the ammunition was dirty, corroded or covered with a film.

The repackaging operation, carried out by an AEY subcontractor at the Rinas Airport in Tirana, has become the focus of the Congressional investigation.

According to the transcript excerpts released by the committee, Major Harrison told investigators that he did not agree with the decision to hide the boxes from the reporter, and said that he felt “very uncomfortable” during the meeting.

Major Harrison, who as the chief of the embassy’s office of defense cooperation was responsible for helping American efforts to train, equip and modernize Albania’s military, said that his suggestion to bar the reporter from visiting the Albania base was rejected.

In a letter to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the committee’s chairman, Representative Henry A. Waxman, Democrat of California, said Monday that there were signs that embassy officials in Tirana tried to cover up the November meeting once Mr. Waxman’s staff began an investigation into the arms company. The letter said the committee would seek to interview Mr. Withers and other embassy personnel.


This is the kind of thing that sets off warning bells. When Major Harrison realized what sort of ground he was standing on, he immediately took steps to protect himself--perhaps he already was savvy to how the Bush Administration treats people who get between them and their money:

After his hour-long interview, Harrison "expressed an interest in seeking advice of counsel" and a Pentagon attorney terminated the session, Waxman wrote. Three days later, Harrison's lawyer told the committee he needed at least two weeks to prepare for continuing the interview.

Waxman charged in his letter that "it appears" embassy officials kept from the committee information related to the ambassador's meeting in Albania. Harrison told the panel that he had "urged embassy officials to inform the committee," Waxman wrote, but embassy officials did not mention it in response to a prior request for information.


All this, so a few corrupt officials in Albania could dump Cold War-era ammunition into the hands of some Club-hopping trash from Florida, who could then make millions re-packaging it and sending it to the Middle East.

Perhaps the death penalty for war profiteers isn't harsh enough.

Thursday, June 19, 2008

American Died in Chinese Custody

This is a quick diary that I posted at Vote Vets, and it speaks to an issue which many people raised all kinds of hell about in the 1980s and early 1990s--and nowadays you don't hear about it all that much.

The Korean War was the forgotten war in more ways than one.

Another damned good reason not to trust the people in power to do what's right. And why the hell didn't the DoD say or do anythign in 2003 when they first received this notification from the Chinese?

After decades of denials, the Chinese have acknowledged burying an American prisoner of war in China, telling the U.S. that a teenage soldier captured in the Korean War died a week after he "became mentally ill," according to documents provided to The Associated Press.

China had long insisted that all POW questions were answered at the conclusion of the war in 1953 and that no Americans were moved to Chinese territory from North Korea. The little-known case of Army Sgt. Richard G. Desautels opens another chapter in this story and raises the possibility that new details concerning the fate of other POWs may eventually surface.

Chinese authorities gave Pentagon officials intriguing new details about Desautels in a March 2003 meeting in Beijing, saying they had found "a complete record of 9-10 pages" in classified archives.

Until now, this new information had been kept quiet; a Pentagon spokesman said it was intended only for Desautels family members. The details were provided to Desautels' brother, Rolland, who passed them to a POW-MIA advocacy group, the National Alliance of Families...


How many more? Will we ever know? And who in their right mind would trust our government to tell us the truth after this incident?

-WS

Saturday, June 14, 2008

"We requested comments from DOD, but none were provided"

The Government Accountability Office makes some nifty charts:

From fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2007, and for the first quarter of fiscal year 2008 through December 2007, Congress has provided DOD with a total of about $635.9 billion for its efforts in support of GWOT. DOD has reported obligations of about $562 billion for military operations in support of the war from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2007 and for the second quarter of fiscal year 2008 through March 2008. The $73.9 billion difference between DOD's GWOT appropriations and reported obligations can generally be attributed to certain fiscal year 2008 appropriations and multiyear funding for procurement; military construction; and research, development, test, and evaluation from previous GWOT-related appropriations that have yet to be obligated and obligations for classified and other activities, which are not reported in DOD's cost-of-war reports. As part of our ongoing work, we are reviewing DOD's rationale for reporting its GWOT related obligations. Of DOD's total cumulative reported obligations for GWOT through March 2008 (about $562 billion), about $435.1 billion is for operations in and around Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and about $98.9 billion is for operations in Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, the Philippines, and elsewhere as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. The remaining about $28 billion is for operations in defense of the homeland as part of Operation Noble Eagle. In fiscal year 2008, through March 2008, DOD's total reported obligations of about $69.8 billion are about half of the total amount of obligations it reported for all of fiscal year 2007. Reported obligations for Operation Iraqi Freedom continue to account for the largest portion of total reported GWOT obligations by operation--about $57 billion. In contrast, reported obligations associated with Operation Enduring Freedom total about $12.7 billion, and reported obligations associated with Operation Noble Eagle total about $89.3 million.



DOD’s Cumulative Reported GWOT Obligations and Cumulative GWOT Appropriations for Fiscal Years 2001 through 2007 and through the Second Quarter of Fiscal Year 2008 (October through March 2008):



DOD’s Reported GWOT Obligations for Fiscal Years 2001 through 2007 by Operation:





And, as usual:

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We requested comments from DOD, but none were provided.


Anyway, that's where the money is going--into the stratosphere.

Monday, May 26, 2008

Open Source Intelligence Collection

Newsweek becomes the unwitting accomplice to an idea being floated by the Defense establishment that, hopefully, will be shut down quickly and quietly:

Congressional experts fear that Defense intelligence agencies are not making wide enough—and smart enough—use of the vast pool of "open source" information now available in cyberspace. The House Armed Services Committee, in a report approved last week on the House floor, worried that clumsy attempts by Pentagon agents to download useful intelligence from the Web could compromise U.S. spy operations by putting potential enemies on notice that U.S. intelligence is interested in them.

Last week the Federation of American Scientists made public a U.S. Army field manual, stamped FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY, outlining procedures for open-source intelligence collection by Army units. The manual says Army agents "must use Government computers to access the Internet" unless they have special authorization to do otherwise. One U.S. official, who asked for anonymity when discussing sensitive information, said that, in an effort to track people behind Web sites giving detailed instructions on how to build sophisticated IEDs, counterterrorism experts two years ago asked Pentagon brass for permission to log on to the Web sites using fake identities. The official said the plan was abandoned when lawyers and policymakers insisted that the counterterrorism officials log on using computers with telltale ".gov" or ".mil" domains—a ruling that would have tipped off potential bad guys.

A Capitol Hill official who also asked for anonymity said that congressional overseers were concerned that using U.S. IP addresses to search the Net could "complicate [the] ability to go deep into Web sites to extract information." One way for the Pentagon to get around such restrictions would be to hire private contractors, but this raises questions about protecting the rights of Americans. A Pentagon spokesman told NEWSWEEK: "We've seen an increased appreciation within the Department of Defense regarding the value of open-source intelligence."


That's not what they want "masked" or hidden IP addresses for. But it was a good try.

Foreign intelligence services are already savvy to the fact that the US government conducts open source research. It's in many ways an open and free process that allows governments to put certain technologies on the table and to allow certain pieces of information to be made available, freely and without confusion.

For example, the Serbian government really does want the United States to know exactly where the Chinese embassy really is located in Belgrade. They really want the US military to be able to locate, find, and map exactly where it is. They don't want any confusion about that.

What the defense establishment wants is an excuse to hand hundreds of people free, unfettered access to any and all Internet sites so that they can harass, intimidate, and collect information from blogs, web sites, message forums and the like. This is because the DoD has had to shut down CIFA. Every time a major web site discovers that a government employee is "looking" at their content, it sends a collective shiver down the spines of free speech and civil liberties advocates. Since the DoD can no longer rely on CIFA, it makes sense to create a framework that would allow analysts to have anonymous access to the Internet in order to mirror or mimic what CIFA was (allegedly) doing.

This also gets around having to get FISA warrants or comply with USSID 18, of course. Because if a military intelligence analyst is collecting information anonymously, why would anyone have to worry about FISA in the first place? Who would know?

The defense establishment is simply tired of being caught doing this, so they are pushing to get the extra technology and funding to make their efforts more anonymous.

Apparently, they just want to be free to "stick it to the moonbats."

--WS

Wednesday, May 21, 2008

Michael Gerson's Mancrush on Robert Gates

Some people just can't hide their mancrushes, can they? We've seen the media's mancrush for Senator John McCain, and now we see evidence that Defense Secretary Robert Gates has a huge fan in Washington Post columnist Michael Gerson.

Gerson tries to rewrite the history of the Walter Reed scandal into a mash note to Gates:

When he was told that some in the Army were dismissive of press reports on the mistreatment of patients at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, according to one witness, grew "very, very quiet." Within two weeks, the Walter Reed commander was out of a job.

This kind of decisive silence has been employed by Gates to good effect in scandals ranging from misdirected nuclear parts to the cremation of fallen American soldiers and pets at the same facility.

To those who know this Eagle Scout with 28 years of experience in government, his subdued efficiency is not surprising. To those of us who haven't had the pleasure, his transformational ambitions and strategic boldness are surprising indeed.


Decisive? It took him almost two weeks to get rid of an incompetent General? In the middle of a war, the Secretary of Defense has to wait that long to make a basic decision on who is in charge of one of the major facilities that treats and cares for wounded soldiers? We're not talking about who's in charge of the motor pool on Fort Sill. We're talking about a facility that is just across town from the Pentagon. And his solution was to simply move that same General to another command?

The commander of Walter Reed Army Medical Center was fired yesterday after the Army said it had lost trust and confidence in his leadership in the wake of a scandal over outpatient treatment of wounded troops at the Northwest Washington hospital complex.

Army Maj. Gen. George W. Weightman, who assumed command of Walter Reed in August, will be temporarily replaced by Lt. Gen. Kevin C. Kiley. But the appointment of Kiley, who had earlier been the facility's commander, surprised some Defense Department officials because soldiers, their families and veterans' advocates have complained that he had long been aware of problems at Walter Reed and did nothing to improve its outpatient care.

The action came 10 days after a Washington Post series exposed the squalid living conditions for some outpatient soldiers at Walter Reed and bureaucratic problems that prevented many from getting the care they need.

"The care and welfare of our wounded men and women in uniform demand the highest standard of excellence and commitment that we can muster as a government," Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said in a statement. "When this standard is not met, I will insist on swift and direct corrective action and, where appropriate, accountability up the chain of command."

A senior Defense Department official said Gates had demanded quick action to show that the Pentagon was serious about improvements at Walter Reed. But the official said that Gates was not involved in the appointment of Kiley.


That's not decisive. That's incomprehensible. Weightman went from commanding Walter Reed, a small Army post northwest of Washington DC to commanding Fort Detrick, a much larger Army post...northwest of Washington DC. And, when you think about it, how much sense did it make to take Walter Reed away from Weightman and give him command of Fort Detrick?

The mission of the U.S. Army Garrison and Fort Detrick is to Command, operate and administer the use of resources to provide installation support to on-post Department of Defense and non-Department of Defense tenant organizations; and to furnish automated data processing, financial management and logistical support as directed to selected Headquarters, Department of the Army staff and field operating agencies.

Major tenants located on Fort Detrick are the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command, 21st Signal Brigade, and the U.S. Army Medical Materiel Agency.

Fort Detrick serves four Cabinet-Level agencies, which include: The Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Department of Agriculture and Department of Human Services. Fort Detrick's DoD support also includes elements of the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Air Force and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Beyond that, Fort Detrick supports several Unified and Major Army Commands: Unified U.S. Army Forces Command, U.S. Army Space Command, U.S. Army Information Systems Command, and U.S. Army Health Services Command.

Fort Detrick today is a U.S. Army Medical Command installation supporting a multi-agency community. Approximately 5,800 military, federal, and contractor personnel are assigned there. They conduct biomedical research and development, medical materiel management, and defense communications. Each of the military services is represented. The Commanding General, U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command (USAMRMC), is the installation commander.

[SNIP]

As the Department of Defense's lead laboratory for medical biological defense, the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases conducts basic research leading to the development of vaccines, drugs, diagnostics, and information to protect U.S. service members from biological warfare threats. The institute is a world-renowned reference laboratory for definitive identification of biological threat agents and diagnosis of the diseases they produce.



And, like any good corporate leader, the guy brought in to clean up the mess created by the demonstrably incompetent guy who was kicked upstairs to run a biological warfare program turns out to have been exactly the wrong guy.

Oh, and one more thing--that "decisive" decision by Gates? How'd that work out?

Lt. Gen. Kevin Kiley has lost his job as Army surgeon general, another casualty of the care scandal at Walter Reed Medical Center.

Acting Army Secretary Pete Geren asked for Kiley's resignation, and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates approved the action, a senior Pentagon official said.

In its official announcement, the Army said Kiley had requested retirement.

Kiley had been made temporary head of Walter Reed, the Army's top hospital, after Army Maj. Gen. George W. Weightman was ousted in the wake of a series in The Washington Post that found soldiers living in deplorable conditions.

However, he was quickly replaced by Gen. Eric Schoomaker amid criticism that Kiley, who was head of Walter Reed from 2000 to 2004, had been aware of the problems at the facility.


That's decisive leadership? Ten days after the problems were exposed, Gates fired Weightman and either did or didn't have anything to do with the decision that installed Kiley. Ten days after that, Gates fired Kiley. Weightman got a promotion, if you consider being sent from Walter Reed to Fort Detrick a promotion.

Does Michael Gerson have an editor? An editor who actually reads the Washington Post? Did it escape Gerson and his editor's attention that the Washington Post actually won a Pulitzer Prize for its coverage of the Walter Reed scandal?

Apparently, it did.

Sunday, May 11, 2008

Pentagon Begins Assessing Impact of Rising Food Prices

In light of growing unrest around the world over rising food prices, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is asking for a closer look at the crisis and its security implications, a U.S. military official said Monday.
Adm. Michael Mullen has instructed his staff to investigate the matter so his office can be prepared in the event the crisis becomes a defense issue, the source said.

It's the first time the highest levels of the U.S. military have become involved in the issue.

The crisis first gained international attention when riots broke out several weeks ago in Haiti and Egypt over the high cost of food.

The U.S. military official emphasized that there is "no military planning" and no intention of getting U.S. troops involved in the crisis.

The source acknowledged there is little the U.S. military can do, but said, "This is an area that has certainly got our attention now."

Even as they look into the matter, Mullen's staffers are not expected to come up with any formal recommendations to the chairman.

The rising cost of bread in Egypt has led to government crackdowns
Police clashed with protesters in the Nile Delta city of Mahalla on Sunday, firing tear gas and arresting dozens after angry residents demanding an end to price hikes and soaring inflation set two schools ablaze and burnt tyres along the city's railway.

Egypt is the world's biggest consumer of bread, with each Egyptian eating 400 grams of bread a day. That compares with France - the land of the baguette - where the figure is only 130g per day.

The shortages have forced bakers and consumers on to the black market. According to the state-owned daily Al-Ahram, 12,000 people have been detained in raids across the country in recent days and they are all to face justice over selling flour on the black market.

A 100 kilogram sack of subsidised flour is worth about $3.14. The same sack costs $377 on the black market.

The government is desperately scrambling to contain the crisis.

On Friday the authorities announced plans to suspend rice exports for six months from April and the commerce ministry said cement exports will also be frozen over the same period in an attempt to combat price rises.

The Pentagon views what is happening in Egypt as a crisis:
Egypt could be one area of concern for the Pentagon because unrest there has continued sporadically over food prices, two senior U.S. military officials have said.

Cairo is a major ally of Washington in the global war on terror, and the United States does not want the unrest there to grow, possibly risking the regime of President Hosni Mubarak.

Other countries throughout the developing world have been hit hard by the rise of food prices:
There also have been riots over high food costs in Haiti, sparking concern about another wave of illegal immigration to the United States.

The rising costs and chaotic riots have prompted several countries to stop exporting wheat and rice, and the U.N. World Food Program has cut food rations to millions of displaced people in Sudan's Darfur region because so many food convoys have been hijacked.

In other areas of the Middle East, bread is a symbolic basic staple of life, and as prices rise, resentment of wasteful government spending begins to grow:
In Yemen, where food riots broke out in recent months, the answer to nearly every question we asked about food elicited emotions ranging from fear of malnutrition to anger over the exorbitant rise in prices.

The cost of one round of traditional flat bread, roughly two slices of bread in the United States, has risen sharply, from about 10 Yemeni rials (about 2.5 cents) to 20 rials in the local bakeries. This may not sound like much to an American who’s used to paying $3.50 or more for a loaf of bread, but it is to a Yemeni – and to many others in the developing world for whom food expenditures can represent 60 to 80 percent of a family’s spending.

Few of the Yemenis we met, if any, understand why food prices have risen so sharply. Even Americans awash in information are as confused and confounded as Yemenis. More than one person made a connection between higher food prices and the ongoing construction of what they call the “President’s Mosque” – a mosque named after the country’s leader and reported to cost $65 million. (They had no proof, which, of course, seems an unnecessary part of any discussion about supposed government excess.)

In Yemen, when the price of bread rises, so does anger and resentment of the government. Elsewhere, because of government subsidies, the price of bread is stable, contributing to different kinds of headaches.

In Iran, inflation is now up to an annual rate of 18 percent; earlier this month, that cost the economic minister his job. The bakers get government flour and are allowed to charge only a certain low rate for the bread they sell.

[SNIP]

The menu that people hit by this immediate crisis are using is fairly simple: flour and rice, even as these staples double or quadruple in price; cakes in Haiti made largely of mud, choked down in a desperate attempt to fill one’s belly; bread baked by the military in Egypt. But from our travels, it seems that the menu items that helped create the current crisis are more complex, processed and partially hydrogenated than these modest items.

Food corporations have learned how to enter the developing world. Few of the families we met could afford a week’s worth of a processed food item at one time, so the global food companies make their wares more affordable by offering them in single-serving packets. In Manila, individual portions of “foods” such as imitation-cheese spreads, chips and spiced rice dishes are much like the convenience packs sold in the United States. Highly processed foods are making inroads into the diets of the developing world, and with that comes dependence.

In fact, there are many organizations throughout the world who are expressing concern about the rise in food prices:
UN staff in Jordan also went on strike for a day this week to demand a pay rise in the face of a 50% hike in prices, while Asian countries such as Cambodia, China, Vietnam, India and Pakistan have curbed rice exports to ensure supplies for their own residents.

Officials in the Philippines have warned that people hoarding rice could face economic sabotage charges. A moratorium is being considered on converting agricultural land for housing or golf courses, while fast-food outlets are being pressed to offer half-portions of rice.

The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation says rice production should rise by 12m tonnes, or 1.8%, this year, which would help ease the pressure. It expects "sizable" increases in all the major Asian rice producing countries, especially Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Burma, the Philippines and Thailand.

Holmes is the latest senior figure to warn the world is facing a worsening food crisis. Josette Sheeran, director of the UN World Food Programme, said last month: "We are seeing a new face of hunger. We are seeing more urban hunger than ever before. We are seeing food on the shelves but people being unable to afford it."

The programme has launched an appeal to boost its aid budget from $2.9bn to $3.4bn (£1.5bn to £1.7bn) to meet higher prices, which officials say are jeopardising the programme's ability to continue feeding 73 million people worldwide.

Robert Zoellick, president of the World Bank, said "many more people will suffer and starve" unless the US, Europe, Japan and other rich countries provide funds. He said prices of all staple food had risen 80% in three years, and that 33 countries faced unrest because of the price rises.

In the UK, Professor John Beddington, the new chief scientific adviser to the government, used his first speech last month to warn the effects of the food crisis would bite more quickly than climate change. He said the agriculture industry needed to double its food production, using less water than today.

He said the prospect of food shortages over the next 20 years was so acute it had to be tackled immediately: "Climate change is a real issue and is rightly being dealt with by major global investment. However, I am concerned there is another major issue along a similar time-scale - that of food and energy security."

The possibility that the Pentagon might need to deploy US troops to prop up various "friendly" regimes throughout the world hinges on whether such a move would be feasible. The strain on US troops because of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have left the Pentagon less likely to resort to full scale invasions.

Any plan to invade a country or countries due to instability would likely resemble the plans revealed by General Wesley Clark:
GEN. WESLEY CLARK: I knew why, because I had been through the Pentagon right after 9/11. About ten days after 9/11, I went through the Pentagon and I saw Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz. I went downstairs just to say hello to some of the people on the Joint Staff who used to work for me, and one of the generals called me in. He said, "Sir, you've got to come in and talk to me a second." I said, "Well, you're too busy." He said, "No, no." He says, "We've made the decision we're going to war with Iraq." This was on or about the 20th of September. I said, "We're going to war with Iraq? Why?" He said, "I don't know." He said, "I guess they don't know what else to do." So I said, "Well, did they find some information connecting Saddam to al-Qaeda?" He said, "No, no." He says, "There's nothing new that way. They just made the decision to go to war with Iraq." He said, "I guess it's like we don't know what to do about terrorists, but we've got a good military and we can take down governments." And he said, "I guess if the only tool you have is a hammer, every problem has to look like a nail."

So I came back to see him a few weeks later, and by that time we were bombing in Afghanistan. I said, "Are we still going to war with Iraq?" And he said, "Oh, it's worse than that." He reached over on his desk. He picked up a piece of paper. And he said, "I just got this down from upstairs" -- meaning the Secretary of Defense's office -- "today." And he said, "This is a memo that describes how we're going to take out seven countries in five years, starting with Iraq, and then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and, finishing off, Iran." I said, "Is it classified?" He said, "Yes, sir." I said, "Well, don't show it to me." And I saw him a year or so ago, and I said, "You remember that?" He said, "Sir, I didn't show you that memo! I didn't show it to you!"

The Pentagon has long maintained plans to invade virtually any and all countries in the world:
It sounds like a joke but it's not. War Plan Red is real. It was drawn up and approved by the War Department in 1930, then updated in 1934 and 1935. It was declassified in 1974 and the word "SECRET" crossed out with a heavy pencil. Now it sits in a little gray box in the National Archives in College Park, available to anybody, even Canadian spies. They can photocopy it for 15 cents a page.

War Plan Red was actually designed for a war with England. In the late 1920s, American military strategists developed plans for a war with Japan (code name Orange), Germany (Black), Mexico (Green) and England (Red). The Americans imagined a conflict between the United States (Blue) and England over international trade: "The war aim of RED in a war with BLUE is conceived to be the definite elimination of BLUE as an important economic and commercial rival."

In the event of war, the American planners figured that England would use Canada (Crimson) -- then a quasi-pseudo-semi-independent British dominion -- as a launching pad for "a direct invasion of BLUE territory." That invasion might come overland, with British and Canadian troops attacking Buffalo, Detroit and Albany. Or it might come by sea, with amphibious landings on various American beaches -- including Rehoboth and Ocean City, both of which were identified by the planners as "excellent" sites for a Brit beachhead.

Friday, May 2, 2008

Of necessity, the Pentagon strikes "Question 21" from the Security Clearance questionaire

As the war in Afghanistan grinds on toward the seven-year mark, and the war in Iraq is almost two months into the sixth year, the effects on our military forces have been overwhelming. Last month the RAND corporation released a study that pulled the curtain back on the horrors of what our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines are being forced to deal with and should have served as a wake-up call for the homefront - and the Pentagon. It also compliments and confirms an Army study on mental health that was released by the Joint Chiefs earlier this month that pegged the number of soldiers suffering from PTSD after one deployment at 12%, after two deployments at 18.5% and after three deployments at 28%.

Many units have deployed multiple times, and as the studies showed, the members of those units are suffering horribly. The more times they deploy, the worse they suffer.

Until yesterday, many of those who are suffering the effects of repeated combat rotations suffered in silence...because of "Question 21."

Anyone wo has ever gone through the process of getting a security clearance knows what it is..."Have you consulted a mental health professional in the past seven years for issues other than martial problems or grief?" A "yes" required excruciating details of the reason treatment was sought, and the treatment method(s) employed. This usually raised other questions and led to closer scrutiny.
John E. Fortunato, chief of Fort Bliss' Restoration and Resilience Center, which treats soldiers returning from combat with post-traumatic stress disorder, called Thursday's announcement an important first step.

Fortunato, who has treated 37 soldiers since his center opened nearly a year ago, said commanders have taunted troops and told them to "soldier on" when they complained of combat stress.

Soldiers have "paid such a high price for PTSD," Fortunato said.

The cost of treating a soldier is far less than pushing him or her out of the Army, Fortunato added. He estimated it costs his center roughly $20,000 to treat someone with post-traumatic stress disorder, compared to the hundreds of thousands of dollars the military would have to spend to replace the discharged soldier.

"The measure (of mental health treatment) success is retention," he said.

During his visit, Gates said the military must lift the stigma on mental health care and encourage troops to see it as equal to physical care.

"The most important thing for us now is to get the word out as far as we can to every man and woman in uniform to let them know about this change, to let them know the efforts that are under way to remove the stigma and to encourage them to seek help when they are in the theater or when they return from the theater," Gates told reporters here as he announced the change.

"The department considers it a mark of strength and maturity to seek appropriate health care, whenever required," James Clapper, the undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, and David Chu, the undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, wrote in a letter announcing the change.

It is a welcome change that is long overdue, but truly - it's better late than never.



PALE RIDER ADDS...

It's a welcome step--but will they really strike the question and not hold that against someone when they are adjudicating a clearance renewal? Because that's what this essentially affects. A soldier who reclasses into an MOS or job specialty that requires a clearance after an initial tour shouldn't be penalized, and those who already had clearances shouldn't be penalized for getting PTSD counseling. So you need to strike that question for the FIRST application for a clearance and then for the 5 year periodic updates.

MORE IMPORTANTLY--they strike Question 21, but did you know--Questions 27, 28, and 29 are about ANY kind of "illegal drug use" and the number one item detailed is marijuana? Did you know that Question 30 asks about alcohol and whether or not use of alcohol led to any kind of counseling?

Seems to me, they can strike Question 21, confident they will catch anyone who has PTSD who "self-medicates" with marijuana or alcohol, and as we know from the data, sufferers of PTSD have to self-medicate with whatever they can find while they await treatment in a very slow system and while they go through a phase of getting their various life issues under some kind of control.

The medications that go with that treatment have always been of interest on the clearance paperwork as well--meaning, if you were prescribed valium or some other form of legitimate drug for treatment, you had to disclose that in detail as well. So I hope they end the scrutiny of counseling AND they end the scrutiny of asking what medications were used to treat the PTSD.

As it sits right now, forget about medical marijuana for an active duty soldier. If an active duty soldier legitimately needs it to calm down, the tests hot on a urinalysis, their career is essentially over if they've been in longer than 36 months. This reform is welcome, but the treatment of PTSD often conflicts with what they allow, culturally, in the military, and that's a nearly zero level of tolerance for anything relating to marijuana. If a person who has separated from service needs it, that is less complicated. And if someone is a reservist or guardsman, their testing regime might be less often than for the active duty, but they're in jeopardy of testing positive and facing UCMJ.

A mature and considered debate awaits--do we treat these men and women with medical marijuana or not? And if we do, then THAT should not endanger their clearances nor should it end their careers. So, it's all well and good to strike Question 21 if they then know they can turn around at get someone on the other questions, which ask about use at any time since the age of 16, use while holding a clearance, manufacturing and distribution, and whether use of alcohol led to ANY kind of counseling or treatment. Those questions would surely catch quite a few people who might have answered in the affirmative on Question 21.

Blue Girl adds -

Pale Rider raises a damned good issue. Medical marijuana would, in my (medical) opinion, be preferable to long-term use of any of the anti-anxiety drugs in the benzodiazapine family. They are highly addictive, and highly intoxicating. They also have a long half-life, which means that the drug builds up in the system, and tolerance from intoxication takes a long, long time to kick in. Frequently, by the time it does, an addiction has set in, and abuse soon follows. Benzos should only be used for short periods of time for this reason. But PTSD is not a short-term disorder. It takes a long time to treat.

Marijuana, too, has a long half life, but it stores in the fat cells and doesn't have an amplified intoxication effect.

And by the way, it's bullshit to say it can't be regulated and dosed, because it sure as hell can. By one of the oldest and most effective methods of extracting active ingredients from medicinal herbs...tincturing. Tinctures can be tested for efficacy by batch via chemical assay, and graded by a system something akin to proofing of alcohol. We don't have to distribute two-finger bags and rolling papers at sick call.

And we might need to have a serious discussion about what is best for those in need and forget what gets the authoritarians, hippie-haters and conservatards in a lather. Stop even paying attention to those whack-jobs. They have been wrong about everything and that is never going to change, it's a hallmark of the species. The sooner we get past trying to placate those implacable mouth-breathers and marginalize them to the degree they so richly deserve, the better off we'll be as a society.

Thursday, May 1, 2008

Mission NOT Accomplished

Remember how we left Afghanistan on the back burner to go after Iraq? Well, it looks like someone is either trying to kill this story by leaking it or float it as a trial balloon...

Pentagon officials are quietly considering a significant change in the war command in Afghanistan to extend U.S. control of forces into the country's volatile south.

Such a move, partly linked to an expectation of a fresh infusion of U.S. troops in the south next year, would in effect mark a partial "re-Americanization" of the combat mission in Afghanistan.

Taliban resistance has stiffened in the south since NATO took command there in mid-2006, and some in the Bush administration believe the fight against the Taliban could be strengthened if the U.S., whose span of control is now limited to eastern Afghanistan, were also in charge in part or all of the south.


Blaming our NATO allies for the resurgence of the Taliban isn't going to fully satisfy people who have been paying attention. Frankly, there is huge disagreement between NATO and the US over the use of airstrikes. The people who know Counterinsurgency within NATO understand that killing dozens of civilians with a JDAM makes their work harder, not easier. This rift has been around for a while, going back to this Reuters article from January, 2008:
Behind stepped-up commitments from the United States and Britain, stark differences are emerging between the two biggest powers operating in Afghanistan about how best to tackle the Taliban and al-Qaeda threat.

On the face of it, there's joint action: the United States is sending 3,200 more troops [the Marines who just arrived] and a British politician is to be named as the new, high-profile envoy to Afghanistan.

But analysts say the squabble is symptomatic of uncertainty over how to deal with Afghanistan, which is emerging as a more complex and nuanced battleground than Iraq, and a desire to show who is in the lead under the NATO umbrella.

The dispute has focused on Britain's proposal to use untrained neighbourhood defence teams -- known as 'arbakai' -- to help improve security in the volatile south were it operates.

In unusually frank and public criticism, U.S. officials and military commanders have said the idea will not work, could fuel fighting and that Britain doesn't understand counter-insurgency.

The dispute began after Prime Minister Gordon Brown made a speech to parliament last month saying he wanted to see a shift in strategy towards "hard-headed realism" that worked "with the grain of Afghan tradition".

"One way forward is to increase our support for community defence initiatives, where local volunteers are recruited to defend homes and families modelled on traditional Afghan arbakai," he said.

Immediately afterwards, Washington began speaking against the plan, even though similar tactics have been employed by U.S. forces to quell the Sunni-led insurgency in western Iraq.

General Dan McNeill, the commander of NATO's International Security and Assistance Force, told the Financial Times flatly that the idea would not work and could fuel insurgency.

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates took the criticism a step further on Wednesday, telling the Los Angeles Times that Britain and other forces operating in southern Afghanistan didn't seem to know how to combat a guerrilla insurgency.

"Most of the European forces, NATO forces, are not trained in counter-insurgency," Gates said.


What the hell is the difference between the "neighborhood defense teams" and "the Sunni Awakening councils?" It seems to me that we're being a little disingenuous--the British are simply using a very basic approach of getting the local population invested in their own security and defense, one that we've used in Iraq. And it takes a lot of balls to suggest that the British, who make up a large chunk of the NATO force in Afghanistan, don't know COIN. They're joined by elite troops from other European powers who have probably had as much, if not more training and instruction in these areas. This goes back to sneering at the Canadians--big mistake. They have a smaller but professionalized military that emphasizes competence and skill over 19th century drill tactics and overwhelming firepower.

The resurgence of the Taliban owes itself to the safe haven provided by Pakistan. Without that safe haven, it is highly unlikely that the Taliban could have come back so strong.

Change in the command structure in Afghanistan is being driven by political realities and won't happen soon:

The defense officials doubted a decision would be made before fall and possibly not until a new administration takes office in 2009. Two officials said there appears to be no high-level advocate for making such a change in the near term, although there is growing concern that while higher U.S. troop levels in Iraq have helped reduce violence there, the trends in Afghanistan are less positive.

There are now about 34,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan — the most at any time during the war, which began in October 2001. They include 3,400 Marines who arrived this month as reinforcements for combat missions in the south and to help train Afghan security forces. Those Marines are scheduled to leave in October, but if replacements are not offered by NATO allies soon the Pentagon likely will either extend the Marines' deployment or tap another unit to fill the void.


With who? Who do they think they're going to send? We're down to a few National Guard brigades that are stressed as it is.

Wednesday, April 30, 2008

Bean Counting Gone Horribly Wrong


Put this on your outrage pile...

Since 2004, the Pentagon has spent roughly $16 billion annually to maintain and modernize the military's business systems, but most are as unreliable as ever—even as the surge in defense spending is creating more room for error. The basic defense budget for 2007 was $439.3 billion, up 48 percent from 2001, excluding the vast additional sums appropriated for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to federal regulators and current and former Pentagon officials, the accounting process is so obsolete and error prone that it's virtually impossible to tell where much of this money ends up. While the department's brass has made a few patchwork improvements, billions are still unaccounted for. The problem is so deeply rooted that, 18 years after Congress required major federal agencies to be audited, the Pentagon still can't be.


There are some wars going on--you'd think we'd see some cooperation:

Preoccupied with protecting their turf, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines continue to maintain separate, increasingly outdated systems that can't talk to each other, trace disbursements, or detect overbilling by contractors. At the Indianapolis facility, as at the Defense Department's four other main U.S. centers for financial operations, accounting programs under the same roof can't share information without extensive jury-rigging, as though contracts, payments, and accounting had nothing to do with one another.

"In the Defense Department, what you have now are material weaknesses that are in every single area, in every part of the department, so deep and so wide you do not really have any way of figuring out where money is being spent," says Linda Bilmes, a federal budget expert at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government.


You have to read all the way up to page three to find this little nugget:

The Indianapolis center and other back offices are supposed to comply with a congressional mandate to track how much of each year's emergency appropriations are spent on the Bush administration's declared global war on terrorism. But a former senior official from the Indianapolis center, who requested anonymity, says that its outmoded systems can't be tweaked to produce such data. Instead, it's done offline by workers combing through computer data and pulling out what they think should be attributed to the war on terrorism. Their guesswork, the source says, is probably way off.

The dysfunction stems in part from the traditional independence of the military branches. Over several decades, they have cobbled together separate processes for identical functions, resulting in the uncontrolled growth of more than 4,000 accounting, financial, and inventory systems. Their names form an acronym soup: CAPS, Stanfins, IAPS, Somards, Samms, Mocas, HQARS, Stars. The department's primary system for handling weapons contracts and payments dates from 1958; a costly attempt to replace it was abandoned in 2002 as a failure. The Army's notoriously inaccurate main accounting system was created in 1966.


I would hasten to add that none of this is by accident. I happen to know there are certain DoD agencies that have sophisticated systems that are pretty complex. They're up to date, have vast capabilities, and use cutting edge technology. Whatever boondoggle exists in Indianapolis is largely an intentional design, combining the best efforts of thousands of planners to hide the money they're spending and keep Congress off of their turf.

The first task of the next Secretary of Defense is to designate the system that they're going to use, and give everyone two fiscal years to transition. And then every single computer, mainframe, desk lamp and lightswitch in Indianapolis gets shut off, permanently. Failure to do that means an instant 25% cut in funds for each year until the DoD is in compliance with Congress. Fix it, make everyone use it, and then shut that old system down forever.


When Petulant Children Try Go to War

...it looks like this:

A second American aircraft carrier steamed into the Persian Gulf on Tuesday as the Pentagon ordered military commanders to develop new options for attacking Iran. CBS News national security correspondent David Martin reports that the planning is being driven by what one officer called the "increasingly hostile role" Iran is playing in Iraq - smuggling weapons into Iraq for use against American troops.

"What the Iranians are doing is killing American servicemen and -women inside Iraq," said Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.


These accusations are not new. In fact, our government has been caught overstating them several times. But who exactly is doing the killing? The Badr brigade, trained by Iran, is now integrated into the Iraqi security forces. Does that mean that the government of the country we are trying to prop up is paying Iranian-backed troops to kill us? If so, then the right answer is to stop propping up a government that welcomes Iranian trained militias into their ranks.

U.S. officials are also concerned by Iranian harassment of U.S. ships in the Persian Gulf as well as Iran's still growing nuclear program. New pictures of Iran's uranium enrichment plant show the country's defense minister in the background, as if deliberately mocking a recent finding by U.S. intelligence that Iran had ceased work on a nuclear weapon.


What basis in reality is that? So what if the Iranian defense minister appears in a picture. Is that proof they have an arms program? Or the capability to see one through to fruition? If that is what constitutes proof, then expect our allies to undercut our efforts and mock us behind our backs.

No attacks are imminent and the last thing the Pentagon wants is another war, but Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen has warned Iran not to assume the U.S. military can't strike.

"I have reserve capability, in particular our Navy and our Air Force so it would be a mistake to think that we are out of combat capability," Mullen said.

Targets would include everything from the plants where weapons are made to the headquarters of the organization known as the Quds Force which directs operations in Iraq. Later this week Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is expected to confront the Iranians with evidence of their meddling and demand a halt.

If that doesn't produce results, the State Department has begun drafting an ultimatum that would tell the Iranians to knock it off - or else.


"Reserve capability?" What in God's name does that add up to? Do we have reserve capability in the Army? Of course we don't--and in any significant attack on Iran, it won't be the Navy and the Air Force that sees the battle up close--it'll be the Army that will have to put boots on the ground the ensure those facilities are destroyed and it'll be the Army in Iraq that has to withstand a wave of Shiite attacks by outraged groups.

And the summation of the childishness and the ridiculousness of this country's foreign policy is contained in the phrase "knock it off or else."

Can you believe that? Can you believe that we would tell another country such a thing? That our position would be a schoolyard taunt between bullies with no maturity?

We're updating the old adage--if you're not embarrassed by your government right now, you're definitely not paying attention.