A Czar for Afghanistan?

You've got to be kidding me.

From Atrios:

John McCain just said he'd appoint an Afghanistan czar who would report directly to the president. Isn't there anyone either in the military or in a civilian position who, you know, sorta has that job already without having to be named a "Czar."

The answer is yes--and his name is General David Petraeus, CENTCOM Commander.

Do you think the Media--in all of their Mancrush Glory--will deign to point out that Senator John McCain just threw General Petraeus under the bus, backed up over him, drove over him again, and then left him there in the dust? If McCain thinks Afghanistan has gotten to the point where he needs to name a "czar," then he needs to promise to find a CENTCOM Commander who can replace Petraeus.

Unbelieveable.

--WS

We Must End the Iraq War, Plain and Simple

Of course Obama is going to take heat for being realistic and flexible--that's a given. What isn't new about his position is that he offers the only realistic chance to actually draw our combat troops out of Iraq because he is not politically tied to the war in the way that John McCain is.

Barack Obama is taking heat for hinting that he might refine his 16-month timetable for withdrawing U.S. troops from Iraq. But a forthcoming Pentagon-sponsored report will recommend an even steeper drawdown in less time, NEWSWEEK has learned. If adopted, the 300-page report by a defense analysis group at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., could transform the debate about Iraq in the presidential election.

Expected to be completed in about a month, it will recommend that U.S. forces be reduced to as few as 50,000 by the spring of 2009, down from about 150,000 now. The strategy is based on a major handoff to the increasingly successful Iraqi Army, with platoon-size U.S. detachments backing the Iraqis from small outposts, with air support. The large U.S. forward operating bases that house the bulk of U.S. troops would be mostly abandoned, and the role of Special Forces would increase.

The report's conclusions have been discussed inside Secretary Robert Gates's Defense Policy Board, a body of outside experts. And they've found favor with some former members of the Iraq Study Group, such as former White House chief of staff Leon Panetta. "That's basically the approach we thought made sense—embedding some of our forces at smaller outposts, transferring major combat to the Iraqis," says Panetta.

Now, General Petraeus is saying he knew nothing about this study, and that's reasonable to conclude--he isn't exactly sitting around waiting for studies to pour in. What General Petraeus needs to do is align himself with the idea that the war in Iraq is not an endless hole in which to stuff troops that we don't have. If he wants to continue his career, he has to break with the Bush Administration and join the reality-based club. Obama at least realizes that this is about numbers, not a wish list for neocons. We don't have the numbers to sustain 140,000 troops in Iraq--not unless we empty Afghanistan, Europe, and Japan and walk away from those commitments. The Republican Party has broken the US military, and that should be the number one issue this fall, closely followed by the issues of tearing up the Constitution, abandoning Veterans, and ruining the economy.

The US Army needs to be rebuilt from the ground up. A radical reorganization and retraining needs to take place--emphasizing lessons learned and mistakes acknowledged. We have a unique situation with our military. We have hundreds of thousands of combat Veterans who can form the cadre and the backbone of a transformed Army that can defend American interests, if we can keep them. If we don't emphasize their medical care and their quality of life, these men and women are going to bolt the service and the institutional lessons of the Iraq War will leave with them.

I am not in the school of thought that says we must place strong emphasis on Counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics. All we are doing when we do that is hand the civilian leadership the justification to go out and find us the next insurgency to fight somewhere in the world. Build an Army that does only COIN, and that's the fight that the civilians will pick with someone. Better to have light units that can do COIN and their current missions; better to emphasize to all troops that COIN is something they might have to do one day and allow those hundreds of thousands of Veterans to train accordingly for it, but not exclusively for it. Nation building does not work. If a President Obama decides to go out and engage in nation building, I will be extremely disappointed.

None of this can happen under a President McCain. There will be no drawdown or resting of our exhausted forces under him--only a slow, grinding hell that allows him political cover until the next opportunity for glory reveals itself.

--WS

Afghanistan Enters Another Summer

One of the few generals who can actually command combat troops in the field is General David McKiernan. The US Army actually has precious few of these men left--many left in disgust during the Rumsfeld era. McKiernan ran the show in Iraq in 2003--carrying out the plans handed to him. Of all the things that can be said about the Iraq War, there is no disputing the success of the US military's smashing of the Iraqi military in record time. It was a deep strike that left the follow on support troops vulnerable, but with what he had, McKiernan carried out his orders and succeeded where many would have failed. He was one of the generals who had to watch General David Petraeus pass him by--McKiernan went to be Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff for United States Army Forces Command while Petraeus went from being a Division Commander to CENTCOM Commander in a few short years.

McKiernan is an ROTC soldier, not a West Point man--a distinction that might not mean a great deal, but nevertheless. His rise through the ranks was not a foregone conclusion. He has recently been chosen to command all forces in Afghanistan:

The American general who led the ground invasion of Iraq took command of the 40-nation NATO-led campaign in Afghanistan on Tuesday.

Army Gen. David D. McKiernan took charge of the 51,000-member International Security Assistance Force from Gen. Dan McNeill, who will retire from the U.S. Army after 40 years.

Addressing a change of command ceremony Tuesday, McKiernan said he was "honored to walk alongside our Afghan brothers."

General McKiernan faces many new challenges--not the least of which is the fact that his new boss, General Petraeus, has, shall we say, an entirely different problem with Afghanistan:

If the problem in Iraq was introducing political suppleness, the problem in Afghanistan is the opposite: It is reducing the political suppleness. The way to do that is to introduce military force, to change the psychology of the region by convincing it that the United States is prepared to remain indefinitely and to bring overwhelming force to bear. That was the point of the U.S. announcement that it would take over the burden dropped by NATO.

The problem is that this is a bluff. The United States doesn’t have overwhelming force to bring to bear. The Soviets had 300,000 troops in Afghanistan. They held the cities, but the countryside was as treacherous for them as it is for the Americans. The force the United States can bring to bear is insufficient to overawe the tribes and cause them to break with the Taliban. And therefore, the United States is in a holding pattern, hoping that something will turn up.

That something is Pakistan. If Petraeus follows true to his Iraqi form — where he engaged the Iranians based on their own self-interest, inducing Tehran to rein in al-Sadr — then his key move must be to engage the Pakistanis in the fight against the Taliban. The problem is that it is not clearly in Pakistan’s self-interest to create a civil war in Pakistan with the Taliban, and the new government in Islamabad does not appear to have the appetite for such a struggle. And the Pakistani army continues to have elements sympathetic to the Taliban. If the army is not prepared to put up much of a fight in Pakistan’s northern tribal areas, it certainly is not looking for armed conflict with the Taliban — many of whose members are in fact Pakistani guerrillas — in Pakistan’s nontribal areas.

In sum, Petraeus improved the situation in Iraq, but he hasn’t won the war there. And applying those lessons to Afghanistan is simply repeating what has happened since 2001. Petraeus is a good general, so it is unlikely he will continue that same course. But it is also unlikely that he will be in a position to force the Pakistanis to deny Taliban sanctuary. We therefore don’t know what he will do in Afghanistan. But, as we have said before, it is a deteriorating situation, and he will be forced to act on it. That’s why he was placed at the helm of CENTCOM.

If Petraeus had Moqtada al Sadr to contend with, McKiernan has Baitullah Mehsud as his main concern:

While the Pakistani army goes for show, flying journalists in for a brief visit to demonstrate how the Taliban is in retreat, the Taliban goes for a far different tactic.

Baitullah Mehsud, the head of Pakistani Taliban, called a news conference in the same area, drove up in a new Toyota SUV full of security carrying new AK-47 assault rifles, and holds court, unmolested, for an extended period of time.

Mehsud was not bashful about acknowledging his role in combating U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, and promised to intensify those attacks. Articulating the standard jihadi-Islamist view, he stated that “Islam does not recognize boundaries. There can be no deal with the United States.”

[SNIP]

It is time to stop pretending Pakistan can or will be an ally against the Taliban, either in Pakistan or Afghanistan. The group grew and was nurtured under the wings of the [Inter-services Intelligence] ISI, and are broadly supported, both by officials in Pakistan, and, in many places, by the population.

Without being able to rely on the Pakistani authorities to deny the Taliban sanctuary and without being able to take direct action in those areas itself, the NATO forces are hamstrung in an effort that at best can hold the line for a few years. Victory, or any semblance thereof, is simply out of the question as long as these sanctuaries remain.

McKiernan has to move quickly and effectively to effectively deal with Mehsud:

He and his main ally, Qari Hussain, whom officials and associates have described as a highly trained and vicious militant, have methodically built up strongholds in North and South Waziristan — killing uncooperative tribal leaders, recruiting unemployed young men to their jihad and filling the vacuum left by a lack of government services. Now, they also have lieutenants and allies across the tribal region.

In South Waziristan, they run training camps for suicide bombers, some of them children, according to the former Taliban member. Their realm is so secure that in April Mehsud's umbrella group, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, held a conference of thousands of fighters that culminated in a public execution, according to a local resident.

Local Pakistani authorities say they are helpless to deal with Mehsud's group. In a measure of their despair, on Wednesday the authorities in the Mohmand district, where the conference and public execution were held, announced a truce with the Taliban.

Mehsud was once a minor figure in the small Shabikhel branch of the fierce Mehsud tribe that lives in South Waziristan, whose inhospitable territory remained a sliver of imperial India left unconquered by the British.

But he managed to enhance his stature through the ambivalence — or protection, according to some officials — of the Pakistani authorities, say former Pakistani military officials and tribal leaders. His strength grew quickly after February 2005, when the military, then under the control of President Pervez Musharraf, signed a peace deal with him.

"That was when I knew the army was not serious," said a tribal leader who has dealt with Mehsud and would not be named for safety reasons. "If the army took firm action they could crush him in two months."

Instead, the army and the Inter-Services Intelligence, the overarching Pakistani intelligence agency, wanted to keep Mehsud "in reserve," said the tribal leader, who is also a former military officer.

It should come as no surprise that as McKiernan takes over in Afghanistan, Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, arrives in Pakistan for an official two-day visit.

While Mullen lays the groundwork to deal with the Taliban, the US media does its best job of hiding its head in the sand. Barnett R. Rubin at Informed Comment recently debated David Ignatius of the Washington Post after Rubin spent some time getting a decidedly "different" picture of what is going on in Afghanistan:

One of the main explanations for the level of violence is a significant increase in infiltration from Pakistan's Tribal Areas, which are directly adjacent to RC/E. The Pakistan army has used the election of a new civilian government as a blame-shifting cover for its decision to withdraw from FATA and conclude a truce with the Pakistani Taliban. This truce has enabled the militants to focus their energy on Afghanistan.

This may be true, but it does not show that the U.S. effort in Afghanistan is in fact succeeding, when all factors are taken into account. During my visit to Kabul I found that several officials of the U.S. government there interpreted my challenge to Ignatius' assertions as criticisms or denigration of their efforts in RC/E. That is not at all my intention. I was not able to take up the Embassy's offer of a repeat of the Ignatius tour on this visit, and I last visited RC/E in August 2006, when I went to Gardez, Paktia, to visit Governor Hakim Taniwal, an old friend and academic colleague (Taniwal was a sociologist) . Taniwal was killed by a suicide bomber a few weeks later. I have no reason to doubt the positive accounts of US counter-insurgency work, mostly in Khost, one of the smallest of the 12 provinces in RC/E. The failures of U.S. policy do not result from poor implementation by people in the field. On the contrary, from what I have seen, whatever successes there have been have largely been led from the field, not from Washington. Those working on the ground have worked hard in many cases to reverse or evade policies imposed by the Bush administration.

As good as McKiernan might be as a General, he has to understand that the best way to solve the problems that he faces are to use diplomacy--as in, a diplomatic effort to pacify the Pakistanis who support the Taliban just enough to allow for some "accommodation" between Karzai and the militants. Karzai is going to have to make peace with the Taliban, or at least reach some sort of arrangement with them. He might even--gasp--have to share power with them. Remember--Karzai has asked for just that in the past.

The Taliban's former chief spokesman has revealed that top-level talks are being held between the Afghan government of Hamid Karzai and key lieutenants of the former Taliban leader Mullah Omar.

His disclosure that the Taliban "cabinet in exile" is engaged in negotiations appeared to contradict the statement to Parliament yesterday by Gordon Brown that hardline Taliban leaders would be isolated from talks over the future of Afghanistan.

The fact that Karzai has long advocated negotiations and power sharing with the Taliban is a new wrinkle for the US to contend with. This means that diplomacy is the only way to get ourselves extricated from Afghanistan, which should be our ultimate goal. Without a functioning State Department and with a CENTCOM commander who is more focused on Iraq, this might have to wait until a new Administration takes over. The encouraging thing is this--Petraeus was instrumental in bringing in Sunni militiamen. The idea of bringing the Taliban into the mix in Afghanistan isn't too far off the mark. Whether or not the Taliban will abandon their assistance of al Qaeda is something for the diplomats to work out, of course.

McKiernan will need diplomats more than he'll need airstrikes.

*Yes, the best thing to do would have been to NOT invade Afghanistan. We get that. This post deals with the reality as it is today. Making the point that "we never should have gone there in the first place" is simply stating the obvious.

“NATO is in Afghanistan; it’s time they did some soldiering.”

The United States is running into resistance from Pakistan when it comes to securing the border between that country and Afghanistan.

“Pakistan will take care of its own problems, you take care of Afghanistan on your side,” said Owari Ghani, the governor of North-West Frontier Province, who is also President Pervez Musharraf’s representative in charge of the neighboring tribal areas.

Mr. Ghani, a key architect of the pending peace accord, believes along with many other Pakistani leaders that the United States is floundering in the war in Afghanistan. Pakistan, he said, should not be saddled with America’s mistakes, especially if a solution involved breaching Pakistan’s sovereignty, a delicate matter in a nation where sentiment against the Bush administration runs high.

“Pakistan is a sovereign state,” he said. “NATO is in Afghanistan; it’s time they did some soldiering.”

The US and NATO regularly target Taliban forces on either side of the border:

On Wednesday night, the United States fired its fourth Predator missile strike since January, the most visible symbol of the American push for a freer hand to pursue militants from Al Qaeda and the Taliban who use Pakistan’s tribal areas as a base to attack Afghanistan and plot terrorist attacks abroad. In Afghanistan, cross-border attacks have doubled over the same month last year and present an increasingly lethal challenge to American and NATO efforts to wind down the war and deny the Taliban and Al Qaeda a sanctuary.

In an unusual step during a visit to Pakistan in March, Adm. Eric T. Olson, the commander of United States Special Operations Command, held a round-table discussion with a group of civilian Pakistani leaders to sound them out on the possibility of cross-border raids by American forces. He was told in no uncertain terms that from the Pakistani point of view it was a bad idea, said one of the participants.

Instead, Pakistani officials are trying to restore calm to their country, which was rattled by a record number of suicide attacks last year. Within days, they are expected to strike a peace accord with Pakistan’s own militants that makes no mention of stopping the infiltrations. In fact, Pakistani counterinsurgency operations have stopped during the new government’s negotiations with the militants.

[SNIP]

American officials in Washington said the Predator strike on Wednesday killed a handful of Qaeda militants, including one they described as a “significant leader.” The strike indicated that the C.I.A. retained some freedom to operate in the tribal areas. But as the gap between Pakistani and American policies widens, United States officials are pushing harder for still more latitude.

During his visit to North-West Frontier Province, Admiral Olson was taken to the military headquarters of the 14th Division of the Pakistani Army in Dera Ismail Khan, an area just outside the tribal region, where he was struck by the extent of the anti-Taliban sentiment, Pakistani officials said.

Still, in the talks, which were organized by the United States Consulate here in late March, the civilian leaders said they advised the Americans against fighting in Pakistani territory populated by Pashtuns. Pakistan’s government has long been wary of nationalist and separatist strains among the Pashtuns, whose population straddles the Pakistani-Afghan border.

“I said it would be extremely dangerous,” Khalid Aziz, a former chief secretary of North-West Frontier Province, said he told Admiral Olson. “It would increase the number of militants, it would be a war of liberation for the Pashtuns. They would say: ‘We are being slaughtered. Our enemy is the United States.’"

Map-languages and regions of Afghanistan

Within Pakistan, there are indications that the coalition government is coming apart:

Former prime minister Nawaz Sharif pulled his party out of Pakistan's six-week-old coalition government on Monday, plunging the volatile Muslim nation back into political uncertainty.

Sharif, whose Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) was the second-largest member of a four party alliance, made the announcement after failing to break a deadlock with its main coalition partner over the reinstatement of dismissed judges.

Sharif made the restoration of 60 judges sacked by President Pervez Musharraf in November the main condition for joining the coalition led by the party of Asif Ali Zardari, the widower and political successor of the late Benazir Bhutto.

Three days of talks in London between Sharif and Zardari, whose Pakistan People's Party (PPP) leads the coalition, ended on Sunday without any breakthrough.

"Our ministers will meet the prime minister tomorrow and will submit their resignations," Sharif told a news conference.

Nine of the 24 ministers in Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani's cabinet belong to the PML-N, including Finance Minister Ishaq Dar.

Sharif said his party would continue to support the PPP government despite quitting the cabinet.

"For the time being, we'll not sit in opposition."

Despite the possibility of the collapse of the Pakistani government, however, the New York Times says that the US is stepping up its rhetoric:

Last week John D. Negroponte, the deputy secretary of state, used perhaps the strongest language yet against Pakistan, saying that the United States found it “unacceptable” that extremists used the tribal areas to plan attacks against Afghanistan, the rest of the world and Pakistan itself.

“We will not be satisfied until the violent extremism emanating from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas is brought under control,” Mr. Negroponte told the National Endowment for Democracy.

Earlier this month, Afrasiab Khattak and Asfandyar Wali Khan, the leaders of the Awami National Party, which leads the government in the North-West Frontier Province, met with Stephen J. Hadley, the national security adviser, and Mr. Negroponte in Washington.

In their meetings, Mr. Khattak said, it was hard to deter the Americans from the notion of launching their own operations into Pakistan. The topic came up “again and again,” he said.

The Americans specifically mentioned their concern that Qaeda operatives in the tribal areas were preparing an attack on the United States, he said.

“We told them physical intervention into the tribal areas by the United States would be a blunder,” Mr. Khattak said. “It would create an atmosphere in which the terrorists would rally” popular support.

Should the United States and its NATO allies be focused on operations along the Pakistani border at all? According to researcher Sarah Meyer, the Afghan people are facing starvation and famine due to a particularly harsh winter, coupled with ongoing war in their country:

Among the resources compiled by Meyer, this article highlights the need to take care of the Afghan people:

If instead of the fields of poppies there were expanses of wheat, 18 million Afghans who today suffer from hunger would have enough food. With these statements - which appear a bit naive - the experts of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) have declared that by better using international funds, the development of new irrigation and technology systems for agriculture could be realised. But the most difficult thing is convincing Afghan farmers to change their extensive opium cultivation to the production of wheat, fruit, and vegetables.

According to data supplied by the UN, Afghanistan uses 193,000 hectares of land for the cultivation of poppy, and produces more than 90% of the opium in circulation. The estimates reveal that by the end of 2008, the country will produce more than 8,200 tonnes of raw opium.

According to some experts, the world economic crisis and the dizzying rise in food prices everywhere could prompt farmers to convert their poppy fields to wheat. In fact, the price of wheat has risen from 157 dollars per tonne in January to 500 dollars in April of this year.

Tekeste Ghebray Tekie, the FAO representative in Afghanistan, is certain that by growing wheat with the appropriate irrigation systems, more than two and a half tons per hectare could be produced. "If you use this land for high cash crops like vegetables, fruit or cotton", Tekeste says, "then the contribution to food security will be enormous".

Before the Soviet invasion in 1979, Afghanistan had much more irrigated land, but the irrigation systems were destroyed during the war. After the United States military intervention in the country, begun in October of 2001, 15 billion dollars in international aid was invested. But according to Oxfam, only 300 million of this has been earmarked for agriculture.

Photo: Dara, Afghanistan

Herschel Smith at The Captain's Journal highlights efforts by the US Department of Agriculture to assist Counterinsurgency Operations in Afghanistan:

Body armor is not in [Jeff] Knowles’ typical wardrobe as an employee of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). But then again, working with farmers in Afghanistan to help rebuild their agricultural system isn’t his typical work either.

Knowles, who now lives in Hawaii, spent six months in the war-scarred nation talking with farmers about what they grow and what their needs are. He was honored last week by USDA secretary Ed Schafer for his service in Afghanistan in 2005-06.

“I think it’s one of the best things we’re doing in the country,” Knowles said via a phone interview from his USDA office in Hawaii. “If we can help improve quality of life for farmers — and 95 percent of the Afghan people are farmers — we’re doing something real.”

Living conditions are rough. And most farmers are subsistence farmers, growing crops like wheat, potatoes, onions, tomatoes, apricots, apples and almonds.

But getting enough water for crops is a major issue …

It was in Hawaii that Knowles decided to volunteer for a six-month stint in Afghanistan.

“It was really intriguing to me — they were facing problems with erosion, heavy and widespread, and a lot of their irrigation system was destroyed,” he said. “It seemed that my entire career was pointing to this. The things I’d been working with for close to 30 years were the things they needed in Afghanistan.”

It's a Kabuki thing...you wouldn't understand

This whole Petraeus-to-CENTCOM thing has my cynicism surging.

Pun intended.

While everyone was absorbing the news that Baghdad's favorite couple would be separating, and a Petraeus-Crocker divorce was in the offing, I went a different direction immediately. I thought "Hmmmm...Did McCain really misspeak last week? Or did he have an advance heads up on this?"

I realize he is the ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, but this is an executive decision. Was he briefed during the decision making process? If so, were other members of SASC? (Hillary Clinton sits on that committee, too.)

If the committee wasn't briefed, and it turns out that he was, what about the other presidential candidates? Were they briefed as well?

I am not saying he was briefed; I am asking if he was, and if he was, were the other candidates?

Reflecting on what he said last week, this is a fair question.

(Whether or not I need fitted for a tinfoil hat is a side issue.)

Promotions All Around

CENTCOM goes to Petraeus, and Odierno gets bumped up:

Army Gen. David Petraeus, the four-star general who led troops in Iraq for the past year, will be nominated by President George W. Bush to be the next commander of U.S. Central Command, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Wednesday.

Gates also announced that Bush will nominate Army Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno to replace Petraeus in Baghdad.

Central Command oversees the wars in Iraq and in Afghanistan.

If confirmed by the Senate, Petraeus would replace Navy Adm. William Fallon, who abruptly stepped down in March after a magazine reported that he was at odds with Mr. Bush over Iran policy. Fallon said the report, while not true, had become a distraction.

Army Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, currently commander of the Army's 3rd Corps based in the U.S., finished in February a 15-month tour as the top deputy to Petraeus in Baghdad.

I'm speculating, but Petraeus has already won confirmation because of how he testified earlier this month before skeptical Democrats. We already know that the surge has failed, Iraq is back onto the fast track for another round of civil war, the Mahdi Army is waiting to see what happens and the Bush Administration has been embarrased in previous attempts to fill certain positions.

But ask yourself this--is Odierno the right man for the job? Is CENTCOM going to start focusing more on Afghanistan than it has been able to?

By the way, what the hell happened to "The War Czar?" Shouldn't the name of General Lute have come up during the shuffle of personalities? Did that question take you aback? You know, General Douglas Lute? Remember him?

“I think it’s important to the people of Iraq,” said Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute, the president’s coordinator for Iraq issues. “It signals a commitment of both their government and the United States to an enduring relationship based on mutual interests.

“The basic message here should be clear: Iraq is increasingly able to stand on its own,” General Lute said. “That’s very good news, but it won’t have to stand alone.”

Sound dated? That's because it's from November, 2007. Since then, Lute hasn't been in the New York Times at all, according to their news archive of officials.

So much for "promotions," right?

Admiral Fallon Quits - Another thing we didn't need

BREAKING NEWS: U.S. Central Command leader Adm. William Fallon to step down

WASHINGTON - Adm. William Fallon is stepping down as head of the U.S. Central Command, which oversees military matters in the Middle East, Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced Tuesday.

Gates said Fallon took the decision because of recent statements attributed to him that Fallon felt had created a misperception about his goals and those of President Bush.

Gates said Fallon had asked Gates for permission to retire and that Gates agreed.

Fallon was the subject of an article published last week in Esquire magazine that portrayed him as opposed to Bush’s Iran policy. It described Fallon as a lone voice against taking military action to stop the Iranian nuclear program.

“I think this is a cumulative kind of thing,” Gates said in response to a question about that. “It isn’t the result of any one article or any one issue.”

Gates described as “ridiculous” any notion that Fallon’s departure signals the United States is planning to go to war with Iran.

“As I say, the notion that this decision portends anything in terms of change in Iran policy is, to quote myself, ’ridiculous,’ “ he said.

Fallon has had a 41-year Navy career. He took the Central Command post on March 16, 2007, succeeding Army Gen. John Abizaid, who retired. Fallon previously served as commander of U.S. Pacific Command.

More to follow...

UPDATE I - by Blue Girl - 3:15 cdt

Screw the plaudits and phony warmth. The admiral is leaving because of policy differences between Fallon and the administration. But the differences aren't just about Iran, or even Iraq, where he has been outspoken about opposing the "Surge™ and about setting schedules for troop withdrawals.

Insiders say the death knell was sounded by the recent publication of an article in Esquire magazine, The Man Between War and Peace, which highlighted comments made by Fallon in an Al Jazeera interview last fall in which he was disdainful of the constant drumbeat for war with Iran.

Now, get out your tinfoil hats. I think there is a whole 'nuther level. They disagree strongly about the man-god Petraeus of the rank of General. Remember that Fallon ruffled quite a few (yellow) feathers when he referred to the American commander in Iraq as an "ass-kissing little chickenshit" and didn't even get around to a feigned denial that he said it for six months.

Petraeus is due back in Washington this month to appear before Congress, and he wants to halt drawdowns. Fallon opposed the surge, predicted what would happen, and wanted drawdowns. And just in time, violence and casualties are ticking up. What a coinky-dink.

UPDATE II - PALE RIDER

Right now, it's all about where the Aircraft Carriers are and where they are going. THAT'S the key to any operation in the Persian Gulf. Forget the position of the US Army in Iraq--those forces are dispersed and tied down. Forget the idea that we can accomplish anything by air alone in Iran--that's fallacy. Forget the idea that Iran won't immediately lock itself down and survive anything we throw at it--when the first bomb hits, we will have legitimized the Islamic state and the fundamentalist control of that nation for the next fifty years. We will ensure that the wayward sons of today's Mullahs become the clerics in charge long after I'm gone.

It ain't about oil. I will tell you that much. It's got nothing to do with oil at all. It's all about Israel. Sorry to break it to you, but we're not running out of oil. We're seeing a vast shakedown in play--the last gasp of conservative/neocon greed is going to gather up as many fallen acorns and stock them away, because they know they won't get this chance until President Pierce Bush is sworn in.

Bush Planning to Fire CENTCOM Chief?

Think Progress has an excellent piece on the possibility that Admiral William Fallon may be gone soon. Thomas P.M. Barnett indicates in a magazine article for Esquire that he might be out at CENTCOM as soon as this summer:

[W]ell-placed observers now say that it will come as no surprise if Fallon is relieved of his command before his time is up next spring, maybe as early as this summer, in favor of a commander the White House considers to be more pliable. If that were to happen, it may well mean that the president and vice-president intend to take military action against Iran before the end of this year and don’t want a commander standing in their way.

The article goes on to say that Fallon now denies calling General Petraeus an "ass-kissing little chickenshit."

Is that an attempt to hang on to his job? The only thing standing between the Bush Administration and war with Iran is a thin line of leaders, personified by Fallon at CENTCOM. Is getting rid of Fallon an attempt to start a conflict with Iran that has the intention of securing some kind of legacy for the Bush Administration?

The legacy is too shameful to rehabilitate--and no amount of firing people can save it. Especially when they try to fire the wrong people.