Misconceptions About "Moral Conduct" Waivers

While it's no secret that there are problems with military recruiting--and one of those problems being the acceptance of substandard recruits--there is a misconception out there as to what this really means. Letting in people who can't read and write is worse than letting in people with questionable backgrounds.

Part of the problem comes from using flawed or misguided methodology to panic the American people into thinking that the military is full of gangbangers and criminal masterminds. That kind of thing pisses me off to no end--a statistically small number of troops have always made the military look lawless and unprofessional, and that's the bullshit that needs to be debunked. It's not a "shocker" and it's not a crisis. We have plenty of other problems, but this is not the one we should be focused on.

Here, Greg Mitchell quotes from the Sacramento Bee and its coverage of "moral conduct" waivers in the military:

During a yearlong examination, the Sacramento Bee studied the civilian and military backgrounds of hundreds of troops identified from recruiting documents and other military records, focusing on those who entered the services since the Iraq war began and those linked to in-service problems.

Though not a representative sample, the 250 military personnel analyzed most closely for "Suspect Soldiers" included 120 with questionable backgrounds, including felonies and serious drug, alcohol or mental health problems.

Risks associated with employing people with criminal histories multiply in a war zone, where a single incident by one soldier or Marine can affect entire units and fuel anti-American sentiment.

Ruby, Holmes and Gonyon were among 70 with troubled pasts whom The Bee linked to incidents in the military, most occurring in Iraq. A number of those incidents were identified for the first time through military records; even in some well-publicized incidents, The Bee uncovered criminal records not previously made public.

Though dozens of these soldiers would not have qualified for law enforcement jobs in this country, the military sent them to Iraq, where troops often function as police officers.

"These guys are out there carrying weapons, fighting on the streets with drugs in their pockets," said Tressie Cox, whose son, Lee Robert, had a history of drug and mental problems before he was charged with selling drugs in Iraq. "Shame on my son, but shame on all you people out there who are policing this and allowing this to continue to happen."

Right off the bat, I can tell you that when I see that the sampling was not "representative," I know we're in for a ride down bullshit lane. The easiest way to construct a negative piece is to simply pick the worst examples--the most sensationalized ones--and run with it.

When I served, you could have written this exact same story by looking at criminal activity in the military. If you had gathered up the worst offenders from 1997, you would have found that the highest ranking NCO in the US Army was accused of sexual harassment.You would have found NCOs convicted of sexual abuse of trainees at Aberdeen Proving Ground. You would have found other stories of members of the military associating with gangs, shooting people, robbing people and stealing. You would have found domestic assaults, murders and more. The problem is, you would have found all of this reprehensible conduct and more long before we went to war in Iraq.

There are two things people need to remember--despite the increase in "moral conduct" waivers, the fundamental mindset of the military has not changed. The UCMJ allows commanders to kick people out if they break the law--no one is saddled with a bad soldier permanently because of shortages. They are simply ramrodding more questionable troops into the system and making the commanders sort out the ash and trash. But what I don't see is evidence where the troops who have been given "moral conduct" waivers have become adequate or even good soldiers. The Sacramento Bee article cites several studies which show that, yes, the military ends up separating the "moral conduct" waiver recruits at a higher rate than recruits without the waiver, but were those studies complete? One study only looked at the California National Guard--hardly a representational look at the National Guard as a whole.

That's where I question the methodology. Because it wasn't representative, it didn't focus on a randomly generated group and show what happened in each of their cases--it just showed the most outrageous criminals. Well, those outrageous criminals are nothing new. What is new is that someone thinks all of this can be linked to the lax recruiting standards, and that's probably correct. Keeping felons out would make it easier for commanders throughout the military. The problem is, what do you do with the felon who joins the military and becomes a model soldier and turns their life around? Anyone who served in the military of the '50s and '60s knows people who went in badasses and screwups and came out model citizens.

When I talk about methodology, this chart exemplifies why you can't accept the numbers at face value:



The chart has a lot of things that I question. Including the calendar year 2003 is my biggest complaint--we did not have a problem in 2003, but we had the initial indications of one. By the end of 2003, we knew we had "problems" in Iraq, but the first units to have invaded Iraq were largely still there. We did not enter the backbreaking rotation of combat brigades until 2005 or so. When the casualties began to skyrocket, when the rotations began to strain the active duty and the National Guard, and when the first spike in the number of troops going AWOL happened, that triggered the recruiting issues. The problems that triggered the increase in accepting substandard recruits didn't even exist in 2003 or 2004 at a high rate:

Army desertion rates have fluctuated since the Vietnam War _ when they peaked at 5 percent. In the 1970s they hovered between 1 and 3 percent, which is up to three out of every 100 soldiers. Those rates plunged in the 1980s and early 1990s to between 2 and 3 out of every 1,000 soldiers.

Desertions began to creep up in the late 1990s into the turn of the century, when the U.S. conducted an air war in Kosovo and later sent peacekeeping troops there.

The numbers declined in 2003 and 2004, in the early years of the Iraq war, but then began to increase steadily.

In contrast, the Navy has seen a steady decline in deserters since 2001, going from 3,665 that year to 1,129 in 2007.

The Marine Corps, meanwhile, has seen the number of deserters stay fairly stable over that timeframe _ with about 1,000 deserters a year. During 2003 and 2004 _ the first two years of the Iraq war _ the number of deserters fell to 877 and 744, respectively.

The Air Force can tout the fewest number of deserters _ with no more than 56 bolting in each of the past five years. The low was in fiscal 2007, with just 16 deserters.

Despite the continued increase in Army desertions, however, an Associated Press examination of Pentagon figures earlier this year showed that the military does little to find those who bolt, and rarely prosecutes the ones they find. Some are allowed to simply return to their units, while most are given less-than-honorable discharges.

A chart which shows "problem recruits" from calendar years 2003 and 2004 plainly misses the problem of recruiting entirely--we were not in a crisis during those years. We didn't actually step up the acceptance of the moral conduct waiver troops until AFTER the data on this chart, reaching the high level we're at now:

The percentage of Army recruits receiving so-called "moral conduct" waivers more than doubled, from 4.6 percent in 2003 to 11.2 percent in 2007. Others, The Bee found, were able to enlist because they had no official criminal record of arrests or convictions, their records were overlooked or prosecutors suspended charges in lieu of military service - akin to a now-defunct Vietnam-era practice in which judges gave defendants a choice between prison and the military.

I don't know how you read a chart like that when, clearly, it uses calendar year data that isn't relevant. Even so, the statistical differences are not great. Yes, troops with moral conduct waivers are "slightly" more likely to be bad troops. Not all of them are--the numbers would be off the charts were that the case.

So, statistically, they're only slightly more likely to be worse. And we don't have the right data to back it up. Take it with a grain of salt, then.

Finally, two quick points--urinalysis testing for drug offenders and keeping troops who have Lautenberg violations from owning or carrying weapons. If there are troops on drugs, they better be testing them and catching them and kicking them out. If there are troops that have domestic violence issues, they better not be allowed to re-enlist.I think what is missing is an understanding of the Lautenberg Amendment, which should have helped eliminate some of the problems in the Sacramento Bee article much earlier on, if it was applied and enforced properly:

The Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun Control Act of 1968, effective 30 September 1996, makes it a felony for those convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence to ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms or ammunition. The Amendment also makes it a felony to transfer a firearm or ammunition to an individual known, or reasonably believed, to have such a conviction. Soldiers are not exempt from the Lautenberg Amendment.

Summary court-martial convictions, nonjudicial punishment under Article 15, UCMJ, and deferred prosecutions (or similar alternative dispositions) in civilian court do not constitute qualifying convictions within the meaning of the Lautenberg Amendment. The prohibitions do not preclude a soldier from operating major weapons systems or crew served weapons such as tanks, missiles, and aircraft. The Lautenberg Amendment applies to soldiers with privately owned firearms and ammunition stored on or off post.

Army policy is that all soldiers known to have, or soldiers whom commanders have reasonable cause to believe have, a conviction of a misdemeanor crime of domestic are non-deployable for missions that require possession of firearms or ammunition. Soldiers affected by the Lautenberg Amendment are not eligible for overseas assignment. However, soldiers who are based outside the continental United States (OCONUS) will continue to comply with their assignment instructions.

Soldiers with qualifying convictions may not be assigned or attached to tables of organization and equipment (TOE) or modified TOE (MTOE) units. Commanders will not appoint such soldiers to leadership positions that would give them access to firearms and ammunition. Soldiers with qualifying convictions may not attend any service school where instruction with individual weapons or ammunition is part of the curriculum.

Soldiers whom commanders know, or have reasonable cause to believe have, a qualifying conviction may extend if otherwise qualified, but are limited to a one year extension. Affected soldiers may not reenlist and are not eligible for the indefinite reenlistment program. Soldiers barred from reenlistment based on a Lautenberg qualifying conviction occurring after 30 September 1996 may not extend their enlistment. However, such soldiers must be given a reasonable time to seek removal of the conviction or a pardon.

I think the bottom line is, we need better research, a clearer understanding of what constitutes a recruit that can succeed in the military, and better methodology before we panic about what we're getting.

We still have the best military in the world; we need to concentrate our efforts on fixing it and rebuilding it and healing the troops affected by the Iraq War before we condemn them to a phony stigma of being "a bunch of gang bangers and felons."

David Martin Catches the Army in a Startling Admission

Every once in a while, the working media at the network level gets something right. CBS News Correspondent David Martin nails one of the generals at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in a major, major gaffe.

In the wake of the Walter Reed scandal, 35 so-called "Warrior Transition Units" were set up at bases around the world. They were supposed to be places where soldiers could be cared for until they either returned to duty or were discharged.

But the general in charge of the program admits it hasn't been working the way it was supposed to. Here's why.

"How many soldiers in these units were actually wounded in combat?" Martin asked.

"About 12 percent were wounded in either Iraq or Afghanistan," Brig. Gen. Gary Cheek said.

"Only 12 percent?" Martin said.

"Only 12 percent," Cheek said.

If you include those whose injuries could be called combat-related - a stressed-out soldier in a car accident after returning from Iraq, for instance - the percentage goes up to 48 percent.

The rest have injuries or illnesses which have nothing to do with combat. As a result, the number of soldiers in Warrior Transition Units exploded from 6,000 to 12,000 - even as casualties in Iraq were going down.

"We were putting soldiers into the Warrior Transition Unit that really didn't need that complex, managed care," Cheek said.

"So did somebody say, 'Hey, this isn't how it was supposed to work?'" Martin asked.

"I would say yes," Cheek said.

I would say, "fix that problem immediately, and if no one gives you the resources to do it, tell someone BEFORE another reporter finds another massive problem at a major installation and exposes the shocking gaps in medical care that our soldiers are finding when they are injured, sick or wounded.

For every instance where a soldier is injured in combat, or injured in a combat zone, there are still the same basic needs for health care that existed before the Iraq War. Those needs are, by the admission of General Cheek, not being met because the programs designed for wounded warriors are swamped by the needs of soldiers should have already had the resources in place to care for them. The necessary expansion and increase in active duty health care hasn't met the needs. I want to stress something--the Veterans Administration is already overwhelmed. And so is the care given to active duty troops and troops activated for combat duty. The strain must be incredible--so where are the doctors, nurses and health care professionals to meet that demand? Why hasn't the military gone out and either activated them or recruited them or trained them?

We are nearly seven years past the attacks of September 11 and the invasion of Afghanistan; we are over five years past the war in Iraq. And no one thought this was going to be a problem?

With the number of soldiers in transition units increasing by about 600 a month, the Army can't hire health care workers fast enough.

"By the time we got the ratio up to where it needed to be, we were probably 30-to-60 days behind what the population had already grown to," Cheek said.

Last week the Army tightened the medical conditions that qualify a solider for a Warrior Transition Unit. And a new order requires all units to be fully staffed by Monday, but some aren't going to make it.

So when they say "tightened" they mean--they've kicked out the ones who needed care because they weren't already getting the care they needed and they're trying to hold open spots for the soldiers who aren't wounded yet.

It's time to clean house and get the personnel that are needed. If this is the state of medical care in the military, then the current leadership at the general officer level needs to go--and be replaced by a more creative and driven group of men and women who are in those middle grades and who want to step up and start solving these problems.

What a disgrace. Is there anyone in the support element of the United States Army who can figure out that we're actually in a war right now? We have a Combat Arms part of the Army that can definitely fight, and fight like no other Army in history and we have a support infrastructure that can't get them medical care, can't get them the gear they need and is struggling to adapt to the wars we're fighting now.

Desperate, or just craven?

Since 2003, the United States has deployed over 40,000 troops to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in spite of findings that they were determined medically unfit for combat. This reliance on medically unfit troops is one more sign of the stresses our military is operating under.

Most of the non-deployable servicemembers are in the Army, which is doing most of the fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. From 5% to 7% of all active-duty, National Guard and Reserve soldiers slated for combat were found medically unfit due to health problems each year since 2003, according to statistics provided to USA TODAY.

Unit commanders make the final decision about whether a servicemember is sent into combat, although doctors can recommend against deployment because of a medical issue, Army spokeswoman Kim Waldron said.

"The commander consults with health care professionals to determine whether the treatment a soldier needs is available in theater," said Army Col. Steven Braverman of the Army Medical Command.

At Fort Carson, in Colorado, Maj. Gen. Mark Graham ordered an investigation into deployment procedures for a brigade deployed to Iraq late last year. At least 36 soldiers were found medically unfit but were still deployed, Graham told USA TODAY.

For at least seven soldiers, treatment in the war zone was inadequate and the soldiers were sent home, he said, and at least two of them should never have been deployed.

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in February, the panel's chairman, Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., asked Army leaders about an e-mail from the surgeon for the Fort Carson brigade that said medically "borderline" soldiers went to war because "we have been having issues reaching deployable strength."

"That should not be happening," Army Secretary Pete Geren told the committee. "I can't tell you that it's not, but it certainly should not be happening."

Meanwhile, soldiers with medical problems have also deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan from Fort Drum in New York and Fort Stewart and Fort Benning, both in Georgia, according to Brenda Farrell, who is leading an investigation into the practice for the Government Accountability Office.

Now lets get real for a moment - some of the things that caused a soldier to be classified as unfit for combat are pretty minor - the need for allergy medicine, eyeglasses or dental work, for example - but others were not so minor and have resulted in soldiers being returned stateside for treatment unavailable in-theater.

Doubly unsettling are the charges that soldiers with psychological problems were deployed to war in spite of findings that they were unfit for combat for mental health reasons. Thrusting those soldiers into that situation is in no way conducive to psychological healing.

Quite the opposite in fact. And when they come back even more compromised, and are out of the military, they will no longer their commanders problem - they will be societies. So maybe society should come out of the fog and demand a stop to this right now.

Brent Bozell Does His Best Impression of a Crazed Liar

Oh, now this kind of thing makes me laugh out loud:

In the Washington Post today, Brent Bozell, the president of the conservative Media Research Center, argues that Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) “may have the Beltway crowd in his corner, but grass-roots conservatives aren’t sold.” Claiming that McCain “is the one who arguably least qualifies as a Reagan conservative,” Bozell suggests ways that the Arizona senator can motivate the conservative movement.

But in making his argument, Bozell falsely claims that it was the Clinton administration, not the Bush administration, that created the current strains on the “military infrastructure“:

This is what conservatives call on him to do:

McCain must present a strategy to defeat the threat of radical Islam. He needs to call on the United States to rebuild its military infrastructure, so devastated by the Clinton administration.

So we're blaming Bill Clinton for the damage done to our military because of the Iraq War, now five years in? Let's do some math--the Iraq War is five years old this month. FIVE YEARS! And the military has been under the current Commander in Chief for Seven Years, two Months (or so). Bill Clinton left office in January 2001 and handed over a military that had 8 of its 10 active duty divisions--and virtually ALL of its Reserve and Guard component--ready to go to war and fully equipped and damned near full strength. He handed over Marine MEUs and Aircraft Carrier battlegroups that were trained and ready to deploy because they had been training and deploying and keeping our interests overseas defended admirably. Hundreds of pilots were experienced, having used Iraq as a live fire training range [while enforcing the No-Fly zones] for years. I served during that time, and that was a time when we were throwing criminals and gang members and anyone who didn't shape up out of the military as quickly as the rules allowed. NOW? Now we're keeping all of the broke dick people in, recruiting the criminals, and letting the gang members run wild in family housing units all over the country.

The only deployments that were taking a toll on the military were the rotations of units like the 10th Mountain Division and the 3rd Infantry Division to Kuwait and the Balkans. (I estimate on that, because, as I recall, we had various brigades moving in and out of the Balkans and we had done Operation Desert Fox with some elements of 3rd ID at Camp Doha.)

We still had all of our troops in Germany, although they were involved in some of the operations in the Balkans as well. We had the entire III Corps, ready to go to war. We had everyone else doing what they're supposed to do--training and preparing for any eventuality and any mission.

Clinton didn't "devastate" the military--the military was already drawn down by the decision--made AFTER the Berlin Wall fell but long BEFORE Clinton took office--to cash in THE PEACE DIVIDEND.

You remember the PEACE DIVIDEND, don't you?

Bush laid out the rationale for the Plan in a speech in Aspen, Colorado, on August 2, 1990. He explained that since the danger of global war had substantially receded, the principal threats to American security would emerge in unexpected quarters. To counter those threats, he said, the United States would increasingly base the size and structure of its forces on the need to respond to “regional contingencies” and maintain a peacetime military presence overseas. Meeting that need would require maintaining the capability to quickly deliver American forces to any “corner of the globe,” and that would mean retaining many major weapons systems then under attack in Congress as overly costly and unnecessary, including the “Star Wars” missile-defense program. Despite those massive outlays, Bush insisted that the proposed restructuring would allow the United States to draw down its active forces by 25 percent in the years ahead, the same figure Powell had projected ten months earlier.

That ten division army that we have right now? That "gutted" military that you claim was all Clinton's fault? That "hollow force" we have right now?

Cheney Proposed Cutting F-16 Aircraft. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Cheney said, "If you're going to have a smaller air force, you don't need as many F-16s...The F-16D we basically continue to buy and close it out because we're not going to have as big a force structure and we won't need as many F-16s." According to the Boston Globe, Bush's 1991 defense budget "kill[ed] 81 programs for potential savings of $ 11.9 billion...Major weapons killed include[d]....the Air Force's F-16 airplane." [Cheney testimony, House Armed Services Committee, 2/7/91; Boston Globe, 2/5/91]

Cheney Proposed Cuts to B-2 Program. According to the Boston Globe, in 1990, "Defense Secretary Richard Cheney announced a cutback... of nearly 45 percent in the administration's B-2 Stealth bomber program, from 132 airplanes to 75..." [Boston Globe, 4/27/90]

Cheney Proposed Cutting AH-64 Apaches. In testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Defense Subcommittee, Cheney said, "This is just a list of some of the programs that I've recommended termination: the V-22 Osprey, the F-14D, the Army Helicopter Improvement Program, Phoenix missile, F-15E, the Apache helicopter, the M1 tank, et cetera." In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Cheney said, "The Army, as I indicated in my earlier testimony, recommended to me that we keep a robust Apache helicopter program going forward, AH-64...I forced the Army to make choices...So I recommended that we cancel the AH-64 program two years out." [Cheney testimony, Senate Appropriations Committee, Defense Subcommittee, 6/12/90; Cheney Testimony, House Armed Services Committee, 7/13/89, emphasis added]

Cheney Proposed Cutting M-1 Abrams Tanks. In testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Defense Subcommittee, Cheney said, "This is just a list of some of the programs that I've recommended termination: the V-22 Osprey, the F-14D, the Army Helicopter Improvement Program, Phoenix missile, F-15E, the Apache helicopter, the M1 tank, et cetera." The Boston Globe reported on the impact of Cheney's cuts to armored tanks: "The Army's cupboard is left particularly bare. Coming in the wake of last year's killing of the M-1 tank and the Apache helicopter, the death of the M-2 means the Army will soon have virtually no major weapons in production." [Cheney testimony, Senate Appropriations Committee, Defense Subcommittee, 6/12/90; Boston Globe, 2/5/91]

Cheney Proposed Cutting B-52 Bombers. In 1990, Cheney proposed cutting 14 B-52 bombers. Cheney also sought the retirement of two Navy battleships, two nuclear cruisers, and eight nuclear-powered attack submarines. In 1991, Cheney scrapped the Navy's A-12 Stealth attack plane, a fighter that was proclaimed to be a key part of the future of navy aviation in advanced stealth technology. [Newsday, 2/5/91; NY Times, 1/8/91; Boston Globe, 4/27/90; Boston Globe, 1/30/90]

Cheney's Record as Secretary of Defense Includes Cutting Troops and Bases
Cheney Cut Thousands of Active-Duty, Reserve, and Civilian Forces. In January 1990, Cheney banned the hiring of any new civilian personnel in the Defense Department through the end of September, which left more than 65,000 jobs vacant. Under the budget proposed in 1990, the Pentagon would have reduced active military personnel by 38,000; selected reserves would have fallen by 3,000. The budget called for the deactivation of two Army divisions. Long range, the Pentagon planned to reduce its work force by 300,000, including about 200,000 military personnel and 100,000 civilians. In 1991, he called for reduction of 200,000 active and reserve military personnel over two years. In 1992, Cheney called for cutting 500,000 active-duty people, 200,000 reservists, and 200,000 civilians over five years. [Minneapolis Star-Tribune, 2/2/92; Chicago Tribune, 2/20/91; 1990 CQ Almanac, p. 672; Washington Post, 1/13/90; Boston Globe, 1/30/90]

Active-Duty and Reserve Forces Endured Huge Reductions Under Cheney. The LA Times reported in November 1991 that the number of active-duty military personnel had decreased by over 106,000, or 5 percent of the total forces. The National Guard and Reserves had been cut by nearly 38,000, instead of the 105,000 the Bush Administration sought. [LA Times, 11/2/91]

Cheney Proposed Over 70 Base Closures. In 1990, Cheney proposed the closure of 72 domestic military installations and 12 overseas facilities. On April 12, 1991, Cheney proposed to close 31 major domestic military bases. The plan also called for shutting 12 smaller bases and reducing operations at 28 others. He submitted his list of closures to a commission on base closings on April 15, 1991. In 1992, Cheney proposed 70 overseas military base closures, three of which were in Turkey. [Aerospace Daily, 8/17/92; 1991 CQ Almanac, p. 427; Chicago Tribune, 1/30/90]

So, for the Brent Bozell types out there, shut up when you claim Clinton "gutted" the military. The budget was negotiated with Republican Congressmen more interested in cutting ALL spending wherever possible--negotiations that, at one point, shut down the goddamned government.

The current size of our military could have been changed in a heartbeat in 2001--and your President still can't get the right vehicles and gear to enough troops in Iraq.

Recruiting year off to a slow start

The Army started off the recruiting year with the lowest number of recruits signed up for Basic Training since the United States military became an all-volunteer force in 1973. Gen. William S. Wallace, commander of Army Training and Doctrine Command, told Pentagon reporters on Wednesday that the diminished number of delayed enlistment recruits in the pike will make it extremely difficult to reach the goals for 2008.

For the last two years, the goal of 80,000 new recruits has barely been met. To meet the numbers, qualified OCS candidates were not informed of the option (even though the Army is experiencing a paucity of Lieutenants and Captains). Additionally, the Army has been forced to admit a staggering percentage of recruits on waivers. In FY 2006, fully 17% of all recruits were admitted under waivers for psychological, criminal and health problems. Nearly one in five who were actively recruited, would not have gotten five minutes of a recruiters time five years ago.

In a perfect world, the recruiting year starts with 20,000 recruits, or 25% of the yearly goal, in the pike and scheduled for Basic. The remaining 60,000/75% are to be recruited over the course of the fiscal year. Last summer, the Army toted the board and realized they were not going to meet their 2007 numbers unless drastic measures were taken. Over 1000 former recruiters who had fulfilled their recruiting duties were sent back to the sales floor. Additionally, the Army instituted recruitment bonuses. Recruits willing to leave for basic training by the end of September (to bolster 2007 numbers) were offered healthy $20,000 bonuses - a years salary in many cases.

As a result of rushing recruits into uniform to meet the 2007 goals, the Army started this recruiting year with less than 7400 recruits, or a mere 9% of the 2008 goal, in the queue. “It’s going to be another tough recruiting year,” said General Wallace.

From Army Times:

The bonus program, which began July 25, was part of a last-minute push by the Army to meet its year-end recruiting goal, after having fallen short on recruiting numbers in May and June. It had the effect of getting many of the recruits who signed up after July 25 into basic training sooner than they would have otherwise, thus reducing the number with entry dates after Oct. 1.

“That is of concern for us because the delayed entry program gives us guaranteed enlistees to meter out across the year,” Wallace said. Without that cushion to begin the recruiting year, recruiters are going to have to sign up enough people to meet the existing goal as well as replenish the pool for next year.

Coupled with the recruiting problems are retention problems. The backbone of any military is the mid-level NCO's, and they are not reupping. Instead, worn out by repeated deployments and feeling a sense of futility about the misadventure in Iraq that has cost nearly 4000 American lives, they are opting to leave the service. These losses in leadership will undoubtedly haunt the military for the next two decades.

Without top-notch NCO’s the force suffers. They fill a unique role, because they manage both up and down the chain of command. They transmit orders to the troops they supervise, and they have great influence over the decisions made by the officers they serve.

NCO’s simultaneously prepare their units to complete their mission and know the personal pertinents of their personnel. They know whose kids are struggling to adjust, whose marriage is rocky, who is expecting a baby, whose mother is ill, who has an in-law “vacationing” on their couch and clueless about why they can’t come play. They have the standing to pull a green Lieutenant aside and tell him or her the real score.

These middle managers are especially important in wartime. Not the least of all among reasons: seasoned NCO’s keep Leiutenants alive long enough to become seasoned officers. There are more Sergeants leading Soldiers and Marines down dangerous alleys and on patrol than there are Lieutenants and Captains.

These are the enlisted personnel that an Army facing a three-decade rebuilding process after the folly of destabilizing and occupying Iraq needs to retain most, but they are not staying. Instead they are leaving in droves. And Sergeants who leave after 8, 12, 15 years in service are not G.I.'s who can be replaced at the local recruiting station.

Even if you support it, how do you sustain it?

Folks, the Army is in trouble. It is going to take at minimum two decades to rebuild our Army. Five years of rugged warfare conditions have taken a steep toll on man and materiel alike. It's broken all right, and George Bush is the vandal who broke it.

That the Army missed their recruiting goals for May by 9.27% is just the tip of the iceberg. The real fractures go much deeper. Young officers are leaving the service in higher numbers than at any time since Vietnam. It is unprecedented – but the Army has been hemorrhaging officers and senior NCO’s in leadership positions for at least the last two years. When I started getting up in arms about it was when I read an editorial by Lucian Truscott IV in the New York Times two years ago that confirmed what I had been witnessing.

This compromises the quality of the leadership of the officer corps. Army OCS has a 100% acceptance rate, and Republican members of Congress are having a hard time finding qualified candidates to even apply to West Point. (I know applications have been falling for at least two years, and I am looking for the supporting link for that claim)

Take this data point for instance: 97% of all eligible Captains are being promoted to Major. Traditionally that number has been between 70-80%. The promotion to Major has heretofore been the winnowing point for career officers. Now, if you have Captain’s bars and sufficient time in service, and you haven’t been court-martialed yet, you will get Oak Leaf Clusters.

Now consider that even though we are missing all those officers, qualified applicants are not being informed of the OCS option because their numbers are needed to bolster the enlisted ranks. This is counterproductive recruiting and short-term thinking.

This exodus of seasoned officers has resulted in what can only be classified as promotion by attrition. And that is no way to run an Army.

Now – let’s consider the recruits to the enlisted ranks. Fully 17% of the recruits into service in FY 2006 were admitted to service on waivers. Can anyone imagine a scenario in which that figure would improve when have already recruited everyone who is fit and willing? (Yeah, me neither.)

So lets recap: In our Army, we have a bunch of hinky troops – and not enough of ‘em, by the way – and no one to lead them. Also keep in mind that the Army uses accounting methods in the billet shell game that would make a Hollywood accountant blush. (h/t SPfY for that line).

This is a recipe for disaster and a broken military. It’s time we face the facts and deal with them. I do not believe our military has time to let Bush run out the clock on his failed presidency. Congress needs to get tough, and they need to do so now, while they are writing the Defense Authorization Bill for FY 2008. The way things stand right now, we have at least a 20 year rebuilding process ahead of us. And we can't pay for it with tax cuts. It's time for a gut-check.

A Coming Crisis

I have long been beating the drum about the dearth of officers in our Army. But I overlooked the enlisted ranks. The Christian Science Monitor (one of the best examples of on-the-ground-reporting anywhere) reports that key enlisted personnel are exiting in alarming numbers, and if the trend continues, the Army faces a coming crisis. (I had an 'Oh, Fuck' moment when I read the article)

In 2005, the Army retained 96% of the mid-grade NCO’s whose enlistments were up. The first-quarter numbers for 2007 are in, and that retention number is down to 84%.

The reason for this decline is simple. I can give that answer in one word: Iraq.

Extended tours, repeated deployments, inadequate dwell time with family and friends between those deployments. It is wearing on the Army – which has born the brunt of fighting Bush’s vanity war.

Let’s just cut the crap – if you don’t have an adequate corps of seasoned Sergeants transmitting Officer’s orders and providing leadership – You don’t have a functioning Army. Lest anyone think otherwise, Sergeants run the Army.

So let’s put the state of the military in perspective:

First of all, readiness is suffering. Remember that during Hurricane Katrina, the Louisiana National Guard was unable to mount and adequate response, in part because most of their deep-water vehicles were in Iraq. Desert warfare has taken over – Mountain and amphibious training is not being done. Should the United States have to respond to an imminent threat, the engagement would take more time, cost more lives and money and have a lower chance of success because response / readiness has been undermined by the drain of Iraq.

Secondly, we are suffering a dearth of leadership. The Army is losing command level officers and mid-level Sergeants at a rate that is being felt now and represents a potentially catastrophic crisis of leadership in the future.

In the wake of Vietnam, the military had to be rebuilt, and the Honor Code had to be stitched back together bit by tattered bit. The challenge met by my husband and all of the rest who went in between 1976 and 1985 (the decade after the fall of Saigon) was a cakewalk in comparison to the rebuilding that will by necessity have to take place in the wake of Bush and his Iraq adventure.

In order to make recruitment goals, more and more concessions are being made. People who would not have made it in the door of a recruiting station five years ago are being pursued passionately. They keep loosening the rules so more people can meet the minimum standards for acceptance into service. If you still can’t get in, and you really want to serve, well by golly – we probably have a waiver right here with your name on it! Moral, criminal, physical, we got waivers! (Waivers here! Get your waivers!)

Gotta tell ya – I’m not getting a case of the warm fuzzies over here when I stop to consider all those hinky troops – being led by weak officers and NCO’s…The very thought unleashes horrors in my mind.

They are in the kitchen whipping up a recipe for disaster.

Someone turn off the gas.