Friday, January 11, 2008

Friday Catblogging - with bonus pets edition!

Dreidel is a pretty smart little critter. We have steam heat, and a radiator is preferable to any towel warmer Koehler has ever made or sold. We put the towels on the radiator when we put Zoe in the bath, and she soon figured out that if the towels are there, there is a warm spot and she hops right on up.


Last night, Buddy Impeachment entertained us with his nightly midnight freak-out, then suddenly disappeared. Turns out he was laying in wait in the bathtub, and when another cat wandered into the bathroom, he jumped out and committed a drive-by slapping, and then it was on again - and all three cats tore through the apartment at top speed for another half hour. I'm sure the medical students a floor below just loved that!


Dreidel is learning from the master that the key is getting in or on the blankets while they are still warm, and before the food-givers make the bed - or in this case, the futon.



This is Bitty - Bitty is one of four cats that owns my friend and fellow lefty blogger, fighting the good fight in a red state, Beulahman - and I'm not going to tell you how he got his unusual handle - you have to go read it for yourself! But hey - I summered on a farm in rural Missouri as a teen - I know a couple of characters like Lil' Ear my own self...



And finally - a purse dog! Because I am not content to just tell you you are likely to see anything on the bus in Kansas City - I like to provide evidence!


Have a good weekend, y'all - Either Pale Rider or I will be back later with the news dump!

The Consequences of the Surge in Iraq

Not enough attention is being paid to the fact that the so-called "success" of the Surge is going to have consequences that will happen later this year or early next year--at essentially the point where the Bush Administration will be fleeing responsibility and leaving the mess in Iraq to the next President.

The strategy of "surging" troops into Iraq pushes the bubble down the calendar and kicks the can down the road--it has done nothing but ease the political pressure on the Administration until such time as the unsustainable "surge" ends and the resulting vacuum allows...what exactly? What will happen when the reduced troop presence is made apparent to all sides in Iraq? Will the violence return? Let us hope not.

The sincere wish of every reasonable person is that the violence in Iraq will stop. No one prays for it to return, just so we can say "I told you so!"

This article examines the consequences that might lie ahead:

POLITICS-US: On Anniversary, Views of Surge Diverge
By Jim Lobe

WASHINGTON, Jan 10 (IPS) - Exactly one year after U.S. President George W. Bush announced that he would significantly increase the number of troops deployed to Iraq, the wisdom of his so-called "surge" strategy remains very much in dispute here.

While even many Democrats, who have sought in vain to reverse the strategy since it was first announced, now concede that it has helped reduce the violence in Baghdad and other parts of Iraq, critics say that its ultimate political objective -- national reconciliation between Iraq's three major ethnic and sectarian groups -- remains as distant as ever.

Some even argue that the surge, which added some 30,000 troops to the 140,000 deployed to Iraq at the time of Bush's announcement, may actually have enhanced prospects for a bloodier civil war by effectively permitting the warring sides -- now more demographically segregated than ever -- to re-group and re-arm in anticipation of a new round of bloodletting as U.S. troops withdraw.

"The thing that worries me most of all is what happens over the next 12 to 24 months in Iraq," ret. Army Gen. Douglas MacGregor, an outspoken critic of U.S. strategy in the Iraq war since the 2003 invasion, told National Public Radio (NPR) earlier this week. "Could we have actually made matters worse in the long term?"


So if you can add, and I know I can, "12 to 24 months" means the NEXT President. And if you're watching the polls, you know it ain't gonna be Fred Thompson.

The surge, which actually got underway in February under the command of Gen. David Petraeus, was designed primarily to increase U.S. troop strength and military operations in a way that would both halt the slide into all-out civil war between the Sunni and Shi'a communities and provide greater security to all sides.

The goal, in Bush's words, was to provide the Shi'a-dominated government with "the breathing space it needs" to "make reconciliation [with the Sunni insurgency] possible".

As laid out by Bush one year ago, that reconciliation would be signaled by the passage by Iraq's National Assembly of key legislative "benchmarks", including a reform of the de-Ba'athification programme; an oil law that would ensure equitable distribution of the revenue gained from Iraq's energy resources; and constitutional reforms that, among other things, would result in provincial elections in 2007.


This Spring, General Petraeus will return to the capitol, and will, no doubt, be considered the Greatest General of All Time by the people who have a vested interest in seeing the can kicked down the road. Is anyone going to bring up the fact that the surge RE-Ba'athified the country and allowed those who were purged to essentially stand up with arms and come back into the process, now readily armed and prepared to fight it out for the soul of the country? Those Sunni generals see the Shia who "replaced" them as what, now? Their countrymen? Or their enemies?

There is little doubt that violence in Iraq, and especially in Baghdad and al Anbar province, has fallen dramatically. According to statistics assembled by Petraeus' command, attacks against both civilians and U.S. and Iraqi forces have fallen by 60 percent since just last summer when the surge reached its full strength, and even compared to the all-time high of December 2006 when more than 1,500 deaths from ethnic or sectarian violence were recorded in Baghdad alone.

At the same time, however, a major debate has broken out over how much that decline was due to the surge itself. While the more aggressive counter-insurgency tactics pursued by Petraeus may have played an important role in the capital, in particular, experts point as well to other factors that were not directly related to the surge itself.

Indeed, by the time the surge got underway, the process of "sectarian cleansing" in formerly mixed Shi'a-Sunni neighbourhoods in and around Baghdad had been mostly completed, thus reducing a major catalyst for sectarian violence.

Many analysts also point to the pre-surge decision by key Sunni tribal groups, initially in al Anbar province, to turn against al Qaeda in Iraq. By deciding that al Qaeda was the dangerous enemy, the so-called "Sunni Awakening" movement, led in many cases by former Ba'athists, became de facto U.S. allies, effectively pacifying the region where U.S. forces had suffered the highest casualty rates in the war.

Similarly, the decision by Shi'a cleric Moqtada al Sadr to order his powerful Mahdi Army to stand down -- largely as a result of the popular backlash caused by its operations in Najaf, according to one Pentagon consultant, ret. Gen. Barry McCaffrey -- has also helped reduce bloodshed.


That's the part that no one talks about--the stand-down of the Mahdi Army and the payoffs to the Sunnis are what caused the violence to ebb. More US troops also helped--but how much? Realistically, what is the impact of adding 30,000 troops to help contain violence in a country with over 24 million people? [The population used to be 26 million--with widespread numbers fleeing the violence, I'm revising that number down. As people return, I'll revise it upwards.]

[snip]

A particular point of contention at this point is the future of the Sunni Awakening, re-named CLCs, more than 80,000 of whom are currently being paid and equipped by the U.S. military. Washington is pushing hard for them to be integrated into the official, Shi'a-dominated Iraqi security forces, but the Maliki government is worried that they will eventually turn their guns against it.

"There has been no strategy for integrating these militias into the Shi'a central government, which now feels threatened by the growing power of the Sunnis," according to a new report by the National Security Network. "In the long run, this approach threatens to further split Iraq and exacerbate sectarian tensions."

"We need to understand that buying off your enemy is a good, short-term solution to gain a respite from violence, but it's not a long-term solution to creating a legitimate political order inside a country that, quite frankly, is recovering from the worst sort of civil war," said MacGregor. "...Are we not actually setting Iraq up for a worse civil war than the one we've already seen?"


So what the "unintended consequence" of all this will turn out to be seems to be this--we took a pause, and allowed both sides to regroup, rearm and reposition themselves. Nice!

So all we did was give the Iraqis a year off from fighting each other. Did our troops get a year off? No. But the Iraqi government has had vacation time, and the combatants have had their time to go off, get married, father children, and clean their newly purchased weapons, weapons bought with your tax dollars.

You can't make this stuff up anymore.

Lets Talk About Port Security

Like it or not, our economy - and way of life - is largely based on imported energy products such as crude oil, liquefied natural gas (LNG), and refined products such as gasoline and jet fuel – and those products come into United States ports in tankers – about 8.5 million barrels per day. This supply chain of energy commodities is vulnerable to attack and disruption at many points, both here and abroad, as evidenced by successful attacks overseas against both ships and facilities.

In assessing the vulnerability of the supply chain, the GAO assessed three areas in a review that spanned several foreign and domestic ports. Multiple steps were taken to analyze data and opinions gathered from agencies and stakeholders, and reported to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce.

The three areas reviewed were:
  1. The types of threats to tankers, and the consequences of a successful attack
  2. Measures taken to protect tankers, and the challenges faced by federal agencies in making these actions effective.
  3. Plans in place for responding to a successful attack and potential challenges stakeholders face in responding.
The GAO determined that the supply lines face threats from three different types of attack:
  1. Suicide attack by explosives-laden boats
  2. Stand-off attacks involving rockets fired from a sufficient distance to allow the attackers to evade defensive fire.
  3. Assault by armed commandos.
The volatile and combustible nature of energy commodities mean the contents of tankers carries a potential for combustion, or, in a less likely scenario, explosion. This explosive capacity represents a significant threat to public safety. The chemical nature of the material transported by tanker represents a high risk of negative environmental impact in the event of an attack. Additionally, the disruption of the supply lines could have a severe economic impact.

The GAO determined that while many steps have been taken, both internationally and domestically, to protect tankers and facilities, many significant challenges remain. For example, in spite of international agreements that detail specific protective steps, in reality many disparities exist in their implementation. The United States is limited in the ability to increase compliance abroad, as well as in ensuring safe passage of tankers traversing vulnerable transport routes.

The global supply chain involves many players, and has three main components, each presenting it's own vulnerabilities. First, the materials are loaded in the country of origin, then it is transported across the open ocean, and ultimately unloaded at a facility in this country. Facilities where tankers are loaded overseas might be owned by private entities, governments, or combinations of the two. Foreign governments are primarily responsible for overseeing the security of energy export operations, and the vessels aboard which energy commodities are loaded are likewise owned by many different companies, some with multi-national ownership interests. Transportation routes involve crossing open, international waters, where there is no government control. Of approximately 3,550 oil tankers and 200 LNG tankers, most are registered in countries other than the United States, which means the United States has minimal oversight authority over these vessels’ crews or condition until they enter U.S. waters. Once an oil or LNG tanker arrives at it's US destination, it is unloaded at terminals that may be on the Atlantic, Pacific or Gulf coasts. LNG is currently limited to five facilities, but demand for natural gas is growing, and the number of terminals for unloading LNG is expected to increase. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission must approve each new LNG terminal. Eleven new facilities are currently approved and dozens are pending approval.

On the domestic front, the Coast Guard, the federal agency responsible for maritime security, reports that it lacks adequate resources to meet its own self-imposed security protocols. Those protocols involve escorting ships carrying LNG. As LNG facilities are added, the workload of many units are likely to increase. The Coast Guard has not developed plans for shifting resources and spreading workload among units. According to the data obtained by the GAO, and discussions held with field unit officials, resource shortfalls were the primary reasons for not meeting these responsibilities.

Although multiple attack response plans have been established to address an attack, three main challenges are faced by the stakeholders in their implementation. Primarily, the plans for responding to a spill, versus responding to a terrorist threat are disparate processes, and ports have rarely exercised these plans in concert to see if they work effectively together. Second, ports are generally lacking in plans for dealing with economic issues, such as the prioritizing of the movement of vessels after an affected port reopens. Finally, some ports report difficulty in even acquiring response resources to carry out planned actions.

Federal grants allocated for port security have in general been geared toward preventing attacks, rather than responding to them, but a more comprehensive risk-based approach is in the planning stages.

Now comes the inevitable Catch-22. Decisions about the need for enhanced response capabilities are hindered by a lack of performance metrics tying resource needs to response effectiveness.

The supply chain of energy commodities is not only critical, it is vulnerable to disruption by terrorist attack. Ports are inherently vulnerable because they must be accessible by both land and sea, and because they are sprawling installations, frequently in close proximity to population centers. The ships themselves are vulnerable because they travel direct routes that are known in advance, and for much of the journey, they are afloat on waters that do not afford evasive maneuvers to avoid possible attack. Because there are so many links in the chain, terrorists have the luxury of examining the chain for the weakest link.

In spite of the increased security presence since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, terrorists have managed to carry out several attacks on this supply chain. These attacks have included attempts to damage tankers, and to disrupt the loading operations at facilities overseas. In 2004, terrorists managed to coordinate two offshore oil terminals in Iraq where tankers were taking on oil, and in 2002, terrorists succeeded in conducting a suicide attack against the French supertanker Limburg in international waters off the coast of Yemen. (pictured)

The successful attacks overseas illustrate that tankers face several major threats, and if carried out domestically, serious consequences would likely result. Terrorists have demonstrated the ability to carry out three types of attack - suicide, stand-off, and commando raid - but overall, the suicide boat presents the greatest concern. It was a suicide boat that disabled the Limburg in October 2002. That attack killed one, injured 17, and spilled 90,000 barrels of oil.

To date, no such attacks have occurred on tankers in U.S. waters or on loading facilities in U.S. ports, but the successful attacks abroad, coupled with the expressed desire by terrorists to target U.S. economic interests, and the potential outcome of a terrorist attack on a tanker have led to the conclusion that protective efforts are warranted.

A successful attack against an energy commodity tanker, port facility or terminal carries the potential for significant public safety, environmental and economic consequences, which vary by commodity. A highly combustible commodity like LNG has the potential to burn, or (less likely) explode. An explosion at a port facility, near a population center, would pose a threat to public safety. Crude oil and heavy petroleum products remain in the environment after they are spilled, and must be removed. Spills pose the risk of significant environmental damage. The economic consequences of a major attack could be as mild as a temporary price spike, associated with apprehension about future attacks or supply disruptions with delays of shipments. While the loss of one cargo shipment would probably not have a significant price impact by itself, if an attack shut down a port for days - or even weeks - price responses and higher costs could mean losses that, when figured across the entire spectrum of effect, could run into billions of dollars.

Much is being done, both internationally and domestically, to protect the supply lines, but much more remains to be done. GAO recommends that cognizant agencies
  1. plan for meeting a growing security workload for protecting liquefied natural gas shipments,
  2. help ensure that ports plan for dealing with economic consequences of an attack,
  3. integrate terrorism and spill response plans at the national and local level, &
  4. work to develop performance measures for emergency response.
The agencies generally agreed with the GAO recommendations, but the Department of Homeland Security stopped short of endorsing them and "took the final recommendation under advisement."