Spencer Ackerman Shows Sadr in a New Light

Rather than dismiss him as a fool and call him "Mookie" like the idiot warbloggers do, Spencer Ackerman comes up with a sobering assessment of Shiite leader Moqtada Sadr.

In Iraq, Moqtada Sadr is perhaps the most powerful single political actor. But in the United States, he is treated with derision and contempt by both officials and commentators. During a visit to Baghdad last week, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice all but called Sadr a coward, saying he was "sitting in Iran" while promising "all-out war for anybody but him." In the right-wing blogosphere, Sadr is commonly called "Mookie." Yet while the political fortunes of all other Iraqi Arab political figures have waxed and waned, only Sadr has consistently gained strength. That raises the question: Why?

My guess is that he is one of the few young Iraqis to actually have faced both Saddam and the United States. He is NOT a military man. He is NOT a leader in the way that we understand--hence, when it's not easy to pigeonhole him, the lesser minds of the right wing go ballistic because they cannot see past their own ideas of what war, insurgency and leadership are supposed to be.

One common explanation is that Sadr is the heir to a distinguished Shiite clerical line that offered the most potent and authentic resistance to Saddam Hussein. A complementary theory holds that Sadr's anti-occupation demagoguery provides all the adherent force he needs.

But a different interpretation -- not exclusive of the other two -- might hold the key to Sadr's continued success. Sadr is an insurgent figure who adopts key principles of counterinsurgency. His military strategy is complemented by an appealing political and economic strategy for securing the loyalties of the population. That would help explain why the counterinsurgents battling Sadr in Baghdad have consistently lost.

"While other individuals and parties sought U.S. support and bickered over the high-profile government ministries," A.J. Rossmiller, who spent 2005 in Baghdad as an analyst for the Defense Intelligence Agency, wrote an e-mail, "Sadrists quietly sought the three things most valuable in a political system: popular legitimacy, a patronage network and the ability to provide for the basic needs of citizens."

And that's why they can't understand him--he's not so much a military figure as he is a nationalist. And, at no time in the history of this country, have we ever been able to grasp what it is that motivates a true nationalist, whether we're talking Castro, Ho Chi Minh, or Milosevic. It's also the reason why we cannot understand Hamas or Hezbollah.

Some counterinsurgents believe that Sadr's own dexterity with counterinsurgency principles, combined with his deep political support in Iraq, make accommodation the only sensible strategy. "The best solution now," said longtime counterinsurgency advocate and former Army officer Terrence Daly, "is to try to coopt Sadr's forces." Defeating him, in other words, is beyond the U.S.'s capabilities.

The principles of counterinsurgency are diverse, but they could be summed up as methods of warfare used to draw a civilian population's political and personal allegiance away from a guerrilla force. A counterinsurgent force seeks to coordinate military and civilian methods to offer both material and ideological incentives to a population so it will support a government and reject that government's enemies.

Currently, the U.S. military and its civilian associates have launched a "population protection" strategy to defend Baghdad residents against sectarian and criminal gangs; to promote competent and responsible governance at the provincial as well as national levels; to jump start commerce; and to provide social services like education health care and sanitation.

But in the areas under his control, Sadr provides all these things -- and does so better than the Iraqi government.

No disagreement there--that's the best reading of this that I've seen.

It is true that Sadr's militia, the Mahdi Army, has been implicated in scores of sectarian murders of Sunni Iraqis, thereby expediting and deepening Iraq's civil war. But the Mahdi Army has also stood as a bulwark for Shiites against Sunni aggression or reprisal, patrolling neighborhoods when no other force was willing or able to protect inhabitants from violence. While Iraq's legal system has remained paralyzed since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, Sadr established courts within months that -- while dealing out an illiberal brand of Islamic justice that has little respect for women's or minority rights -- adjudicated people's disputes. In 2004, when Sunni Iraqis in Fallujah were locked in a stand-off with U.S. Marines, Sadr organized a blood drive in Baghdad even as his own forces battled U.S. troops.

How many times have you heard it said in the media--In 2004, when Sunni Iraqis in Fallujah were locked in a stand-off with U.S. Marines, Sadr organized a blood drive in Baghdad even as his own forces battled U.S. troops. We're talking four years ago, obviously, but how much goodwill has Sadr been able to reap since then? Well, for starters, he ain't dead.

A new report from Refugees International, released Apr. 15, assessed that Sadr "provides shelter, food and non-food items to hundreds of thousands of Shi'ites in Iraq," making it "the main service provider in the country." Among Sadr's more recent efforts has been the active resettlement some of the two million Iraqis internally displaced by the continuing conflict. Refugees International found that while Maliki's efforts have been lacking, Sadr provides not just cost-free housing but also food and a modest income stipend. In other words, according to the report, Sadr provides better governance than the Iraqi government.

It is as if Sadr has read the Army and Marine Corps' 2006 field manual on counterinsurgency. Spearheaded by such respected counterinsurgents as Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, the manual's central insight is that political and economic measures, and not simply military ones, are what defeats insurgencies. "Political power is the central issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies; each side aims to get the people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate," the manual states. "Long-term success in COIN [counterinsurgency] depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government’s rule. Achieving this condition requires the government to eliminate as many causes of the insurgency as feasible."

But Sadr's appeal is not strictly material. Even if he did not deliver the services he provides, he would still have two potent assets that no other Iraqi political figure jointly possesses. First is his uncompromising anti-occupation stance. Last year, his deputies in Parliament led an effort to demand a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops that won a parliamentary majority -- only to be ignored by Maliki.

I'd say he practices the manual. The US is pretending to practice it in Iraq. Every time there's a massive airstrike, it's one more nail in the coffin for COIN strategy in Iraq. We've said that here as often as it can be said.

More fundamentally, Sadr's family led the religious resistance to Saddam Hussein, with both his father and his uncle becoming high-profile victims of the regime. The Sadrist Current that he helms is a movement in Iraq with roots far deeper than any other organized political entity.

Sadr has also managed to overcome the few challenges to his religious authority. Iraq's supreme Shiite authority, the Najaf-based Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, is the only cleric whose religious-political influence outshines Sadr's. While Sistani has receded from Iraqi politics since 2005, the Shiite parties still look to him to grant his imprimatur on controversial political moves. As a result, Sadr has sought to co-opt Sistani, even as Sistani has sought to co-opt Sadr. "The relationship is mutually opportunistic, but also pragmatic, since the two clerics have not been able to ignore each other," observed Babak Rahimi of the Jamestown Foundation in a widely-read analysis last year. He noted that the alliance of convenience "is bound to reshape Iraqi Shiite politics in the years to come." Additionally, Sadr is getting ecclesiastical training in the Iranian city of Qom, a vital step for bolstering his own religious prestige.

When faced with a powerful enemy who enjoys significant popular support, one approach counterinsurgents sometimes advise is co-optation. In 2007, with Robert Gates at the helm of the Pentagon and Petraeus at the helm of the Iraq war, there was a significant effort to signal that the U.S. had no real problem with Sadr.

In June 2007, Petraeus gave an interview to USA Today that conspicuously praised the cleric. "Actually, first of all I'd like to say that Muqtada al-Sadr issued a very constructive statement today in the wake of the Samarra attack calling for mourning for several days and calling for restraint," Petraeus said. "That continues the line of messages that he has put out since his return from Iran a couple weeks ago, in which he has ordered his followers not to attack Sunnis (or) other Iraqis, not to attack mosques and shrines."

Yeah, you don't hear warbloggers condemning Petraeus for trying to accomodate Sadr.

Who's really practicing COIN in Iraq? Who's the nationalist? And who's survived longer than anyone else? No one has been a player in Iraq longer than Sadr, at least at his level. Sanchez, Casey, Bremer, and all the rest have moved on. al-Maliki came afterwards. And Petraeus got where he is by failing upward.

Excellent article, and proof someone is at least thinking critically these days.

Another Excellent Article

We're on a global food crisis kick this week, and here's another great source of information:

There is, however, one big problem looming ahead in the world food industry. Unless the scientists get very lucky very soon, we shall soon all be hearing a lot more about something called Ug99. This is the name of a variant of the stem rust fungus, Puccinia graminis, that attacks wheat.

It was first identified in Uganda in 1999, hence the name. But this year it spread dramatically, its spores drifting on the wind across the Red Sea to Yemen and across the Persian Gulf to Iran.

The wheat stem rust, also known as wheat black rust, is capable of causing severe losses. It can destroy entire wheat fields. The FAO estimates that as much as 80 percent of all wheat varieties planted in Asia and Africa are susceptible to this new strain.

“Global wheat yields could be at risk if the stem rust spreads to major wheat-producing countries,” warns FAO Director-General Dr Jacques Diouf. “The fungus can spread rapidly and has the potential to cause global crop epidemics and wheat harvest losses of several billion dollars. This could lead to increased wheat prices and local or regional food shortages. Developing countries that are relying on wheat and do not have access to resistant varieties will be particularly hit.”

There are two big problems here. The first is that Ug99 has defeated the two main gene complexes, Sr 31 and Sr 24, that protect most wheat strains from stem rust. It appears to resist most fungicides. Stopping it may not be a foregone conclusion.

“Of the 50 genes we know for resistance to stem rust, only 10 work even partially against Ug99,” warns Rock Ward, leading the fight against it at the international Maize and Wheat Improvement Center.

The second problem is the nightmare scenario. Having jumped the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, it is not clear how Ug99 gets stopped before it heads east into Pakistan and India, and north into Russia, Ukraine and Europe.

“This thing has immense potential for social and human destruction," says Nobel laureate Norman Borlaug, now 93 and known as the father of the Green Revolution in agriculture. "We know what to do and how to do it. All we need are the financial resources, scientific cooperation and political will to contain this threat to world food security.”

The article goes on to say that the American midwest is the likely savior of the world, in terms of what could be grown to feed people. I would tend to agree--so long as we abandon to boondoggle of ethanol and start fixing our own farm policies. I grew up with these massive fields of corn and soybeans and I know what could be done if we stopped tying the hands of the American farmer behind him and her. If we could tap into this resource and start using it to stabilize the world, we'd be better off. And, yes, I know that we should limit fertilizer and runoff, and that modern farming beats the hell out of the environment.

Anyway, the Washington Independent does a great job--follow the link and check them out. They're not paying me to say that.

McCain is No Ronald Reagan

McCain-Watch: the ongoing saga of McCain and the Media's Mancrush. (Another Media and McCain Mancrush Mash-up Moment...)

I've been looking for a way to try to explain this, but it wasn't until I saw this article at The Washington Independent that I knew what to do. Holly Yeager hasn't gotten the memo--you're supposed to fall all over yourself in the grips of a twitching mancrush.

The Washington Independent is becoming a favorite source of good material--Check them out. They're better than the Huffington Post, they have good substantive stories every day, and they don't fall into the trap of throwing celebrity driven bullshit on their front page to grab readers, if you want me to be honest about it.

Anyway, Yeager puts together a good story about McCain by using multiple sources, positive and negative quotes, positive and negative points, and you know, some basic analysis. Analysis that seems independent to me. Yeager didn't get the memo that you're supposed to sit there enraptured, make shit up when you get to the deadline, and then turn on anyone who criticizes McCain like someone just took your cookie at the kindergarten table.

Sen. John McCain, the Republican presidential nominee in all but name, has spent this week on an autobiographical road trip, seeking to pull attention from the still combative Democratic contest by highlighting important places in his remarkable life story. But if the “Service to America Tour” has shown the strength of McCain’s biography, it has also underscored his real weakness as a speech-maker.

We’re talking style here, not substance. But in oratory, this is not a minor detail. In formal speeches – like those delivered this week at his Alexandria, Va., high school and at the U.S. Naval Academy, where he graduated in 1958, despite what he called "an impressive catalogue of demerits" – McCain (R-Ariz.) appears dependent on a teleprompter, delivering even the most personal passages with an odd detachment. In his telling, his difficult five-and-a-half years as Vietnam prisoner of war might have happened to someone else.

His flat delivery often makes him seem bored with his own stories -- as he did Tuesday, when he told a crowd of current students at his alma mater, “Memory often accords our high school years the distinction of being among the happiest of our lives. I remember Episcopal in that light.”

Yeager points to something else I can't understand--this idea that a graduate of the Naval Academy should boast about being a jackass who couldn't behave or do well in school. That was a free education you got, Senator. It was handed to you instead of some other kid because of your blood line, not your brains. Why not show a touch of humility about not being able to act like a mature adult when you were given four years of a free education tens of thousands of more deserving kids couldn't get because their father and grandfather weren't Admirals? Typically, when daddy gets you into school, you act like a jackass because you have a sense of entitlement. Not that that hasn't already backfired on us, right?

McCain seems to do better when people ask him questions--albeit, they'd better not be critical of anything McCain has ever said or done:

But Medhurst, Trent, and other analysts agree that McCain does have one strong suit: the question-and-answer session.

David Kusnet, chief speech writer for Bill Clinton during the 1992 campaign and the first two years of the administration, called McCain “almost a mirror image of Ronald Reagan.” Reagan excelled at formal speeches. “But you wouldn’t want to have him do a town hall meeting,” Kusnet said. “He would get his facts wrong, or start repeating himself.”

“McCain is the opposite,” Kusnet said. “He’s not good at reading a speech, especially with a teleprompter. But he is good at a town hall meeting.”

McCain has often relied on that format, conducting more than 100 town hall meetings before the 2000 New Hampshire primary, in which he defeated George W. Bush, and at least 100 more in the state in the run-up to this year’s primary, which ended in his comeback victory.

“He’s not afraid of it and he’s willing to take all comers,” Medhurst said. “It sort of fits his personality.”

That confidence was on display at his old high school. After his formal remarks were done, McCain opened the floor to questions. “It can be about anything that’s on your mind,” McCain said. “Most anything that’s on your mind.”

The shift in format instantly set him at ease. McCain moved around the gym floor, leaning on the podium and holding his microphone with the breezy confidence of a Las Vegas lounge act. Freed from the teleprompter, he made eye contact with the crowd, talked comfortably about his high school wrestling record – “I won more than I lost” – and, after describing an unexpected victory, quoted ESPN’s Chris Berman: “That’s why you play the game.”

McCain’s campaign is expected to continue to use the town hall format as the campaign progresses. Obama, whose rhetorical prowess has been at the heart of his campaign, is also now using the setting more frequently -- recognizing that voters value the more relaxed atmosphere and the opportunity to move from lofty ideas to bread and butter discussions.

Aside from calling a questioner a "stupid little jerk" and thereby alienating the youth vote, I would agree with that. Questioners tend to fawn all over McCain like the media does. When he's being fawned over by an adoring questioner, McCain shines brightly.