No SOFA For You

The complete and utter failure of our policy in Iraq is exemplified in our ability to negotiate a working Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with a country that is run by a man who would be dead or exiled in 24 hours if our troops weren't there.

U.S. and Iraqi negotiators have abandoned efforts to conclude a comprehensive agreement governing the long-term status of U.S troops in Iraq before the end of the Bush presidency, according to senior U.S. officials, effectively leaving talks over an extended U.S. military presence there to the next administration.

In place of the formal status-of-forces agreement negotiators had hoped to complete by July 31, the two governments are now working on a "bridge" document, more limited in both time and scope, that would allow basic U.S. military operations to continue beyond the expiration of a U.N. mandate at the end of the year.

The failure of months of negotiations over the more detailed accord -- blamed on both the Iraqi refusal to accept U.S. terms and the complexity of the task -- deals a blow to the Bush administration's plans to leave in place a formal military architecture in Iraq that could last for years.

The position of the Maliki government is this--we'll get a better deal from someone else. They refuse to be the Arab client state of the neoconservative movement, so they have scuttled the talks and dealt Bush a very minor blow.

Minor, because the war isn't exactly being reported in the US. That's why we're blogging this on Sunday morning--no one gives a shit about what failed over the weekend. You can expect the fact that we have no SOFA agreement with Iraq--after over five years of occupation--to be raised as an issue exactly zero times from here on in.

--WS

The "Strategic Alliance" Between the US and Iraq

When the United States deploys its troops to a foreign country, the framework of the relationship between the two countries is stretched across what is called a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that codifies the particulars of the relationship.

It should come as no surprise that the SOFA between the US and Iraq is a political document, split into two parts, that is being crafted to achieve two goals--to make as permanent as possible the involvement of US troops in Iraq in order to ensure the legacy of George Bush does NOT hinge completely on Iraq and to help John McCain get elected President.

Alexander Cockburn explains:

A secret deal being negotiated in Baghdad would perpetuate the American military occupation of Iraq indefinitely, regardless of the outcome of the US presidential election in November.

The terms of the impending deal, details of which have been leaked to The Independent, are likely to have an explosive political effect in Iraq. Iraqi officials fear that the accord, under which US troops would occupy permanent bases, conduct military operations, arrest Iraqis and enjoy immunity from Iraqi law, will destabili[z]e Iraq's position in the Middle East and lay the basis for unending conflict in their country.

But the accord also threatens to provoke a political crisis in the US. President Bush wants to push it through by the end of next month so he can declare a military victory and claim his 2003 invasion has been vindicated. But by perpetuating the US presence in Iraq, the long-term settlement would undercut pledges by the Democratic presidential nominee, Barack Obama, to withdraw US troops if he is elected president in November.

There is no basis to declare victory in Iraq--the government cannot stand without US assistance and US assistance is killing Americans virtually every day. There is simply no reason to honor any agreement Bush makes with Iraq. There should be a Senate vote on this treaty, but because the administration refuses to call it a treaty there won't be. It avoids the necessary review in the Senate that would ensure that the American people have a say in what is decided.

And what's sad is that the Grand Ayatollah of Iraq has more say in the matter than the US Senate:

Al-Hayat writing in Arabic reports that Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (the leading bloc in parliament and keystone of the government of Nuri al-Maliki) is saying he spoke to Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani about the security agreement with Washington. He says that Sistani laid out four points to which any such agreement must adhere:

-National sovereignty
-Transparency
-National consensus
-Parliamentary approval of it

Al-Hakim met with Sistani Wednesday evening, along with some journalists. The journalists reported that the grand ayatollah stressed national Iraqi unity in the face of challenges, expressed his concern about the lack of services for citizens, including electricity and water, and said the water shortage was especially harming farmers. He also urged haste in the rebuilding of the Askariya Shrine in Samarra.

Al-Hakim said that his own party felt the current American draft detracts too much from Iraq's sovereignty and fails to protect Iraqi wealth. He said that Sistani did not go into details but stressed general principles. He maintained that in general Sistani shared the concerns of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq.

As usual, Joe Biden was all over this from get go:

“Last November, the President of the United States and Prime Minister Maliki of Iraq signed a ‘Declaration of Principles,’ which set out a framework for our countries to negotiate, by the end of July of this year, agreements governing cooperation in political, economic and security spheres. Among other things, the Declaration contemplates ‘providing security assurances and commitments to the Republic of Iraq to deter foreign aggression against Iraq’ and supporting Iraq ‘in its efforts to combat all terrorist groups,’ including Al-Qaeda, Saddamists, and ‘all other outlaw groups regardless of affiliation.’ In other words, all the folks fighting in Iraq and killing each other.

“This sends up not just one, but many red flags with me and many other Americans. We’ve pledged we’re not only going to consult when there is an outside threat, but also when there is an inside threat. We’ve just witnessed when Mr. Maliki engaged in the use of force against another Shia group in the south, is this an inside threat?

“We will hear today about the two agreements that the Administration is negotiating with Iraq which were anticipated in the November Declaration. On Tuesday, Ambassador Crocker told us that these agreements would set forth the ‘vision’ – his phrase – of our bilateral relationship with Iraq.

“One agreement is a ‘strategic framework agreement’ that will include the economic, political and security issues outlined in the Declaration of Principles. The document might be better titled ‘What the United States will do for Iraq,’ because it consists mostly of a series of promises that flow in one direction – promises by the United States to a sectarian government that has thus far failed to reach the political compromises necessary to have a stable country.

“We’re told that the reason why we’re not continuing under the UN umbrella is because the Iraqis say they have a sovereign country. But they don’t want a Status of Forces Agreement because that flows two ways. The Administration tells us it’s not binding, but the Iraqi parliament is going to think it is.

“The second agreement is what Administration officials call a ‘standard’ Status of Forces Agreement, which will govern the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq, including their entry into the country and the immunities to be granted to them under Iraqi law. Unlike most SOFAs, however, it would permit U.S. forces – for the purposes of Iraqi law – to engage in combat operations and detain insurgents. In other words, to detain people that we think are bad guys. I don’t know any of the other nearly 90 Status of Forces Agreements that would allow a U.S. commander to arrest anyone he believes is a bad guy.

The American people don't have a say, and, apparently, the Iraqi people won't have much of a say either. Ali Allawi, the former Finance Minister of Iraq, writes:

In 1930 the Anglo-Iraqi treaty was signed as a prelude to Iraq gaining full independence. Britain had occupied Iraq after defeating the Turks in the First World War, and was granted a mandate over the country. The treaty gave Britain military and economic privileges in exchange for Britain's promise to end its mandate. The treaty was ratified by a docile Iraqi parliament, but was bitterly resented by nationalists. Iraq's dependency on Britain poisoned Iraqi politics for the next quarter of a century. Riots, civil disturbances, uprisings and coups were all a feature of Iraq's political landscape, prompted in no small measure by the bitter disputations over the treaty with Britain.

Iraq is now faced with a reprise of that treaty, but this time with the US, rather than Britain, as the dominant foreign partner. The US is pushing for the enactment of a "strategic alliance" with Iraq, partly as a precondition for supporting Iraq's removal from its sanctioned status under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. It is a treaty under any other name. It has been structured as an alliance partly to avoid subjecting its terms to the approval of the US Senate, and partly to obfuscate its significance. Although the draft has not been circulated outside official circles, the leaks raise serious alarm about its long-term significance for Iraq's sovereignty and independence. Of course the terms of the alliance for Iraq will be sweetened with promises of military and economic aid, but these are no different in essence from the commitments made in Iraq's previous disastrous treaty entanglements.

The Bush administration has set 31 July as the deadline for the signing of the agreement. Under the present plan, the draft of the agreement will have to be brought to Iraq's parliament for approval. Parliament, however, is beholden to the political parties that dominate the present coalition, and there is unlikely to be substantive debate on the matter. The Shia religious leadership in Najaf, especially Grand Ayatollah Sistani, has not clearly come out against the agreement, although his spokesmen have set out markers that must be respected by the negotiators. The Najaf religious hierarchy is probably the only remaining institution that can block the agreement. But it is unclear whether the political or religious leadership are prepared to confront the US. President Bush, with an eye on history, is seeking to salvage his Iraq expedition by claiming that Iraq is now pacified and is a loyal American ally in the Middle East and the War on Terror.

It is only now that Iraqis have woken up to the possibility that Iraq might be a signatory on a long-term security treaty with the US, as a price for regaining its full sovereignty. Iraqis must know its details and implications. How would such an alliance constrain Iraq's freedom in choosing its commercial, military and political partners? Will Iraq be obliged to openly or covertly support all of America's policies in the Middle East? These are issues of a vital nature that cannot be brushed aside with the Iraqi government's platitudes about "protecting Iraqi interests". A treaty of such singular significance to Iraq cannot be rammed through with less than a few weeks of debate. Otherwise, the proposed strategic alliance will most certainly be a divisive element in Iraqi politics. It will have the same disastrous effect as the treaty with Britain nearly eighty years ago.

The late Steve Gilliard wrote at length about the historical precedents, but here's a great excerpt from the history of the British occupation of Iraq that rings true today:

Above all, reliance was being placed on the new military technology to magnify manpower. It had been pushed forward rapidly by the Great War, which in this way fortified imperialism as much as in other ways it weakened it. During its course electrified as well as barbed wire was made use of on a turbulent section of the north-west frontier. The armoured car showed its paces in the Afghan war, though only available in limited numbers, `It possessed great fire power and mobility’, the army reported, `while offering a small and almost invulnerable target to the enemy.’ `Motor machine-gun batteries’ were also now in service. A grander chariot of wrath was the tank, an avatar of the elephant of older Indian warfare. But the true deus ex machina was the aviator, who had made his appearance in various colonial theatres during the Great War. . . .

To empire men of [General L.C.] Dunsterville’s generation, aviation promised, as his book makes clear, to be the trump card, the perfect means of keeping colonial peoples on the strait and narrow path. In the government this view had champions in [Colonial Secretary Lord] Milner and [Secretary for War and Air Winston] Churchill. . . The aim was to turn Iraq, whose defence was being entrusted to the RAF, into a showpiece of the new philosophy

It was in new territories where colonial rule had as yet no infrastructure that air forces could be looked on most of all as a short cut to control. In Iraq the British Mandate found few welcomers, and there were complications both in the north, where oil was expected, with Kurdish rebels, and in the south with Wahhabis, Muslim zealots raiding across the nebulous border from the new neighbouring kingdom of Saudi Arabia. A variety of operations were soon being undertaken by the RAF, on its own or in conjunction with ground forces under its direction. They were breeding a new type of soldier, a technician in uniform. A good specimen was the L.A. Simmons who joined the RAF as a 'skilled driver' in 1923, and spent 'two and a half quite unforgettable years' with armoured car units in Iraq, before moving on to Egypt. He rose to flight lieutenant. The army was not concerned to notice that it had some enquiring minds now in the fold. No one told Simmons and his friends that they would be getting out of a train at Ur of the Chaldees. 'There was little or no "Briefing" in those days, eveyone was kept in the dark about what was going on.' He arranged to have newspaper cuttings sent out from home, in order to get some clue to what he was doing.

His No.4 company of armoured cars had its base at Hinaidi, close to the capital of Baghdad. Far-ranging patrols were carried out, by sections each of four cars, four Fords with Lewis guns, and a tender with radio and provisions. A car had a crew of five, all of whom had to be able to drive it and to handle any of its weapons. 'Our "armoureds" were greatly respected everywhere', he wrote. When men on the ground spotted the enemy in too much strength for them to tackle they radioed for planes to come and bonb him.

Airstrikes--the best way to make sure one does NOT win the hearts and minds of the people. It was true in the 1920s and it is true today.

The legacy of the Iraq War must be something entirely belonging to President Bush and none of the decisions, agreements or documents he has signed should be honored--a break with precedent, of course, but, then again, the Bush Presidency has never honored precedent. NONE of the things that were decided or negotiated were done under legitimate Congressional oversight and nothing was done in the best interests of the American people.

So, Who's Really in Charge?

The US regularly holds detainees that were freed by Iraqi courts.

In the eyes of Iraqi justice, Yahya Ali Humadi is a free man.

To the U.S. military, he's another of the detainees in yellow jumpsuits held at the sprawling Camp Bucca in southern Iraq.

Humadi — ordered released nine months ago after an Iraqi judge dropped all charges — now spends his days in a legal limbo. It's one that has confronted and confounded thousands of other Iraqis since 2003 who have been freed by their nation's courts but remained in U.S. custody.

"I don't know why the U.S. army brought him to an Iraqi court, if they intend to keep him for an unlimited time," said Humadi's lawyer, Samiya al-Baghdadi.

The American military, however, sees no contradiction.

Commanders say the current international mandate in Iraq, as well as general codes of war, allow them to hold any prisoner until the detainee is no longer considered a threat to U.S. forces. Local law and court rulings do not apply, they add.

The lack of a legal framework--an operative Status of Forces Agreement or SOFA that has been ratified and approved by Congress and not secretly negotiated between the Bush Administration and al-Maliki's government--would fundamentally alter what rules the US would have to abide by. Without that framework, anything goes:

These dual realities — freedom granted by Iraqi courts but continued detention by the Americans — have been faced by about 3,000 Iraqis since 2003 and stand as a sharp contrast between U.S. policies on the battlefield and Washington's appeals for Iraqis to build credible civic institutions.

The differences could grow even more pronounced as Iraqi authorities move ahead with an amnesty program that was strongly supported by the White House as a step to reconcile Iraq's rival factions.

The amnesty rulings could offer an early exit for many of the 27,000 prisoners in Iraqi hands. They also could wipe the slate for hundreds of the roughly 22,000 detainees held by the U.S. military — which then must decide whether to abide by the decisions or ignore a formula that Washington applauded.

Iraq Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)

[Image: Aerial photograph of the Castleshaw Roman fort which lies on the old Roman Road from Manchester to York.]

I had to get in my Pale Rider Way Way back Time Machine to go get this for you, so please read it:

ONE of the most effective ways of breeding enmity among friendly nations is to station the troops of one country on the soil of another in peacetime. The problem is compounded when the foreign troops claim extraterritorial privileges and hold themselves not subject to local law. In the overall grand strategy of the cold war, the U.S. has sought to devise a new and workable solution to the old problems: a worldwide network of "status-of-forces agreements" designed to cover the bulk of 700,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors and airmen stationed in 49 friendly countries.

The status-of-forces agreements, in spite of the ruckus over Specialist Third Class Girard in Japan, are working out amazingly well. Status-of-forces agreements have contributed in six years of steady growth toward easing the tensions between allies, and have added up to a remarkable good-sense show of international justice from which the U.S. and its allies alike have benefited. One Girard case provides an uproar in the U.S. and Japan, for example, but 5,544 other U.S.-Japanese cases that came up last year worked out smoothly. Over a longer term, fewer than half a dozen out of 10,000 arrests of Americans in France since 1953 have caused the U.S. any concern.

Off Duty, Off Base. Since 1951, the U.S. has negotiated more than 40 status-of-forces agreements covering most of the world sectors where the U.S. force-in-being is deployed. The basic agreement is the NATO status-of-forces treaty signed in London in 1951 and ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1953. This NATO treaty grants the U.S. primary jurisdiction over G.I.s in a NATO country who get in trouble while on duty, or who commit offenses against other U.S. citizens. The treaty generally grants the "host" NATO country primary legal jurisdiction when G.I.s commit off-duty, off-base offenses that can range from running red lights to rape.

Now, how many blogs will link to an article from 1957 as if it were yesterday and locate for you a very, very relevant little nugget of information?

The key provision--ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1953--means that when the United States decides to station troops on foreign soil, a SOFA must be ratified by the United States Senate.

Is the SOFA being negotiated between Iraq and the United States going to be ratified by the Senate? No. They're not. Surprised?

Gary Hart:

To seal the deal, with the expectation of binding future presidential successors, Mr. Bush and Iraq president Nouri al-Maliki are in the process of negotiating a "status of forces agreement" that would commit the U.S. military to combat any internal or external factions the Iraqi government deemed a threat. This represents a one-directional security treaty cloaked in the form of an agreement not subject to Senate ratification. And it guarantees U.S. involvement in age-old Iraqi sectarian conflict for decades to come.

And so by showing a picture of an old Roman fort from when they garrisoned England, a Time Magazine article from way, way back when, and a little current events, we come to the end of our history lesson for today.