If Not Ivins, Then Who?

Crossposted from our new home blog,They gave us a republic...
A stunning op-ed from the Wall Street Journal asserts that the Anthrax killer is still on the loose, and that Bruce Ivins could not have manufactured the Anthrax.

Richard Spertzel lays out a very compelling set of facts that indicate that the FBI wants to close the case and move on. The initial reaction to the revelation that Ivins was a suspect, who then killed himself with tylenol codeine, was that he may have been a patsy. I think he was a patsy in waiting. I think the FBI was waiting to see what Ivins would do so they could hang the case on him and close it. Why else would this have dragged on for so long? To make that case, let's follow what Spertzel lays out in his op-ed:

The spores could not have been produced at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, where Ivins worked, without many other people being aware of it. Furthermore, the equipment to make such a product does not exist at the institute.

It gets worse:

Information released by the FBI over the past seven years indicates a product of exceptional quality. The product contained essentially pure spores. The particle size was 1.5 to 3 microns in diameter. There are several methods used to produce anthrax that small. But most of them require milling the spores to a size small enough that it can be inhaled into the lower reaches of the lungs. In this case, however, the anthrax spores were not milled.

What's more, they were also tailored to make them potentially more dangerous. According to a FBI news release from November 2001, the particles were coated by a "product not seen previously to be used in this fashion before." Apparently, the spores were coated with a polyglass which tightly bound hydrophilic silica to each particle. That's what was briefed (according to one of my former weapons inspectors at the United Nations Special Commission) by the FBI to the German Foreign Ministry at the time.

The Washington Post says that the FBI has a possible reason for how Ivins carried out the milling and the processing of the Anthrax spores. My question is--how plausible is this? Does that shoot a hole in Spertzel's assessment?

...Ivins, the government's leading suspect in the 2001 anthrax killings, borrowed from a bioweapons lab that fall freeze-drying equipment that allows scientists to quickly convert wet germ cultures into dry spores, according to sources briefed on the case.

Ivins's possession of the drying device, known as a lyopholizer, could help investigators explain how he might have been able to send letters containing deadly anthrax spores to U.S. senators and news organizations.

The device was not commonly used by researchers at the Army's sprawling biodefense complex at Fort Detrick, Md., where Ivins worked as a scientist, employees at the base said. Instead, sources said, Ivins had to go through a formal process to check out the lyopholizer, creating a record on which authorities are now relying. He did at least one project for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency that would have given him reason to use the drying equipment, according to a former colleague in his lab.

The FBI's own sloppy procedures and leaks are what undermines their case. Are we to believe that Ivins was really foolish enough to request a piece of equipment that, had the FBI been capable of conducting a reasonably competent investigation, should have tipped everyone off? If the lyopholizer was the equipment used to weaponize the Anthrax, how is it that every single lyopholizer wasn't accounted for, tested, and tracked back to whoever used it within days or weeks of the 2001 attack?

This is another carefully orchestrated leak that could be used to bolster the FBI's non-case. They have been diligent at letting every little damning detail come out, all but convicting Ivins with the certainty of their investigation. But when you start to look at the facts, that certainty melts away. Could there have been a legitimate reason for Ivins to use that equipment? And could the equipment Ivins used actually do the job?

Another FBI leak indicated that each particle was given a weak electric charge, thereby causing the particles to repel each other at the molecular level. This made it easier for the spores to float in the air, and increased their retention in the lungs.

In short, the potential lethality of anthrax in this case far exceeds that of any powdered product found in the now extinct U.S. Biological Warfare Program. In meetings held on the cleanup of the anthrax spores in Washington, the product was described by an official at the Department of Homeland Security as "according to the Russian recipes" -- apparently referring to the use of the weak electric charge.

The latest line of speculation asserts that the anthrax's DNA, obtained from some of the victims, initially led investigators to the laboratory where Ivins worked. But the FBI stated a few years ago that a complete DNA analysis was not helpful in identifying what laboratory might have made the product.

So, it not Ivins, then whom? Spertzel lays this out as well:

Furthermore, the anthrax in this case, the "Ames strain," is one of the most common strains in the world. Early in the investigations, the FBI said it was similar to strains found in Haiti and Sri Lanka. The strain at the institute was isolated originally from an animal in west Texas and can be found from Texas to Montana following the old cattle trails. Samples of the strain were also supplied to at least eight laboratories including three foreign laboratories. Four French government laboratories reported on studies with the Ames strain, citing the Pasteur Institute in Paris as the source of the strain they used. Organism DNA is not a very reliable way to make a case against a scientist.

The FBI has not officially released information on why it focused on Ivins, and whether he was about to be charged or arrested. And when the FBI does release this information, we should all remember that the case needs to be firmly based on solid information that would conclusively prove that a lone scientist could make such a sophisticated product.

The lone "mad scientist" motif runs through the investigation. We still can't figure out how Ivins kept any sort of clearance. Was he allowed to keep his clearance so that they could continue to investigate him? Did they let him continue to have access so they could watch him and see if he tried to duplicate what the original Anthrax killer had done? If you knew there was someone unstable in an organization who could possibly carry out a copycat attack--and then give you the perfect patsy on whom you could hang the whole affair--would you risk waiting for years to see if your patsy tripped up?

Ivins may have been demented, troubled, and unstable enough to use a biological weapon against innocent people. But was he the man who carried out the Anthrax attacks in 2001?

From what we know so far, Bruce Ivins, although potentially a brilliant scientist, was not that man. The multiple disciplines and technologies required to make the anthrax in this case do not exist at Army's Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases. Inhalation studies are conducted at the institute, but they are done using liquid preparations, not powdered products.

The FBI spent between 12 and 18 months trying "to reverse engineer" (make a replica of) the anthrax in the letters sent to Messrs. Daschle and Leahy without success, according to FBI news releases. So why should federal investigators or the news media or the American public believe that a lone scientist would be able to do so?

I don't know about you, but the FBI's case is pretty much in doubt, and a possibly innocent man took the fall for one of the worst failures in the history of the US government.

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Ivins Held Onto His Clearance Long After It Should Have Been Taken Away

I have to admit it--I was skeptical that anyone in the media would pick up on the fact that Dr. Bruce Ivins should have had his clearance denied, suspended, or taken away from him years ago. Today, the Washington Post comes out with a powerful story that should force many into retirement, if not into having their own clearances suspended and their careers ended.

As an FBI investigation increasingly focused on him as a suspect in the 2001 anthrax attacks, Fort Detrick scientist Bruce E. Ivins enjoyed a security clearance that allowed him to work in the facility's most dangerous laboratories, to handle deadly biological agents, and to take part in broad discussions about the Pentagon's defenses against germ warfare.

On July 10, the day he was taken to a hospital for psychiatric evaluation, for example, Ivins spent part of the afternoon at a sensitive briefing on a new bubonic plague vaccine under development at the Army's elite biological weapons testing center, according to a former colleague who talked with him there.

Does it get any crazier than that? They knew this man was a serious threat for years--years--and they never cut off his access.


The only thing that seems to be a constant is the confusion, the incompetence, and the "cover your ass" mentality that persists throughout our government. It's not just the political appointees that are to blame. The bureaucrats and the career people failed to protect our country by tolerating and allowing Ivins to hold a clearance.

Colleagues question how Ivins could have maintained his security credentials if the FBI suspected him in the anthrax case. "Even back in the old days, there was a screening process for people who work in those laboratories," Adamovicz said.

Caree Vander Linden, a spokeswoman for USAMRIID, said government rules bar her from discussing the security clearance of a specific employee.

"There are time-honored procedures to examine security clearances on a regular basis, to verify information provided by the security-clearance holder, and traditional steps to ensure that only the appropriate level of security access is granted, largely based on the nature of the person's government job," she said in an e-mail. It would not have been "unusual" for a scientist of Ivins's standing to attend a briefing on the unclassified plague-vaccine research program, she added.

Ivins himself had questioned the effectiveness of the fort's security procedures in interviews with reporters as long as six years ago. At the time of the anthrax attacks, only senior managers at USAMRIID were routinely required to obtain top-secret-level security clearances. Most scientists of Ivins's rank would be required to undergo a background check and would be cleared to see classified documents on a need-to-know basis, according to a former senior official at the lab.

Therein lies the problem. Why was the briefing unclassified? Was it held in an unclassified lab? Meaning, could any citizen have walked into that briefing and attended? Not if it was in a sensitive laboratory on Fort Detrick, Maryland. Was this briefing determined to be "unclassified" after it was known Ivins had attended it? If so, who can answer for the fact that it took until July 10 to get Ivins some medical help?

Tom Daschle was right to question whether the FBI got its man. The real criminals are the ones who let Ivins have access to classified materials after he was known to be a threat. Depending on who you believe, someone has known for years that a man with access to materials that could kill untold numbers of Americans was a psychopath bent on revenge.

All I can say to the situation is this--cover your ass, people. If the Washington Post is smart enough to ask these questions, perhaps someone else will be asking them as well.

Security Clearances and Homicidal Maniacs

This is the most stunning thing of all about the case of Bruce Ivins. I cannot understand why this isn't the story itself--that it was known for years that this man was a demonstrable threat and that he still held a security clearance.

Here are the relevant facts:

The therapist for Bruce E. Ivins told a judge that as far back as 2000, the late microbiologist suspected in the 2001 anthrax attacks had attempted to poison people and that she was "scared to death" of him, according to an audiotape of the session that emerged Saturday.

Social worker Jean Duley testified at a hearing in Frederick on July 24 in a successful bid for a protective order from Ivins. The New York Times obtained a recording of the hearing and posted it on its Web site Saturday.

What the hell went on between the year 2000 and July 24, 2008?

Ivins was removed from his lab in Maryland by police on July 10 and temporarily hospitalized, according to court records, because it was feared that he was a danger to himself and others. But it was unclear whether he was still employed by the lab at the time of his death Tuesday.

That raises the question of whether Ivins still had his security clearance and, if so, how he kept it, given that his social worker said Ivins had been viewed as homicidal and sociopathic by his psychiatrist.

Absolutely, yes it does. THAT is the most relevant question of all--why did this man have a security clearance between 2000 and 2008 at all? Why was he allowed to work in a sensitive area?

The Army refused Saturday to say whether it had been reviewing the security clearance of the chief suspect in the anthrax attacks who had mental problems and killed himself as federal prosecutors were planning to indict him.

Ivins was removed from his lab in Maryland by police on July 10 and temporarily hospitalized, according to court records, because it was feared that he was a danger to himself and others. But it was unclear whether he was still employed by the lab at the time of his death Tuesday.

That raises the question of whether Ivins still had his security clearance and, if so, how he kept it, given that his social worker said Ivins had been viewed as homicidal and sociopathic by his psychiatrist.

There's no way--no way--this man should have continued to have any clearance or access whatsoever.

Everyone in that decision making chain needs to be sacked, en masse, immediately, and all of their work reviewed immediately. Between 2000 and 2008, Ivins would have had at least one periodic five-year review of his clearance, and whoever performed that review, investigation, and/or adjudication is now party to this debacle. Their shoddy work has endangered us all.

A serious, serious error was made in not denying this man access to classified materials and weapons. Once again, incompetent, bumbling boobs made the wrong decision to allow this man access. Once again, the real story is lost and the focus is not where it should be. The entire system is seriously broken, from top to bottom, and no one can conclude that our security clearance process is working the way that it should when people like Bruce Ivins can have access for years and years while it is absolutely clear that he should not have had access.

--WS

Top scientist kills himself as Feds close in...

Updating, and pushing this story down below the fold: we are following the suicide of the man that the Federal government was preparing charges against in connection to the 2001 Anthrax attacks. The case of what happened has long been shrouded in mystery and in deception. Here's an invaluable little piece of insight from Glenn Greenwald:

During the last week of October, 2001, ABC News, led by Brian Ross, continuously trumpeted the claim as their top news story that government tests conducted on the anthrax -- tests conducted at Ft. Detrick -- revealed that the anthrax sent to Daschele contained the chemical additive known as bentonite. ABC News, including Peter Jennings, repeatedly claimed that the presence of bentonite in the anthrax was compelling evidence that Iraq was responsible for the attacks, since -- as ABC variously claimed -- bentonite "is a trademark of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's biological weapons program" and "only one country, Iraq, has used bentonite to produce biological weapons."

ABC News' claim -- which they said came at first from "three well-placed but separate sources," followed by "four well-placed and separate sources" -- was completely false from the beginning. There never was any bentonite detected in the anthrax (a fact ABC News acknowledged for the first time in 2007 only as a result of my badgering them about this issue). It's critical to note that it isn't the case that preliminary tests really did detect bentonite and then subsequent tests found there was none. No tests ever found or even suggested the presence bentonite. The claim was just concocted from the start. It just never happened.

That means that ABC News' "four well-placed and separate sources" fed them information that was completely false -- false information that created a very significant link in the public mind between the anthrax attacks and Saddam Hussein. And look where -- according to Brian Ross' report on October 28, 2001 -- these tests were conducted:

And despite continued White House denials, four well-placed and separate sources have told ABC News that initial tests on the anthrax by the US Army at Fort Detrick, Maryland, have detected trace amounts of the chemical additives bentonite and silica.

Two days earlier, Ross went on ABC News' World News Tonight with Peter Jennings and, as the lead story, breathlessly reported:

The discovery of bentonite came in an urgent series of tests conducted at Fort Detrick, Maryland, and elsewhere.

Panic, confusion, and just plain old laziness and incompetence have dogged this story from the beginning. Someone was trying to spin this story and manipulate it to calm public fears. Has it now been solved? Or is this just the beginning of a new chapter?

Continuing our post, below:

Incredible...this story broke overnight and we're just now getting more details.

A top U.S. biodefense researcher apparently committed suicide just as the Justice Department was about to file criminal charges against him in the anthrax mailings that traumatized the nation in 2001, according to a published report.

Bruce E. Ivins, 62, who worked for the past 18 years at the government's biodefense labs at Fort Detrick, Maryland, had been told about the impending prosecution, the Los Angeles Times reported for Friday editions. The laboratory has been at the center of the FBI's investigation of the anthrax mailings, which killed five people in the weeks following the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

Ivins died Tuesday at Frederick Memorial Hospital in Maryland. The Times, quoting an unidentified colleague, said the scientist had taken a massive dose of a prescription Tylenol mixed with codeine.

We're going to get as much of this out as possible--this is a huge development that underscores how a failed investigation can put Americans at risk. We do not know exactly how the investigation moved from Steven Hatfill to Bruce Ivins, but the fact that it has taken nearly seven years to get to this point leaves many more questions than it does answers.

Federal investigators moved away from Hatfill -- for years the only publicly identified "person of interest" -- and ultimately concluded that Ivins was the culprit after FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III changed leadership of the investigation in late 2006.

The FBI's new top investigators -- Vincent B. Lisi and Edward W. Montooth -- instructed agents to reexamine leads or potential suspects that may have received insufficient attention. Moreover, significant progress was made in analyzing genetic properties of the anthrax powder recovered from letters addressed to two senators.

The renewed efforts led the FBI back to USAMRIID, where agents first questioned scientists in December 2001, a few weeks after the fatal mailings.

By spring of this year, FBI agents were still contacting Ivins' present and former colleagues. At USAMRIID and elsewhere, scientists acquainted with Ivins were asked to sign confidentiality agreements in order to prevent leaks of new investigative details.

Ivins, employed as a civilian at Ft. Detrick, earlier had attracted the attention of Army officials because of anthrax contaminations that Ivins failed to report for five months. In sworn oral and written statements to an Army investigator, Ivins said that he had erred by keeping the episodes secret -- from December 2001 to late April 2002. He said he had swabbed and bleached more than 20 areas that he suspected were contaminated by a sloppy lab technician.

"In retrospect, although my concern for biosafety was honest and my desire to refrain from crying 'Wolf!' . . . was sincere, I should have notified my supervisor ahead of time of my worries about a possible breach in biocontainment," Ivins told the Army. "I thought that quietly and diligently cleaning the dirty desk area would both eliminate any possible [anthrax] contamination as well as prevent unintended anxiety at the institute."

The Army chose not to discipline Ivins regarding his failure to report the contamination. Officials said that penalizing Ivins might discourage other employees from voluntarily reporting accidental spills of "hot" agents.

But Ivins' recollections should have raised serious questions about his veracity and his intentions, according to some of those familiar with the investigation.

More updates when we get them.
--WS