Dyncorp CEO Blasts Blackwater

The CEO of Dyncorp, Herb Lanese, no doubt sensing that now is the time to reach out to the small community of businesses and government agencies that need personal security contractors, fires off a series of damning charges against Blackwater:

Before I turn the call over talk the question-and-answer session though, I want to spend a moment discussing two items that have been in the news lately, because they affect DynCorp. One is Blackwater, and the second is the report of Special Investigate -- I always mess up this wording, excuse me, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, SIGIR.

First, talking about Blackwater, it's very important for our shareholders to understand that we compete with Blackwater in a very narrow field that currently represents 2% of our revenue -- I want to repeat that -- 2% of our revenue. So when you compare us to Blackwater, 2% of our revenue is on the same basis as Blackwater.

Unfortunately, it's very visible work that tends to attract a disproportionate amount of attention that I believe unfairly distorts the image of DynCorp. I don't need to tell you what kind of work we do or how long we've been at it, because I realize all of you understand and know that. But I do want you to know that in this narrow space in which we compete with Blackwater, we believe we are a very different company.

For example, we are highly selective in our hiring practices. We operate very, disciplined security teams. We enforce a strict, no-alcohol policy, strict no-alcohol -- not eight hours prior to going up on a work assignment, but no alcohol period.

And we've developed our own rules for the use of force that are more detailed than those issued by the U.S. government. In fact, our rules for the use of force are based on the most conservative elements of the three sets of rules in effect in Iraq.

And let me just take a moment to explain a couple of these points that are off from my prepared remarks. On the selection process, roughly 50% to 65% of the people that we interview in this protection area are declined for employees either because of background checks, physical exams or lack of experience. An additional 15% are rejected because they don't pass our psychological tests.

We're not in the game of firing people after we hire them. We're in the game of being selective in hiring the right people upfront. That is a really important distinction.

When you look for the rules for the use of force or rules of engagement in Iraq, there really are three sets of rules. And I think in recent Blackwater testimony, when asked, the person who was testifying said, "Well, we follow the rules of force -- rules for the use of force in Iraq." Well, there's three of them. Which one do you follow? All three are not the same.

I don't think any of this is about what's going on right now--it's about 2009 and it's about future contracts. Lanese is clearly agitating against the idea that anyone would renew their contracts with Blackwater. What better way to do that than to suggest that Blackwater hires unfit people? Why didn't he just come out and say it--we don't hire the guys who are going to shoot someone's Iraqi gramma in the gut for looking at them crosseyed.

How many private conversations between CEOs like Lanese and decisionmakers are being held right now, concerning Blackwater? There must be a lot of things being said like you're not really going to renew their contract, are you?

Anyway, it's good business. If Dyncorp was in trouble, a free market capitalist like Erik Prince would be out there, throwing more chum in the water, trying to get an angle on the next contract bidding process. This is usually when your tax-cut happy, let the markets decide, privatize everything-type Republican throws a temper tantrum and demands some form of government intervention or protection from having their overpaid gig taken away.

Erik Prince will, no doubt, walk away from the mess called Blackwater a very rich man. But a few thousand guys are going to see their paychecks stopped one day and they won't know why. Well, they should have been paying attention to what Herb Lanese said.

Guiliani Lies About Who Cut the Size of the Military

This is why I don't blog. I have read three stories tonight. And all three of them have made me so mad, I want to throw something.

Republican frontrunner Rudy Guiliani is a serial liar. Do we need to say more?

Giuliani faults the other Clinton
By JONATHAN ROOS [Des Moines] REGISTER STAFF WRITER
November 9, 2007

Ames, Ia. -Republican Rudy Giuliani, campaigning in Iowa the same day that Bill Clinton was in the Hawkeye State, charged Thursday that the former president had weakened the American military and intelligence services through spending cuts during his administration.

"Our military is too small to deal with the Islamic terrorism threats, but it really is too small to deter would-be aggressors to even think of challenging us. And that's due to Bill Clinton," Giuliani told students and others in the audience of about 350 at Iowa State University's Memorial Union.

"Bill Clinton cut our military and our intelligence budget by such a huge amount that we've never made up the difference," said the former New York mayor, a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination.Giuliani said in response to a question about relations with China that the United States needs a bigger military, including at least 10 more combat brigades and a 300-ship Navy.
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I know, I know. My sides are hurting from the extreme discomfort of hearing those outrageous lies. There are people eating that stuff up. There are people who are, no doubt, in complete agreement with Guiliani.

Well, let's debunk this bullshit.

The following is the record of Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, prior to the Clinton Administration, and all of these items come from defenselink.mil:

...Early in 1991 the secretary unveiled a plan to reduce military strength by the mid-1990s to 1.6 million, compared to 2.2 million when he entered office. In his budget proposal for FY 1993, his last one, Cheney asked for termination of the B-2 program at 20 aircraft, cancellation of the Midgetman, and limitations on advanced cruise missile purchases to those already authorized. When introducing this budget, Cheney complained that Congress had directed Defense to buy weapons it did not want, including the V-22, M-1 tanks, and F-14 and F-16 aircraft, and required it to maintain some unneeded reserve forces. His plan outlined about $50 billion less in budget authority over the next 5 years than the Bush administration had proposed in 1991. Sen. Sam Nunn of the Senate Armed Services Committee said that the 5-year cuts ought to be $85 billion, and Rep. Les Aspin of the House Armed Services Committee put the figure at $91 billion.

Over Cheney's four years as secretary of defense, encompassing budgets for fiscal years 1990-93, DoD's total obligational authority in current dollars declined from $291.3 billion to $269.9 billion. Except for FY 1991, when the TOA budget increased by 1.7 percent, the Cheney budgets showed negative real growth: -2.9 percent in 1990, -9.8 percent in 1992, and -8.1 percent in 1993. During this same period total military personnel declined by 19.4 percent, from 2.202 million in FY 1989 to 1.776 million in FY 1993. The Army took the largest cut, from 770,000 to 572,000-25.8 percent of its strength. The Air Force declined by 22.3 percent, the Navy by 14 percent, and the Marines by 9.7 percent.

And everyone agreed--the end of the Cold War brought a "peace dividend." Remember those days? You can trace a straight line from the decisions made during the first Bush administration to the size and capability of our military today. Who started the ball rolling, as far as "reducing" the size of our military?

Here's what defenselink.mil has to say about the three SecDefs under Clinton, one of whom (Cohen) was a Republican. Let's start with Les Aspin--who was a disasterous choice:

Development of the Defense budget for FY 1994, beginning on 1 October 1993, remained Aspin's biggest task. The budget process proved more complicated than usual, owing to Clinton's campaign pledge to reduce DoD funding and to a "bottom-up review" of the military structure ordered by Aspin shortly after he took office. The end of the Cold War and the consequent opportunity to cut military costs clearly called for the kind of reevaluation of ends and means that the bottom-up review might contribute. A Pentagon steering group chaired by Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) John M. Deutch and including representatives from various OSD offices, the Joint Staff, and the services conducted the review.

Because of the growing threat of regional conflicts, Aspin wanted to have a strong capability to carry out limited military operations, including peacekeeping, and to maintain "a strong peacetime presence of U.S. forces around the world." The bottom-up review report, which Aspin released in September 1993, took into account strategy formulation, force structure, weapon systems modernization, and Defense infrastructure. The report projected a reduced force structure still capable of fighting and winning two simultaneous major regional conflicts. Forces would include 10 active Army divisions; 11 carrier battle groups, 45 to 55 attack submarines, and about 345 ships; 5 active Marine brigades; and 13 active and 7 reserve Air Force fighter wings. The report also called for additional prepositioned equipment and airlift/sealift capacity, improved anti-armor and precision-guided munitions, and enhanced Army National Guard combat brigade readiness.

William Perry:

As always with secretaries of defense, the formulation of the Defense budget and shepherding it through Congress was one of Perry's most important duties. The problem of how to deal with a large projected Defense budget shortfall for the period 1995-2000, an issue that weakened Aspin and contributed to his resignation, per-sisted when Perry took office. Immediately on presenting his 1995 budget request, which he termed "a post-Cold War budget," Perry stated that Defense required a few more years of downsizing and that its infrastructure needed streamlining as well. The proposal, he said, maintained a ready-to-fight force, redirected a modernization program (including a strong research and development program), initiated a program to do business differently (acquisition reform), and reinvested defense dollars in the economy.

Perry asked for $252.2 billion for FY 1995, including funds for numerous weapon systems, such as a new aircraft carrier, three Aegis cruisers, and six C-17 cargo aircraft. The budget projected a further cut of 85,500 in active duty military personnel, leaving a force of 1.52 million. Ultimately Congress provided $253.9 billion TOA, about $2 billion more than in FY 1994, but actually a 1.2 percent cut in real growth.

And Cohen:

When he presented the FY 1998 budget, Cohen noted that he would involve himself with the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which would focus on the challenges to U.S. security and the nation's military needs over the next decade or more. When the QDR became public in May 1997, it did not fundamentally alter the budget, structure, and doctrine of the military. Some defense experts thought it gave insufficient attention to new forms of warfare, such as terrorist attacks, electronic sabotage, and the use of chemical and biological agents. In commenting on the QDR, Cohen stated that the Pentagon would retain the two regional wars scenario adopted after the end of the Cold War. He decided to scale back purchases of jet fighters, including the Air Force's F-22 and the Navy's F/A-18E/F, as well as Navy surface ships. The review included cutting another 61,700 active duty service members--15,000 in the Army, 26,900 in the Air Force, 18,000 in the Navy, and 1,800 in the Marine Corps, as well as 54,000 reserve forces, mainly in the Army National Guard, and some 80,000 civilians department-wide. Cohen also decided to recommend two more rounds of base closings in 1999 and 2001. The Pentagon hoped to save $15 billion annually over the next few years to make possible the purchase of new equipment and weapon systems without a substantial budget increase above the current level of $250 billion.

Those criticisms of Cohen look about right--we should have been more focused on terrorism in the 1990s. But who took over in 2001 and basically ignored the warnings of people like Richard Clarke? Who didn't do anything to respond to the bombing of the USS Cole when we found out who was responsible for that bombing in 2001?

Today, we still have ten active Army divisions. We reduced our Army to ten on a gradual basis--starting with the direction set by the first Bush administration after the fall of the Berlin Wall. We had ten when Clinton left office. We had ten when we went to war in Iraq in 2003. So for Guiliani to say that our military is too small because of something Clinton did all by himself is ludicrous. Bear in mind--after the 1994 mid-term elections, each and every Defense bill had to pass a Republican-controlled House of Representatives. You know--the people who were thrown out of office for incompetence in 2006? The Duke Cunningham crowd? And there's no mistaking what the agreed-upon direction was--the downsizing of our military in the wake of the end of the Cold War.

We saw reductions in the size of our military because of the direction this country took after the Cold War. Secretary of Defense Cheney cut more people from our military, by my count, than Aspin, Perry and Cohen combined. They all cut people because that was the strategic vision as agreed upon by Republicans and Democrats throughout the 1990s. Sometimes it makes my head want to explode--nothing happens without compromise and nothing gets done without both parties finding common ground. But why does Guiliani get away with criticizing what Clinton supposedly did when each and every defense appropriation bill was gone over with a fine-toothed comb by every Republican in the House and Senate, who were all desperate to find some way to embarrass or criticizen Clinton?

Today's military is the size that it is because of a trend in American policymaking that structured our military based on the post-Cold War realities, and not so much on what would happen if someone's crazy kid started wars all over the place and had about as much success as a drunken frat boy trying to get laid in a convent.

Will our media reveal Guiliani to be the serial liar and exaggerator that he is?

I kinda doubt it.

Lots of stuff you wanted to know about Blackwater, but couldn't bring yourself to ask...

The fallout continues from the deadly rampage by Blackwater mercenaries against Iraqi civilians on September 16 that left at least 11 Iraqis dead. Blackwater insists that their employees fired in response to coming under attack. The Iraqis claim the Blackwater personnel were unprovoked when they opened fire on civilians at a busy traffic circle while escorting a State Department convoy through Baghdad.

The September 16 incident set off a firestorm and at one point the government of Iraq said all Blackwater personnel had to leave the country and the company had to cease operating inside Iraq. This edict did not stand and Blackwater is once again roaming the streets, terrifying the populace with their mere presence and undermining whatever the hell it is the mission is supposed to be, and sowing seeds of hostility with the populace that prompt attacks against all Americans, thereby putting American G.I.’s at heightened risk.

The DoD on Wednesday announced that the Pentagon has sent a team of investigators to Iraq to probe security contractors and their operations in Iraq. In addition, a memo was sent to the commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan reminding them that they have the prerogative to court martial mercenaries working under contract with the U.S. military if/when those mercenaries violate the Rules of Engagement that govern the U.S. military. Gates wanted to make sure that the mercenaries and commanders all understood that the military can prosecute their contractors. Gates, testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee, on Wednesday said he also wanted to know whether the military has the resources to investigate private security personnel under contract with the DoD for alleged crimes. "My concern is whether there has been sufficient accountability and oversight," Gates said.

In the memo, Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England told military commanders that they're responsible for monitoring contractors under their control and charging those who violate rules of engagement.

"Commanders have UCMJ (Uniformed Code of Military Justice) authority to disarm, apprehend, and detain DoD contractors suspected of having committed a felony offense in violation of the RUF (Rules on the Use of Force)," Gordon wrote. The memo was dated Tuesday.

England said commanders should review contractors' standard operating procedures and make any necessary changes to the way they authorize force to "minimize the risk of innocent civilian causalities or unnecessary destruction of civilian property."

The State Department hasn't distributed a similar memo, and it is unclear what, if any, U.S. law applies to the actions of its contractors.

So far, no Defense Department contractor has been charged under U.S. law, and no security contracts have been suspended for violations, Morrell said.

Yeah. It really is as thoroughly and completely fucked up as it sounds.

Four and a half years into Iraq, and six years into Afghanistan, they have decided it’s time to determine what, exactly, to do with mercenaries who attack and murder civilians without provocation, or otherwise commit actions that undermine the efforts of the United States to salvage something – anything – from this clusterfuck so we can claim some sort of semblance of a shadow of a specter of a pale imitation of victory™ and get the hell out of there.

The Iraqi Interior Ministry has sent the investigation of the incident to a magistrate and is looking at possible criminal charges, although they may be hamstrung by the ghost of Paul Bremer and the CPA, in the form of Order 17, which essentially gave mercenaries immunity to run amok, unencumbered by the rule of law. Under Order 17, mercenaries can kill at will, with little or no fear of legal, or even civil, repercussions.

This week, Iraqi lawmakers began considering a proposal that would withdraw the provisions of Order 17 from Iraqi law and make security contractors/mercenaries accountable under the Iraqi system of justice. Iraqis have complained bitterly for years that the mercenary army is unnecessarily aggressive and damages property with impunity and mistreats and kills Iraqis with reckless abandon.

Point of Clarification: The mercenaries involved in the September 16 violence were under contract to the State Department, and that incident is under joint Iraqi – State Department investigation. DoD has no authority to investigate or try the Blackwater mercenaries involved. Gates, being competent, and not beholden to nor under the sway of Cheney or Bush, is looking for problems before someone else finds them and uses them against him. (I don't like the man, but I can not help but respect the talent). At State, on the other hand, the inept and outpaced Condi is still carrying her bosses water, overtly and contemptuously stonewalling congressional oversight into the incident. While the DoD does have contracts with Blackwater, the State Department outspends the DoD on Blackwater contracts at a rate of approximately 8:1.

The private-army aspect of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has been controversial since the first days in Afghanistan, and there has been no shortage of animosity between the professional military and the mercenary army. To date, no personnel under DoD contract have been charged under U.S. law, and no contracts have been suspended for violations. The military has been taken to task though. Two Air Force officers were brought up on charges of assault and conduct unbecoming following a run-in between the officers and Blackwater personnel on a road outside Kabul in September 2006. The charges were later dismissed.

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The bloodletting two weeks ago has set up a clash between the Pentagon and the State Department. The tensions have been long-simmering, and the events of September 16 turned up the heat. "The military is very sensitive to its relationship that they've built with the Iraqis being altered or even severely degraded by actions such as this event," said one senior military official in Iraq. "This is a nightmare. We had guys who saw the aftermath, and it was very bad. This is going to hurt us badly. It may be worse than Abu Ghraib, and it comes at a time when we're trying to have an impact for the long term."

In interviews involving a dozen U.S. military and government officials, many expressed anger and concern over the shootings in Nisoor Square, in Baghdad's Mansour neighborhood. Some worried it could undermine the military's efforts to stabilize Iraq this year with an offensive involving thousands of reinforcements.

"This is a big mess that I don't think anyone has their hands around yet," said another U.S. military official. "It's not necessarily a bad thing these guys are being held accountable. Iraqis hate them, the troops don't particularly care for them, and they tend to have a know-it-all attitude, which means they rarely listen to anyone -- even the folks that patrol the ground on a daily basis."

Most officials spoke on condition of anonymity because there are at least three ongoing investigations of Blackwater's role in the shootings. There are also sensitive discussions between various U.S. agencies and the Iraqi government over the future of Blackwater and other private security firms in Iraq.

Teddy Spain, a retired Army Colonel was willing to speak on the record. “I personally was concerned about any of the civilians running around on the battlefield during my time there. My main concern was their lack of accountability when things went wrong.”

Several commanding officers spoke frankly on condition of anonymity.

…"Given their record of recklessness," said the senior U.S. commander, "I'm not sure any senior military officer here would want responsibility for them."

…"They are immature shooters and have very quick trigger fingers. Their tendency is shoot first and ask questions later," said an Army lieutenant colonel serving in Iraq. Referring to the Sept. 16 shootings, the officer added, "None of us believe they were engaged, but we are all carrying their black eyes."

…"Many of my peers think Blackwater is oftentimes out of control," said a senior U.S. commander serving in Iraq. "They often act like cowboys over here . . . not seeming to play by the same rules everyone else tries to play by."

…"Many of us feel that when Blackwater and other groups conduct military missions, they should be subject to the same controls under which the Army operates," said Marc Lindemann, who served in Iraq with the 4th Infantry Division and is now an officer in the New York National Guard and a state prosecutor.

…"The deaths of contractors from Blackwater helped precipitate the debacle in Fallujah in 2004 and now the loss of Blackwater is causing disruptions in the war effort in 2007," a military intelligence officer said, speaking on condition of anonymity. "Why are we creating new vulnerabilities by relying on what are essentially mercenary forces?"

The lousy reputation Blackwater has among members of the U.S. military has led to renewed debate over whether the DoD should handle State’s security contracts. The Department of Defense (understanding what security protocols should involve) has a more strident procedure for licensing and oversight of personnel under contract to their agency, the DoD also has more detailed incident reporting procedures when weapons are discharged. In addition, the military investigates promptly when incidents occur or allegations are made against mercenaries in their employ.

A Pentagon source insisted that "We are really making State respond, conduct an investigation and come up with recommendations." The source said that in Washington the atmosphere surrounding the confrontation between State and the pentagon is calm and professional but, referring to Iraq, said, "There is probably a bit more emotion going on in theater."

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As if Blackwater needed another revelation (they are also under investigation for smuggling weapons into Iraq that ultimately ended up pointed at American G.I.’s) the New York Times reported Thursday that mercenaries from Blackwater USA have been involved in a far higher rate of shootings while guarding and escorting American diplomats than other companies providing comparable services.

The rate of Blackwater violence is at least twice that of DynCorp International and Triple Canopy, the other security companies operating in Iraq. Blackwater’s hired guns are just that, discharging weapons, on average, twice every convoy. (The other companies frequently escort convoys completely without incident.)

“You can find any number of people, particularly in uniform, who will tell you that they do see Blackwater as a company that promotes a much more aggressive response to things than other main contractors do,” a senior American official said. “Is it the operating environment or something specific about Blackwater?” asked one government official. “My best guess is that it is both.”

While the bloody rampage at the Nisour traffic roundabout was the most shocking in the level of wanton killing, the modern-day Pinkerton's of Blackwater are under investigation in six other episodes that left ten people dead and at least 15 wounded.

Slowly, American officials are accepting the position that Blackwater's behavior in Iraq is counterproductive to the stated 'mission' by fueling resentment among the local population.

“They’re repeat offenders, and yet they continue to prosper in Iraq,” said Representative Jan Schakowsky, an Illinois Democrat who has been broadly critical of the role of contractors in Iraq. “It’s really affecting attitudes toward the United States when you have these cowboy guys out there. These guys represent the U.S. to them and there are no rules of the game for them.”

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Secretary of Defense Gates was in front of Congress asking for $190 Billion for the war effort for FY 2008. Congress is hammering out the budget now.

While the American public may not yet be ready to cut off funding to the U.S. military for the occupation of Iraq, I seriously doubt that there would be great wailing and bleating and rending of cloth and gnashing of teeth if, just for starters, the monies in the budget allotted to Blackwater fell victim to Congresses one true power.

Pointing Up a Vital Distinction

In the fallout from the Walter Reed scandal, I am afraid that a vital distinction is being lost.

Walter Reed is not a VA hospital.

Walter Reed is an active duty military hospital.

Veterans Administration hospitals are operated under the auspices of the Department of Veterans Affairs.

Walter Reed, like Brooke and Tripler Army Medical Centers, and the Naval medical facilities at Bethesda and San Diego, and Wilford Hall Medical Center at Lackland AFB, and all other military medical centers treating the active duty and war wounded, operates under the auspices of the Department of Defense.

The VA health system, under the leadership of Undersecretary Dr. Michael Kussman, was a government system done right before they were overrun by a flood of Iraq and Afghanistan war wounded. The VA computer system is the envy of all civilian healthcare employees who struggle mightily with archaic HIS systems. I know from HIS platforms - I've been a Cerner Pathnet and Meditech "Super User" in every facility I have ever been employed by that used those data management systems. The VA system rocks.

It is an apostacy that the VA faces funding cuts at a time that the active duty services are rushing to dump their wounded off onto the VA system.

The VA is the largest provider of mental health services to the returning veterans of America’s current military actions. Over a million troops have rotated through Afghanistan and Iraq, with a quarter million of them at minimum needing counseling services because they face readjustment issues. Yet they are facing staff cuts and closing of the Vet Centers that provide these crucial services. As a result, troops are not getting the care they need - the care they deserve - sometimes to tragic ends.

It is high-time the VA be fully funded and the Vet Centers fully staffed.

A country that can not or will not adequately accommodate the needs of those it sends to war needs to stop sending its sons and daughters off to war.

Editorializing aside, it is vital to remember that VA Medical Centers and Military Medical Centers are two separate and discreet entities, answering to different cabinet secretaries.

The Military Medical Centers answer ultimately to Defense Secretary Robert Gates.

The VA Medical Centers answer ultimately to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs Jim Nicholson.

Remember the distinction and do not let the media or the politicians conflate the two.

Doing so is a disservice to those who serve and that is not conducive to accountability.

[Cross-posted from Watching Those We Chose]